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Statutes 
Utah Code Annotated, as amended: 
Section 15-1-4 9,18,19,20,42 
Interest on judgments. 
Any judgment rendered on a lawful 
contract shall conform thereto and shall bear 
the interest agreed upon by the parties; which 
shall be specified in the judgment; other 
judgments shall bear interest at the rate of 
12% per annum. 
Section 15-4-3 29 
Payments by Obligor. 
The amount of value of any consideration 
received by the obligee from one or more of 
several obligors, or from one or more of joint 
or of joint and several obligors, in whole or 
in partial satisfaction of their obligations 
shall be credited to the extent of the amount 
received on the obligation of all co-obligors 
to whom the obligor or obligors giving the 
consideration did not stand in the relation of 
a surety. 
Section 15-4-4 17,26 
Release of co-obligor - Reservation of Rights. 
Subject to the provisions of §15-4-3, the 
obligee's release or discharge of one or more 
of several obligors, or of one or more of 
joint or of joint and several obligors, shall 
not discharge co-obligors against whom the 
obligee in writing and as part of the same 
transaction as the release or discharge 
expressly reserves his rights; and in the 
absence of such a reservation of rights shall 
discharge co-obligors only to the extent 
provided in §15-4-5. 
Section 15-4-5 17,26 
Release of co-obligor - Effect of knowledge of 
obligee. 
If an obligee releasing or discharging an 
obligor without express reservation of rights 
against a co-obligor then knows or has reason 
to know that the obligor released or 
discharged did not pay as much of the claim as 
i n 
h*3 was oound by m a contract cr relation with 
that co-obligor to pay, the obligee's claim 
against that co-obligor shall be satisfied to 
the amount which the obligee knew or nad 
reason to know that the released or discharged 
obligor was bound to such co-obligor to pay. 
If an obligee so releasing or discharging 
an obligor has not then such knowledge or 
reason to know, the obligee's claim against 
the co-obligor shall be satisfied to the 
extent of the lesser of two amounts, namely: 
(a) the amount of the fractional share of the 
obligor released or discharged, or (b) the 
amount that such obligor was bound by his 
contract or relation with the co-obligor to 
pay. 
Section 38-9-1 
Liability of person filing wrongful lien. 
A person who claims an interest in, or a 
lien or encumbrance against, real property, 
who causes or has caused a document asserting 
that claim to be recorded or filed in the 
office of the county recorder, who knows or 
has reason to know that the document is 
forged, groundless, or contains a material 
misstatement or false claim, is liable to the 
owner or title-holder for $1,000 or for treble 
actual damages, whichever is greater, and for 
reasonable attorney fees, and costs as 
provided in this chapter, if he willfully 
refuses to release or correct such document of 
rcord within 20 days from the date of written 
request from the owner or beneficial title-
holder of the real property. This chapter is 
not intended to be applicable to mechanics' or 
materialmen's 1 lens. 
Section 48-1-12(2) 
Nature of partner's liability. 
All partners are liable: 
(1) Jointly and severally for everything 
chargeable to the partnership under Sections 
48-1-10 and 48-1-11. 
(2) Jointly for all other debts and 
obligations of the partnership; but any 
partner may enter into a separate obligation 
to perform a partnership contract. 
IV 
"action 43-1-30 
General effect of dissolution on authority of 
partner . 
Except so far as may be necessary to wind 
up partnership affairs or to complete 
transactions begun but not then finished, 
dissolution terminates all authority of any 
partner to act for the partnership. 
(1) With rspect to the partners: 
(a) when the dissolution is not by 
the act , bankruptcy or death of a 
partner; or 
(b) when the dissolution is by such 
act, bankruptcy or death of a 
partner in cases where Section 48-1-
31 so requires. 
(2) With respect to persons not partners 
as declared in Section 48-1-32. 
Section 57-1-3 
Grant of fee simple presumed. 
A fee simple title is presumed to be 
intended to pass by a conveyance of real 
estate, unless it appears from the conveyance 
that a lesser estate was intended. 
Section 78-12-22 
Within eight years. 
Within eight years an action upon a 
judgment or decree of any court of the United 
States or of any state or territory within the 
United States, an action to enforce any 
liability due or to become due, for failure to 
provide support or maintenance for dependent 
children. 
Section 78-12-25 
Within four years. 
Within four years, (1) an action upon a 
contract, obligation or liability not founded 
upon an instrument in writing; also on an open 
account for goods, wares and merchandise, and 
for any article charged in a store account; 
also on an open account for work, labor or 
services rendered, or materials furnished; 
provided, that action in all of the foregoing 
cases may be commenced at any time within four 
years after the last charge is made or the 
last payment is received. (2) An action for 
relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
v 
Section 73-12-26 
Within three years* 
Within three years: 
(1) An action for waste, or trespass 
upon or injury to real property; except that 
when waste or trespass is committed by means 
of underground works upon any mining claim, 
the cause of action does not accue until 
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts 
constituting such waste or trespass. 
(2) An action for taking, detaining, or 
injuring personal property, including actions 
for specific recovery thereof; except that in 
all cases where the subject of the action is 
a domestic animal usually included in the term 
"livestock ," which at the time of its loss has 
a recorded mark or brand, if the animal 
strayed or was stolen from the true owner 
without the owner's fault, the cause does not 
accrue until the owner has actual knowledge of 
such facts as would put a reasonable man upon 
inquiry as to the possession of the animal by 
the defendant. 
(3) An action for relief on the ground 
of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of 
action in such case does not accrue until the 
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts 
constituting the fraud or mistake. 
(4) An action for a liability created by 
the statutes of this state, other than for a 
penalty or forteiture under the laws of this 
state, except where in special cases a 
different limitation is prescribed by the 
statutes of this state. 
(5) An action to enforce liability 
imposed by §78-17-3, except that the cause of 
action does not accrue until the aggrieved 
party knows or reasonably should know of the 
harm suffered. 
Section 78-27-56 
Attorney's fees - Award where action or 
defense in bad faith. 
In civil actions, where not otherwise 
provided by statute or agreement , the court 
may award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that 
the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in 
good faith. 
vi 
Section 73-32-3 38,40 
In immediate presence of court; summary action 
- Without immediate presence; procedure. 
When a contempt is committed in the 
immediate view and presence of the court, or 
judge at chambers, it may be punished 
summarily, for which an order must be made, 
reciting the facts as occurring in such 
immediate view of contempt, and that he be 
punished as prescribed in §78-32-10 hereof. 
When the contempt is not committed in the 
immediate view and presence of the court or 
judge at chambers, an affidavit shall be 
presented to the court or judge of the facts 
constituting the contempt, or a statement of 
the facts by the referees or arbitrators or 
other judicial officers. 
Section 78-32-10 38,40,41 
Judgment. 
Upon the answer and evidence taken the 
court or judge must determine whether the 
person proceeded against is guilty of the 
contempt charged, and if it is adjudged that 
he is guilty of the contempt, a fine may be 
imposed upon him not exceeding $200, or he may 
be imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding 
thirty days, or he may be both fined and 
imprisoned; provided, however, that a justice 
of the peace may punish for contempt by a fine 
not to exceed $100 or by imprisonment for one 
day, or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
Section 78-32-11 40 
Damages to party aggrieved. 
If an actual loss or injury to a party in 
an action or special proceeding prejudicial to 
his rights therein, is caused by the contempt, 
the court in addition to the fine or 
imprisonment imposed for the contempt or in 
place thereof, may order the person proceeded 
against to pay the party aggrieved a sum of 
money sufficient to indemnify him and to 
satisfy his costs and expenses; which order 
and the acceptance of money under it is a bar 
to an action by the aggrieved party for such 
loss and injury. 
vii 
Rules 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Rule 4(b) 16 
Process. Time of issuance and service. 
If an action is commenced by the filing 
of a complaint, summons must issue thereon 
within three months from the date of such 
filing. The summons must be served within one 
year after the filing of the complaint or the 
action will be deemed dismissed, provided that 
in any action brought against two or more 
defendants in which personal service has been 
obtained upon one of them within the year, the 
other or others may be served or appear at any 
time before trial. 
Rule 11 ?1,37,38,39,40 
Signing of pleadings, motions, and other 
papers , sanctions. 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper 
of a party represented by an attorney shall be 
signed by at least one attorney of record in 
his individual name who is duly licensed to 
practice in the state of Utah. The attorney's 
address also shall be stated. A party who is 
not represented by an attorney shall sign his 
pleading, motion, or other paper and state his 
address. Except when otherwise specifically 
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need 
not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. 
The rule in equity that the averments of an 
answer under oath must be overcome by the 
testimony of two witnesses or of one witness 
sustained by corroborating circumstances is 
abolished. The signature of an attorney or 
party constitutes a certificate by him that he 
has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; 
that to the best of his knowledge, information 
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it 
is well grounded in fact and is warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law, and that it is not interposed 
for any improper purpose, such as to harass or 
to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation. If a 
pleading, motion, or other paper is not 
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is 
signed promptly after the omission is called 
to the attention of the pleader or movant. If 
Vlll 
a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed 
in violation of this rule, the court, upon 
motion or upon its own initiative, shall 
impose upon the person who signed it, a 
represented party, or party or parties the 
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred 
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, 
or other paper, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
Rule 14 30 
Third-Party Practice. 
(a) When defendant may bring in third 
party. 
At any time after commencement of the 
action a defendant, as a third-party 
plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint 
to be served upon a person not a party to the 
action who is or may be liable to him for all 
or part of the plaintiff's claim against him. 
The third-party plaintiff need not obtain 
leave to make the service if he files the 
third-party complaint not later than ten days 
after he serves his original answer. 
Otherwise he must obtain leave on motion upon 
notice to all parties to the action. The 
person served with the summons and third-party 
complaint, hereinafter called the third-party 
defendant, shall make his defenses to the 
third-party plaintiff's claim as provided in 
Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the 
third-party plaintiff and cross-claims against 
other third-party defendants as provided in 
Rule 13. The third-party defendant may assert 
against the plaintiff any defenses which the 
third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's 
claim. The third-party defendant may also 
assert any claim against the plaintiff arising 
out of the transaction or occurrence that is 
the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim 
against the third-party plaintiff. The 
plaintiff may assert any claim against the 
third-party defendant arising out of 
transaction or occurrence that is the subject 
matter of the plaintif's claim against the 
third-party plaintiff, and the third-party 
defendant thereupon shall assert his defenses 
as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims 
and cross-claims as provided in Rule 13. A 
third-party defendant may proceed under this 
IX 
Rule against any person not a party to the 
action who is or may be liable to him for all 
or part of the claim made in the action 
against the third-party defendant. 
(b) When plaintiff may bring in third party. 
When a counterclaim is asserted against 
a plaintiff, he may cause a third party to be 
brought in under circumstances which under 
this rule would entitled a defendant to do so. 
Rule 69(c) 
Execution and proceedings supplemental 
thereto. When writ to be returned. 
The writ of execution shall be made 
returnable at any time within two months after 
its receipt by the officer. It shall be 
returned to the court from which it issued, 
and when it is returned the clerk must attach 
it to the record. 
Rule 69(e)(4) 
(4) Purchaser refusing to pay. 
Every bid shall be deemed an irrevocable 
offer; and if the purchaser refuses to pay the 
amount bid by him for the property struck off 
to him at a sale under execution, the officer 
may again sell the property at any time to the 
highest bidder, and if any loss is occasioned 
thereby, the party refusing to pay, in 
addition to being liable on such bid, is 
guilty of a contempt of court and may be 
punished accordingly. When a purchaser 
refuses to pay, the officer may also, in his 
discretion, thereafter reject any other bid of 
such person. 
Rule 69(g)2 
(2) Where purchaser fails to obtain 
possession of property or is dispossessed 
thereof or evicted therefrom. 
Where, because of irregularities in the 
proceedings concerning the sale, or because 
the property sold was not subject to execution 
and sale, or because of the reversal or 
discharge of the judgment, a purchaser of 
property sold on execution, or his successor 
in interest, fails to obtain the property or 
x 
is dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom, 
the court having jurisdiction thereof shall, 
on motion of such party and after such notice 
to the judgment creditor as the court may 
prescribe, enter judgment against such 
judgment creditor for the price paid by the 
purchaser, together with interest. In the 
alternative, if such purchaser or his 
successor in interest, fails to recover 
possession of any property or is dispossessed 
thereof or evicted therefrom in consequence or 
irregularity in the proceedings concerning the 
sale, or because the property sold was not 
subject to execution and sale, the court 
having jurisdiction thereof shall, on motion 
of such party and after such notice to the 
judgment debtor as the court may prescribe, 
revive the original judgment in the name of 
the petitioner for the amount paid by such 
purchaser at the sale, with interest thereon 
from the time of payment at the same rate that 
the original judgment bore; and the judgment 
so revived shall have the same force and 
effect as would an original judgment of the 
date of the revival. 
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XIV 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. 
ONE GENERAL PARTNER AND THE PARTNERSHIP 
WERE NOT SERVED, SO THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE 
RENEWED THE JUDGMENT. 
May a joint judgment against the limited partnerhip and three 
general partners be renewed without serving the partnership trustee 
and one of the general partners, where the partnership has assets 
and judgment is not joint and several, but only "joint"? 
II. 
THE RENEWAL JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT CONFLICT 
WITH THE UNAMENDED ORIGINAL JUDGMENT. 
May a judgment be renewed for more than the amount the 
original judgment allowed, where the original judgment was never 
amended, even by writs of execution, and the new judgment conflicts 
with the first judgment? 
Ill . 
THE CREDITOR HAS TO EQUITABLY OFFSET AMOUNTS 
RECEIVED, AND LEGALLY OFFSET AMOUNTS BID. 
May a judgment be renewed for amounts the creditor has already 
equitably received because of his judgment; or be renewed for 
amounts the creditor legally bid at execution sale for all of the 
right of one defendant, when that right turns out to be less than 
the creditor hoped? 
xv 
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STATEMENT :F "THE CASE 
The Barbers originally filed suit : .1 "anuary, 
paymen" ~r - -r^pissor" u-r ^anei November, .97™ *.:•/ v.-r 
Stock i-j . -'"--' -. 3rr--rs 01 
Defendant T. - :r : ,:TI _A.:::iea P-r ; r.^ rsn 1^ , ~. * -fi — . U T ^ J . srtners 
Addendum r -•• Barber - . T.mpcrium, ~~r - Ll 12 ;'-56 -*; ; '3 
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r n; • requested - . lagment against rhe partnering . ^ T centra. 
= • v/mona LM . i-iaioar . "; . - - : 
1,1
 • • . the principal sum of 315,000, 11 iterest 
thereon or £2,180.88 to date hereof, plus 
interest • • .1 -: • z : o n a 1 a t t h e r a t e o f 12* per 
annum until judgment, plus court costs herein 
expended and reasonable attorney's fees as may 
be awarded :y "he court, (Addendum Item 1) 
•-, - iver ;r m e ^o^rlsi*^ - 1-voeo y 
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~ n e " , e a a . * a s :>r amena 1 r.a + ne i r a y ^ : * Barber "s c o u n s e l ad mi t ted 
:P . xii cue judgment g r a n t e d Apr i l 
. -" * . *•- . A - ... r a e r e a : 
1 
that the Plaintiffs have recovered 
judgment against the Defendants in the (note) 
amount of $15,000, plus accrued interest at 
the rate of 12& from date hereof, until paid 
in the amount of 32,180.88, attorney's fees in 
the amount of $4,000, and court cost in the 
amount of $31.30. (Addendum Item 2, R 208-
210.) 
The judgment did not provide for interest after the judgment, and 
interest after the judgment had not been prayed for in the 
Complaint. (Addendum Item 1.) Objections were made by the 
Defendants who contested several items, including the attorney fee 
award (the Affidavit on fees was never sent to the Defendants, 
Record in case 870128-CA 23; 57). 
The Emporium Limited Partnership eventually filed for 
bankruptcy protection. (R pp.6; 4-17; 27-38, Addendum Item 4.) 
The partnership is still in dissolution. The bankruptcy has not 
been concluded because the partnership has judgments and claims to 
collect against others. (Emporium v. Millenium Corp. Supreme Court 
Case Nos. 20273; 20282, Summary Decision finally resulted in an 
amended judgment of $158,835.83.) 
Barbers never sought to lift the automatic stay in bankruptcy 
against the Partnership (R pp.6, 20, 28-9). They attempted 
collection against the general partners. They did not consider 
themselves successful. 
Barbers prepared several writs of execution (Record in Case 
870128-CA. pp.148-9, 158-9, 209, 262-5). (Record incase 870128-CA 
pp.58-9; 206-14; 241-9; 259-65; 282-5). Defendants argued the 
judgment should not allow accrual of interest after judgment. The 
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(R 4, 5, 27, 62, 237-8). No summons was served on Mr. White. 
Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss the Renewal Complaint was denied 
(R 43-49). Defendants requested permission to file an 
Interlocutory Appeal, but did not obtain permission to bring an 
Interlocutory Appeal at that time. (R 50-61, Supreme Court Case No„ 
870232) . 
Defendants Stocking and Malouf, the only Defendants who were 
served, filed an Answer and Counterclaim. (R 62-65). Thereafter, 
Plaintiffs amended the Complaint (R 66-70) without notice to 
Defendants (R 70) and without prior court approval. (R 93-95, 106-
107). The original Complaint for a new judgment became the First 
Cause of Action (R 66). The Second and Third Causes of Action 
attempted to join relatives and lien holders of the general 
partners in an attempt to partition property once partly owned by 
one general partner which Plaintiffs had executed on and bid for, 
but in which that general partner had no interest. (R 66-70, 73-
78, 108). Barbers also filed a lis pendens pertaining to certain 
property. (R 79). 
The Defendants1 Motion to Strike the Amended Complaint on both 
procedural and jurisdictional grounds (R 93-102; 106-112; Addendum 
Item 9) prompted Plaintiffs to Move For Permission to Amend, after 
the fact (R 103). Defendants' comprehensive arguments (R 105-112) 
were denied without any analysis by the trial court. (R 113). 
Thereafter, Defendants Amended their Answer and Counterclaim, and 
added a Third Party Claim against the Plaintiffs* counsel. (R 114-
120) . 
Just before this appeal (R 260-2), Plaintiffs moved for 
4 
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The court also ruled that all previous orders of the court 
pertaining to the Complaint, Amended Complaint, Counterclaim, 
Amended Counterclaim, and Third Party Complaint were final and 
appealable orders under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P., (Addendum Item 7; TR 
39, lines 15-17), and that there was no just reason for delay in 
filing the Appeal• The Rule 54(b) Order was signed December 27, 
1988. 
Notice of Appeal was filed November 2, 1988 (Addendum Item 8, 
R 260-261) by Defendants Von K. Stocking and Raymond N. Malouf, 
Jr. Defendant Don A. White, Jr. appeared specially and solely to 
the extent necessary to appeal the orders which may apply to him, 
but he maintains that the court otherwise lacked jurisdiction over 
him in this case because he was not served. (R 224-8; 237-240). 
Defendants appealed the Partial Summary Judgment, the court's 
Order granting sanctions, and the court's dismissal of the 
Counterclaim, Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint. (R 
260-1). Defendants also appealed from the trial court's order of 
June 18, 1987 (related to the First Cause of Action) denying the 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (for failure to join the partnership 
as a party; for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter 
because the Plaintiffs tried to have a new judgment renewed for 
more than the original judgment; and for failure to state a legal 
claim for relief because the Plaintiff should have satisfied all 
or most of the judgment because of legal requirements or equitable 
offsets. (R 4-17; 27-38; 43-47). The Memorandum Decision of 
September 16, 1987 (R 113), denying Defendants' Motion to Strike 
the Amended Complaint (R 93-112) is also claimed to be an error. 
6 
Appellants argued that material and disputed facts exist, 
which are marshalled here in summary fashion. Appellants request 
the Partial Summary Judgment to be set aside, and the Plaintiffs1 
case dismissed. The factual and legal issues should be resolved 
in accordance with arguments made by the Defendants opposing entry 
of the judgment. (R 221-241; Addendum Item 12). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I . 
The Partial Summary Judgment exceeds the trial court's 
discretion. The original judgment was not joint and several, but 
only joint. The law requires that for judgment to be obtained 
jointly, all of the persons or entities who might be liable must 
be made parties and be joined in the action. One of the general 
partners, Don A. White, Jr., was not separately served with the 
Complaint and Summons. He has not appeared except to appeal. The 
Emporium Partnership is in bankruptcy. The Trustee was neither 
named as a party nor was the Partnership separately served. The 
Defendants raised these issues and alleged the court lacked 
jurisdiction to renew the 1979 judgment. 
II. 
The original (1979) judgment is limited to the relief pleaded 
for and requested by the prayer. Judgment was given after a Motion 
for Judgment on the pleadings, was limited to these pleadings. 
The Complaint was to enforce performance of a contractual 
promissory note. The note provided for interest on the debt, but 
Plaintiff failed to plead for post-judgment interest. The judgment 
itself fails to provide for interest after the judgment. 
Defendants never needed to appeal that issue, since interest was 
not allowed to Barbers in the judgment. This is not the type of 
a judgment which is included within "other judgments" which will 
bear interest at 12* per annum, referred to in U.C.A. §15-1-4. 
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This is a ]udgment based on a contract and U.C.A. §15-1-4 requires 
that any ]udgment on a contract shall specify the interest in the 
judgment. This one didn't. The judgment was never amended before 
it expired. A writ of execution does not amend the judgment. 
III. 
The creditor actually has possession of the former residence 
of Mr. and Mrs. Von K. Stocking, and an equitable reduction in the 
claim is required. After the 1979 judgment, Stockings defaulted 
in payments to First Federal Savings & Loan. Barber's attorney 
negotiated directly with Mr. Stocking (R 15-18) to buy the house 
and take both Mr. and Mrs. Stocking's equity in the house to 
satisfy part of the 1979 judgment. Because of Barber's interest, 
First Federal did not allow Stockings to cure the default. Barbers 
purchased First Federal Savings & Loan's beneficial interest and 
went ahead with the advertised trust deed sale. Plaintiffs now say 
it was an "arms length" transaction, but Stockings are entitled to 
an equitable offset for the value of their equity in the home. 
Barbers have refused to give it. (R 179-184). Barber's attorney 
wrote letters (R 14) in which Plaintiffs expressed minimum and 
maximum values. The equity is easily calculated between about 
$11,000 and $27,000. However, not one dollar was allowed by 
Barbers. 
Barbers also noticed for sale and bid $20,000 at an execution 
sale for all of the right, title and interest of Raymond N. Malouf, 
Jr. in a residence his wife owns. (R 172-178). Mr. Malouf had no 
equity in the house because of prior mortgages and assignments of 
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mortgages. This was pointed out to the Barbers before they had 
their execution sale, but they bid anyway. Legally, the Barbers 
are obligated to credit the judgment by the amount of their bid. 
(R 33-36) . 
IV. 
Even though this Complaint is solely allowed to renew a 
judgment. Plaintiff tried to join relatives of Mr. Malouf, to 
litigate issues of priority of mortgages and assignments on 
property (R 66-70), by amending the Complaint. The amendment to 
the Complaint was made after the eight year statute of limitation 
on the 1979 judgment ended. (R 66). The issues are res judicata 
because of a prior order made April 24, 1987, in Case No. 17630. 
(R 17630, pp. 379-381). The court abused its discretion in 
allowing Plaintiffs to join persons not parties to the original 
judgment, and against which the Plaintiff had no cause of action. 
(R 94-99) . The 1979 judgment, if it gave the Barbers any potential 
claim against the property, no longer allowed a claim after the 
judgment expired. The judgment lien, if any, joining third parties 
in the renewal action, lapsed with the lapsing of the judgment. 
The judgment lien did not gain legitimacy by the Plaintiffs1 
exercise of an execution sale. Having the sale does not create an 
interest where there was no interest. (R 172-8). 
V. 
Material issues of disputed fact were adequately set forth by 
the Defendants herein, and were before the trial court. CR 163-184; 
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203-218). The court abused it discretion in denying Defendants the 
right to have those facts decided in a trial. 
VI. 
The court gratuitously decided to find counsel for Defendants 
in contempt for raising the same issues which still exist. (R 219; 
228-232). The court called this an Order for Sanctions. (R 246-
8). Whatever it is called, there was neither a legal basis 
(because there was no prior order which was violated, and no Rule 
11 violation), nor a factual basis for sanctions. 
Appellants have marshalled all the facts to support the trial 
court by references to the record and related cases in the Case 
Statement, Summary and Argument. However, the facts to support the 
court's statements that these issues have been resolved already (R 
219; TR 1-3) simply do not exist. The record shows numerous 
efforts to invite the trial court to fairly apply the law to the 





ONE GENERAL PARTNER AND THE PARTNERSHIP 
WERE NOT SERVED, SO THE COURT 
SHOULD NOT RENEW THE JUDGMENT 
This case presents a due process question of whether the 
Emporium Partnership and its general partners are entitled to 
application of both common law and statutory requirements that a 
creditor proceed against the partnership before proceeding against 
general partners. It also presents the due process question of 
whether a renewal judgment can be entered against a partnership and 
against a general partner who have not been made parties to the 
action. 
The Barbers sued to renew the 1979 judgment less than a month 
before the eight year statute of limitations expired. They did 
not, however, serve one of the general partners and did not serve 
the partnership. There were three alleged general partners. Only 
two of them were served. As these filed their appearances and 
answers, they specifically denied that they were appearing for the 
third, Don A. White, Jr. The 1979 judgment is not joint and 
several. The new Partial Summary Judgment specifically provides 
only for joint liability. The distinction is significant, and 
arises from both statutory and common law. Utah law, U.C.A. §48-
1-12(2) provides in this instance that general partners are liable 
jointly, rather than jointly and severally. 
A liability is said to be joint and several when the creditor 
may sue one or more of the parties to such liability separately, 
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or all of them together at his option. Joint liability is used to 
express a common liability incurred by two or more persons. It is 
one in which the obligors bind themselves jointly, but severally, 
and which must therefore be prosecuted in a joint action against 
them all; and is thus distinguished from a "joint and several" 
obligation. (See Blacks Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition 
1968, p. 972). This rule is generally followed. A judgment 
entered against partners after service of process on less than all 
of them will not be given the effect of personal judgment against 
partners not actually served. A judgment against a partner not 
served is totally void. Dillard v. McKnight, 209 P.2d 387, 34 C.2d 
209 (Cal. 1949); and L.C. Jones Trucking Company v. Superior Oil 
Co. , 234 P.2d 802, 68 Wyo. 384 (Wyo. 1951) . Service on one general 
partner may sometimes confer jurisdiction against the partnership 
itself. Diamond Nat. Corp. v. Thunderbird Holding, Inc., 454 P.2d 
13, 85 Nev. 271 (1969). However, this partnership is in 
dissolution and Barbers did not try to serve it. (R 20). 
This court has ruled that when suing jointly, all the persons 
or entities who might be liable must be brought into the suit. 
Palle v. Industrial Commission, 79 U. 47, 7 P.2d 284 (1932). It 
has also held that the requirements of Rule 4, Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure are jurisdictional. Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 
1986) . The Emporium Partnership was not subject to judgment where 
summons was only served on individual general partners for two 
reasons. First, the 1979 judgment was joint, not joint and 
several, so to renew the judgment, jurisdiction has to be obtained 
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over all defendants. This includes the partnership and all general 
partners. This partnership was in dissolution. While all of the 
potential defendants were named, service was only attempted on 
Stocking and Malouf. The other alleged general partner, White, was 
not served and jurisdiction was never obtained to enter a judgment 
against him. The defendants all needed to be sued in their 
individual capacities, just as this court required in Madsen v. 
Borthick, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, at 14 (Dec. 12, 1988). 
The second reason the partnership is not subject to a judgment 
is that the partnership was the beneficiary of the automatic stay 
order required by 11 U.S.C. §362. Suit is precluded until 
Plaintiffs have lifted the stay. Barbers admitted (R 20; 28-30) 
it was not lifted. The partnership's legal representative is the 
bankruptcy trustee, who was never a party, and never served. The 
partnership's dissolution came because of the bankruptcy, U.C.A. 
§48-1-28(5), the authority of any partner to act for the 
partnership has been dissolved, so a general partner could not be 
served for the partnership. See U.C.A. §48-1-30. The trustee 
alone could act for the partnership. 
Recently this court confirmed the importance of the 
distinction between joint and joint and several liability. It also 
made it clear that a partnership is an entity separate from its 
partners. In McCune & McCune v. Mt. Bell Telephone, 758 P.2d 914, 
87 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, (Utah 1988) partners in a law firm were 
jointly, rather than jointly and severally, liable for debts not 
arising from tort or breach of trust. The court further concluded 
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that since the debt was contractual in origin, common law required 
the partnership's assets be marshalled and exhausted, to the extent 
any exist, before the partnership creditor could reach partner's 
individual assets. Id. at 11. Where Barbers did not even serve 
the Emporium Partnership, it was obviously not their intent to do 
this. If partnership debts must be satisfied by partnership 
assets, to the extent any exist, before a creditor can seek 
satisfaction from the assets of a partner, judgment must also be 
against the partnership. 
The original judgment was entered against the general partners 
and the Emporium Limited Partnership. The Emporium Partnership was 
not served in this action. The Defendant partnership is alleged 
to have assets. The court has never found that it does not have 
assets. The McCune decision should control this case. In both, 
the meaning of joint liability is raised. By not serving the 
partnership, Plaintiffs failed to obtain jurisdiction over the 
partnership. The McCune court said: 
It is true that under general partnership law, 
all partnership debts are joint debts of the 
partners and that all partners are ultimately 
liable for those debts. However, a creditor's 
right to proceed against the individual 
partners is conditioned on having first 
proceeded against the partnership assets for 
satisfaction of the debt, something Mountain 
Bell did not do in this case. Therefore, 
Mountain Bell claims the right to do under 
tariff precisely what it could not otherwise 
do legally - pursue a partner's assets first. 
Similarly, by not serving Don A. White or the partnership, 
Barbers failed to cause the court to obtain jurisdiction over 
15 
either the partnership or all of the general partners who might be 
secondarily liable. Under any theory, the partnership itself is 
not now a party, but should be. Unserved partners of the dissolved 
partnership are not parties merely because they were partners. 
Joint liability means a creditor cannot proceed against one 
defendant without joining all defendants. (R 223-8; 237-240). The 
court abused its discretion in allowing judgment to enter against 
the two general partners who were served, since the other joint 
obligors were not served. It abused it discretion again by allowing 
any judgment to enter when the partnership itself was never made 
a party. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b) requires that a summons must 
be served within one year of filing the complaint. It has been 
more than a year since the Renewal Complaint was filed. Is it too 
late to serve the partnership or Don A. White, Jr.? The Rule also 
provides that where some defendants have been served, others may 
be served or appear anytime before trial. In this case, the court 
made its decision without allowing trial. Absence of an actual 
trial is not fatal to the question of whether "trial" has occurred. 
Moon Lake Electric Assoc, v. Ultrasystems Western Constructors, 
Inc. , 99 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Dec. 1988). Therefore, the partnership 
and the other general partner can no longer be served, and the 
judgment, made final by the trial court, should be considered void 
and unenforceable. The L.C. Jones Trucking Company court said: 
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Although there are statutes authorizing 
judgments against two or more joint debtors 
upon service of summons on but one of them, 
the general rule is that it is improper to 
render judgment against all the obligors where 
the court has not acquired jurisdiction over 
some of them. A judgment so rendered is void 
as against the parties over whom the court has 
no jurisdiction. L. C. Jones Trucking Co. v. 
Superior Oil Co. , 234 P.2d 802 (Wyo. 1951) , at 
808. 
Failure of Barbers to serve Don A. White should alternatively 
be considered equivalent to the release of a co-obligor and the 
results governed by U.C.A. §15-4-4 and §15-4-5. Barber's claim 
should thus be deemed satisfied to the amount Don White was bound 
to pay. Don White's share of the debt - at least one-third - (R 
226; No. 17630, R 256) should be subtracted from the claim allowed. 
If Plaintiffs are allowed not to proceed against all joint 
obligors, they must still be required to first satisfy any debt 
from partnership assets, to the extent these exist. 
A joint judgment against a limited partnership and three 
general partners cannot be renewed without first obtaining 
jurisdiction over the partnership and all three of the general 
partners, when the original judgment is joint, and not joint and 
several. If it is renewed, the partnership's assets must be 
exhausted first. If judgment is allowed to stand on appeal, it 
should only be enforceable against the partnership if jurisdiction 
has somehow been obtained. If it is not satisfied, Plaintiffs 
should seek a deficiency against the general partners, but only if 
they can all still be sued. 
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II. 
THE RENEWAL JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT CONFLICT 
WITH THE UNAMENDED ORIGINAL JUDGMENT 
This case presents the issue of whether a 1979 judgment, never 
amended, can be materially modified to allow post-judgment interest 
when a renewal judgment is requested in 1987. Within this issue 
is the question of whether a judgment can accrue interest under 
U.C.A. §15-1-4, where the judgment arises from a contract, but the 
judgment failed to provide for the contract interest. Not only are 
those facts true, but (1) the judgment allowed only a certain 
amount, $2180, as the total judgment interest "until paid"; and (2) 
that amount is all the Complaint asked for. The Complaint did not 
allege the right to interest after the judgment. Even if §15-1-4 
doesn't mean what it says, Barber's pleadings were defective. 
The original judgment merged the promissory note contract into 
the judgment. In renewing the judgment, Barbers are limited to the 
judgment. They cannot refer to the terms of the note. It is too 
late to amend the judgment. 
Yergensen v. Ford, 15 U.2d 397, 402 P.2d 696 (1965) , held that 
a prior note merged into the judgment, and no longer existed. 
Gossner v. Dairymen Associates, Inc., 611 P.2d 713 (Utah 1980) 
cites Yergensen, in a dissent by Justice Hall, to make res judicata 
the assertion of claims which should have been raised in a prior 
action. "Where the parties and issues are the same and there is 
a judgment on the merits, all claims of right from the original 
cause of action are extinguished and the right represented by the 
judgment is substituted therefore." Ld_, at 718. Likewise, Barbers 
are stuck with the limits of their judgment. Barber's 1979 
judgment was defective on its face, and they admitted (R 208) they 
have to rely on U.C.A. §15-1-4 to get post-judgment interest. This 
section should not save them. A new judgment cannot be improved 
by referring to the note. While the note allowed interest after 
judgment, the judgment itself did not provide for it. Barbers are 
therefore not renewing, they are trying to increase the amount the 
judgment allowed. They and the trial court pretend the judgment 
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allows something it does not allow. 
What does the statute say? U.C.A. §15-1-4 requires shall any 
judgment based on a contract, such as a promissory note, specify 
on its face the amount of interest that is allowed. (R 209, 210). 
Only other judgments, those not based on contracts, may accrue 
interest whether or not the judgment provides for interest. 
Additionally, even if this judgment were not based on contract, 
post-judgment interest should not be allowed because of the defects 
in the prayer of the Complaint. The Record herein, pp. 208-9, 
recites: 
November 12, 1986, the Plaintiffs admitted in 
pleadings filed in this court in Civil No. 
17630, that the judgment was "not as clear" as 
it should be, but they wanted to rely on a 
State statute to have interest on this 
judgment anyway. Mr. Daines said: 
Although the judgment language is 
not as clear as one would like, 
Plaintiffs believe it is 
sufficiently clear that State law 
provides that all judgments require 
interest and that it does not need 
to be restated in each judgment 
which is filed by the court. 
(Response to Motion, November 12, 
1986, Civil No. 17630). (R 17630, 
p. 267) . 
That is an admission the judgment does not 
support post-judgment interest. Plaintiffs 
made the same admission to the Court of 
Appeals on page 7 of their Respondent's Brief 
wherein they stated: 
The judgment recites that the 
interest is at 12% but does not 
specifically state that it continues 
to accrue after rendition of the 
judgment. Id_, page 7, Case No. 
870128-CA. 
Of course the Appeals Court did not address 
the issue on the merits, but the admission 
proves Defendants* point. Plaintiffs justify 
the omission and their accrual of the interest 
by relying on Dairy Distributors, Inc. v. 
Local 976, 12 U. 2d 85, 396 P. 2d 47 (1964) 
and Section 15-1-4 U.C.A. to argue the merits 
of their claim. They also try to explain what 
must have been intended by the inclusion of 
the figure $2,180 for interest, and the 
language "from the date hereof". They explain 
that it must have meant from a period before 
the judgment entered until the date of 
judgment. They specifically say "the date 
hereof" must mean the date of the Complaint. 
That's probably true, but the fact remains the 
judgment is deficient. It does not allow 
accrual of post-judgment interest. The 
judgment has never been amended. 
The only way to change the amount of money allowed by a 
judgment is to amend the judgment. Richards v. Siddoway, 24 U.2d 
314, 471 P.2d 143 (1970). (R 210-11). However, amending a judgment 
requires formal action. Certain steps must be followed. The time 
within which a court may act to modify a judgment is limited. A 
long list of Utah decisions dating from 1895 support the position 
that the only basis for changing the amount of money allowed by a 
judgment is for the judgment itself to be amended. A longer time 
is allowed for amending clerical errors than judicial errors. 
Richards, supra, is often referred to for the distinction 
between judicial and clerical errors. The problem with the 
original judgment in this case is not clerical: from wrongly 
recording the judgment as made. Although the defects in the 
Complaint and judgment may not have been intended, the words in the 
judgment are consistent with the Complaint. There was, at most, 
a judicial error. This does not mean that the judge erred in 
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entering the judgment, but that there was error in the judgment 
itself. Richards held that a judicial error can only be cured by 
a timely motion for a new trial, amended findings, appeal, or a new 
action. The longest possible time limit for any of this would have 
been a new action, based on the note, within six years of the date 
on the note, or by May 11, 1984. It is now too late to pursue any 
of those remedies. The error wholly belongs to the Barbers and 
their counsel. The prayer did not ask for post-judgment interest. 
The judgment does not provide for post-judgment interest. Any 
interpretation that it does would allow a judgment in excess of the 
prayer . 
The trial court's entry of various writs of execution did not 
amount to an amendment of the original judgment. Judgments cannot 
be amended by misquoting them. Any writs of execution lasted up 
to two months from issuance [Rule 69(c) 1 and certainly all would 
have expired when the judgment expired anyway. The Barber's sole 
option for a renewal is to rely solely upon the language of the 
1979 judgment, assuming they have jurisdiction and are entitled to 
more money. 
Defendants did bring up the issue of post-judgment interest 
in Barber v. Emporium, 750 P.2d 202 (1988), when contesting the 
enforceability of one of Barber's writs for more than the judgment 
allowed. The Supreme Court said raising the issue on the appeal 
of that writ was untimely, because the motion to quash the writ had 
been denied more than 30 days before the appeal was filed. 
However, even by allowing the disputed writ, the trial court did 
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not amend the judgment . 
Trial courts do not have authority to unilaterally change a 
judgment even if they want to prefer one party. In Benson v. 
Anderson, 14 Utah 334, 47 P. 142 (1896) this court said that 
judicial tribunals may not exercise revisionary power over a 
judgment after it has passed away from the judge. There, an effort 
to change a judgment only six months after it was entered was 
considered too late. In Frost, et al . v. District Court, et al . , 
96 Utah 106, 83 P.2d 737 (1938) this court also said " . . . after 
the time for appeal has expired, the court has no power to modify 
a judgment in a substantial or material respect. This is well 
settled law." 
Thus, the original trial court has no right to amend the 1979 
judgment. It and the Barbers never attempted to do so. Each 
interpreted it by their hopes; not its words. Just because the 
Plaintiffs seek to renew that judgment does not give the trial 
court any authority to modify the original judgment. Even if 
partial summary judgment of some kind were appropriate, the trial 
court has abused its discretion in allowing the modifications. 
There was no appeal, no motion for a new trial, no new action, and 
no timely modification attempt. Any renewal judgment is limited 
like the 1979 judgment is limited. 
The trial court obviously believed the issues presented by 
Defendants had been decided already by the Appeals Court (TR 2, 
lines 14-25; 26 lines 25-36). In order for a matter to be res 
judicata and Defendants' arguments either claim barred or issue 
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barred, the parties or their privies, must be the same; the claim 
alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or 
must be one that could and should have been raised in the first 
action; the issue in both cases must be identical and have been 
fully, fairly and competently litigated in the first action; and 
the judgment must be final. Madsen v. Borthick, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 
13 (Dec. 12, 1988) at 14 and 16. 
Did the post-judgment interest issue meet the Madsen test? 
Mo. Since the Plaintiffs did not allege post-judgment interest, 
it was not presented. Should the Plaintiff have presented it? 
Yes, if Plaintiffs wanted post-judgment interest. Was it fully 
litigated when the 1979 judgment was entered? No, because it was 
not presented to the court by the party who had an interest in 
getting post-judgment interest. Should it have been raised by the 
Plaintiff at that time? Yes. The Plaintiffs who had the burden, 
did not even try to amend the judgment to provide for post-judgment 
interest. 
Perhaps the Plaintiffs assumed they could have post-judgment 
interest. However, their judgment resulted from a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings. Their pleadings, consisting of the 
Complaint, did not ask for post-judgment interest. Rule 8, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, requires the Plaintiff to demand all the 
relief to which he deems himself entitled. An exhibit to a 
pleading cannot serve the purpose of supplying material averments 
or be taken as part of the allegations of the pleading itself. 
Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983). The Plaintiff never 
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attempted to amend the pleadings and has never alleged they asked 
for post-judgment interest. 
The court did recognize, as early as September 1986, that it 
was too late to change the judgment to a different amount. (R Case 
No. 17630, p. 252). That is when the court denied Defendants' 
Motion to Quash a writ of execution. The court completely 
misapprehended Defendants' Motion objecting to the amount 
Plaintiffs claim was due under their writ, as an effort by the 
Defendants to change the amount of the judgment. All the 
Defendants were trying to do was to cause the court to recognize 
the limitations of the 1979 judgment, and restrict the Plaintiff 
to the amount shown thereby. Somehow, the court and the Plaintiffs 
erroneously believed that Defendants had a burden to change the 
amount of the judgment. The point is, the judgment never allowed 
the amounts Plaintiffs claim for it in their writs. 
Ill . 
THE CREDITOR HAS TO EQUITABLY OFFSET AMOUNTS 
RECEIVED, AND LEGALLY OFFSET AMOUNTS BID 
This case presents the question of whether the creditors' 
unconditional bid for "all of the right and interest" of a debtor, 
when the debtors' interest is worth less than the bid, must be 
credited on a judgment. Also at issue is whether equitable 
offsets, for property the creditor took because of his judgment, 
must be applied to reduce the judgment. 
Appellants first discuss the equitable offset Barbers should 
be required to make for their acquisition of Mr . & Mrs. Stocking's 
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property. August 29, 1983, Barber's attorney wrote a letter 
admitting that Mr. Stocking's property was worth between $45,000 
and $60,000. (R 14) . The letter attests the fact that Barbers 
believed there was equity in that property which could offset at 
least part of the judgment. Using the Barber's own admissions in 
the letter, the equity in Stocking's property was between 
$11,808.06 and $26,808.06. These figures represent a difference 
between the high and low values admitted by their letter, and the 
face amount of the 1979 judgment. The letter said in pertinent 
part : 
Norm Barber and I have examined the Von 
Stocking home and believe that its worth would 
probably be somewhere in the range of $45,000 
to $60,000. 
Von Stocking's Affidavits (R 15-18; 179-184) explain that Barbers 
bid $33,191.94 at the trust deed sale for this residence November 
4, 1983. His wife owned half the equity. Barbers had no judgment 
against Mrs. Stocking. His affidavit further shows that Barber's 
attorney talked with Mr. Stocking several times between October 
31st and November 3, 1983, about the fact that the Barbers were 
particularly interested in getting the value of the difference 
between the first mortgage to First Federal and the actual value 
of the house in order to reduce the judgment. (R 179-184; part of 
Addendum Item 10). 
An equitable offset is appropriate. The difference between 
$33,191.94 (the amount Barbers bid at the foreclosure sale - the 
actual amount to pay off the first mortgage) , and the minimum value 
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for the house stated in Barber's letter of $45,000, amounts to 
$11,808.06. The difference between their bid of $33,191.94 and 
$60,000, the Barber's highest estimate of its value, is $26,808.06. 
Either amount makes a material difference to what was still owed. 
The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to either allow 
an equitable offset or Defendants' right to trial on that issue. 
Clearly a genuine issue of fact was presented. Even as a matter 
of law, Stockings should have recovered some credit. Von Stocking 
relied on Mr. Daines' promises. First Federal refused to allow the 
Stockings to cure the default. "No credit" towards the judgment 
means Barbers are unjustly enriched. (Stockings filed suit against 
Barbers for interfering with First Federal, etc., and that case is 
also being appealed.) The trial court did not make findings as a 
matter of law or fact Stockings are not entitled to an offset. 
This issue presents another alternative to foreclose 
enforcement of a renewal judgment. Both U.C.A. §15-4-4 and §15-4-
5 can be read with U.C.A. §57-1-32. The latter statute allows 
Barbers only three months after the Stocking residence was sold to 
seek a deficiency judgment against Mr. Stocking. Barber's failure 
to seek a deficiency judgment is a waiver against Von Stocking for 
more money. It thus operates as a release of him as a joint 
obligor. Because he is released, the judgment cannot be renewed 
against the other joint obligors since Mr. Stocking could no longer 
be joined as a party. It may be argued that the deficiency 
judgment that must be required, if any, only applies to a 
deficiency to pay the debt for particular real property. However, 
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this action, seeking additional funds from Mr. Stocking after the 
trust deed sale, is an effort to collect more. Estoppel should 
extend to this situation, and stop the Barbers from seeking 
additional funds from Mr. Stocking. If Mr. Stocking can no longer 
be made a party, since the original judgment was only joint and 
not joint and several , the Barbers should be considered to have 
waived their right to seek a renewal judgment. 
Now we want to discuss the legal offset. December 3, 1986, 
the Barbers advertised and sold at auction all the right, title and 
interest Defendant Malouf had in residential real property. (R 
73-78). Mr. Malouf objected to the sale, not on procedural 
grounds, but on the basis that it was pointless because he had no 
equity. (R 97; 107-109; 211-214). Nevertheless, Barbers persisted 
and bid $20,000 at the sale. Rule 69(e)(4) U.R.C.P. provides that 
failure of a purchaser to pay the bid is contempt of court. 
Plaintiffs admit they made the bid, but want to be excused under 
Rule 69(g)(2). However, that rule only allows a purchaser to be 
exempt from his bid if there are irregularities in the proceedings, 
or the property sold was not subject to execution and sale. That 
rule also applies only to third party purchasers, rather than 
judgment creditor purchasers. 
Barbers should be deemed to have waived any defense the 
property was not subject to execution sale, where they insisted on 
the sale with full knowledge of claims to no right, title or 
interest raised by Mr. Malouf. Barbers bid anyway. Barbers have 
not admitted, alleged, or proven specific irregularities in the 
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sale. They are not entitled to be excused from performance of 
their bid. 
In Randall v. Valley Title, 681 P.2d 219 (Utah 1984) this 
court required a creditor bidding at a sale to credit the bid to 
the judgment and discharge the claim to the extent of the bid. The 
same principal applies here. The trial court abused its discretion 
by not requiring the same result. This is particularly true where 
the court actually told Barbers to give the credit in its April 24, 
1987 Order in Case Mo. 17630. (R 213; R Case No. 17630 380). 
Requiring credit for the bid merely recognises the legal 
principle of "caveat emptor". This concept, as applied to a bid 
at a sheriff's sales of personal property, was affirmed by the 
Court of Appeals in Basin Loans, Inc. v. Young, 764 P.2d 239 (Ct. 
App. 1988). The court affirmed that a horse trailer was purchased 
subject to a valid prior lien, that the creditor at the execution 
sale could have known about. The court said: 
A buyer at a sheriff's sale acquires only such 
interest as the judgment debtor had in the 
properties sold. Romero v. State, 97 N.M. 
569, 642 P.2d 172, 176 (1982). 
It follows that if the interest of the debtor is encumbered by a 
lien, the buyer takes subject to that lien. This is consistent 
with Kimball v. Salisbury, 19 Utah 161, 56 Pac. 973 (1899). The 
Rule of caveat emptor applies to purchases at judicial sales, and 
the purchaser of said property (takes) it subject to all the 
infirmities of the proceedings of the sale." 
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The amount Barbers received, or could have received, or are 
deemed to receive, or equitably received from the Defendants should 
be credited to the benefit of all the Defendants. This is 
provided by Utah statute §15-4-3, U.C.A., which says: 
The amount received by the obligee from one 
. . . of several obligors, or from one or 
more joint . . . obligors, in whole or in 
partial satisfaction of their obligations, 
shal 1 be credited to the extent of the amount 
received on the obligation of all co-obligors. 
(Emphasis added) . 
Plaintiffs must credit the 1979 judgment for amounts they were 
(1) equitably deemed to receive, and (2) legally deemed to receive 
because of (1) the trust deed sale, and (2) their bid, before 
renewing the judgment. Jorgensen v. Aetna Casualty Co., 98 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 32 (Dec. 29, 1988) expresses this principle, although 
the Jorgensen opinion by Justice Zimmerman deals with debts owed 
by joint and several debtors. 
IV. 
THE REST OF THE CASE SHOULD NOT PROCEED 
AGAINST DEFENDANTS NOT PARTIES TO THE 1979 JUDGMENT 
This Complaint was originally filed solely to renew the 1979 
judgment. The original judgment was only against the partnership 
and the alleged three general partners. The court allowed the 
Complaint to be amended 8 years and 5 months after the 1979 
judgment (R 113) to assert claims against relatives of Mr. Malouf 
and persons having mortgages against any possible interest in 
residential property he held or once owned, far in excess of any 
possible equity. On the merits, the court abused its discretion 
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or lacked jurisdiction to join those Defendants because Plaintiffs 
failed to state a claim against them. (R 93-112, Addendum Item 9). 
Barbers consistently refused to ever credit the $20,000 they 
themselves bid December 3, 1986, for this very property. 
The so-called Second Cause of Action (R 66-70) in the Amended 
Complaint attempts to invalidate an assignment of the beneficial 
interest in a second trust deed on the property from Logan Savings 
and Loan dated June 3, 1982, to a legitimate creditor. The 
assignment was of a second mortgage made two years before Barber's 
1979 judgment, for valid consideration, and it was recorded. This 
was five years three months before the Amended Complaint was filed. 
Defendants alleged Barbers were time-barred by §78-12-22, §78-12-
25 and §78-12-26 U.C.A., the eight year, four year, and three year 
statutes of limitations, respectively. (R 114-118). Barbers also 
attempted to attack the validity of a judgment against Mr.Malouf 
dated January 15, 1982, recorded about five years nine months 
before their Amended Complaint. Defendants asserted the same 
limitations defenses, and other defenses. For the arguments, see 
Defendants' Motion and Memorandum to Strike (R 93-102) and Reply 
in Support of Motion to Strike (R 106-112) dated August 24, 1987 
and September 8, 1987. (Addendum Item 9). 
Procedurally, Rule 14, U.R.C.P., was not fulfilled by the 
court or the Barbers in amending the Complaint. Barbers did not 
allege the additional parties were liable for the 1979 judgment. 
They cannot be liable for a renewal judgment. By the time the 
Amended Complaint was offered in July 1987 (R 73) , the 1979 
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judgment had expired. lApni 13. 1987. Addendum Item 1). Only 
Defendants to the March 27, 1987 Complaint could potentially be 
liable for a renewed judgment. The presence of additional parties 
is not necessary to resolve renewal of the 1979 judgment. Barber 's 
claim against Malouf's interest in property was not relevant to the 
renewal effort. At most Barbers could attempt a completely 
separate action. The 1979 judgment lien on property ended at the 
expiration of the 1979 judgment. While Barbers might argue their 
bid at the execution sale gave them some right to argue for 
possession with others, they never credited their bid to the 
judgment. Barber's Complaint claims they bought something for 
$20,000. They gave no credit. Barbers should be deemed to have 
waived any claim against Malouf's property by their failure to 
credit the bid. They should be estopped from trying to litigate 
ownership or title to the property. 
With respect to the very issues that the Second and Third 
Causes of Action seek to try, in the prior action. No. 17630, the 
same trial court held that the prior execution against Defendant 
Malouf had never been challenged, even though the Plaintiffs had 
notice in excess of three years. It also held that the prior 
execution had priority over any execution claims of the Plaintiffs 
against the same relatives and lien holders that Plaintiffs sought 
to add as Defendants in the Amended Complaint. The matter is thus 
res judicata, and the trial court should have upheld its prior 
rulings in granting Defendants Motion to Strike the Amended 
Complaint. The prior ruling by this court, and the arguments which 
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support it, is contained in the Appeal Record, Case No. 17630, 
pages 355-6; 369-377; 379-381; particularly Findings of Fact 9 & 
10, plus Conclusions of Law 7, 8, 9 & 10. The order was signed 
April 24, 1987, and should be considered res judicata as far as 
counts 2 & 3 of the Amended Complaint are concerned. 
The addition of Defendants named in the Amended Complaint was 
illegal. They are inappropriate parties to Barber's renewal 
effort, and the trial court abused its discretion by allowing them 
into the suit. They should be dismissed, and the Barbers have no 
cause of action. The court abused its discretion by allowing the 
Amended Complaint to be filed September 16, 1987. (R 113). The 
court made no legal or factual findings to justify itself. 
V. 
THE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT 
PROHIBIT SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The review standard for an adverse summary judgment is whether 
there is any genuine issue as to any material fact, and if there 
is not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. This court should treat the Appellants' statements 
and evidentiary materials as if a jury would receive them as the 
only credible evidence, and the Supreme Court sustain the judgment 
only if no issues of fact, which could affect the outcome, can be 
discerned. 
In Zions First National Bank v. Clark Chemical Corp., 762 P.2d 
1090 (Utah 1988) , summary judgment was reversed using the above-
stated standard in an opinion written by Chief Justice Hall. He 
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also wrote the majority opinion in Merrill v. Cache Valley Dairy 
Association, 750 P.2d 539 (Utah 1987), where another summary 
judgment by Judge Christoffersen was reversed. Even the dissenting 
opinion does not quarrel with the review standard. 
The review standard for legal issues does not require this 
court to give any deference to the trial court's legal conclusions 
given to support the grant of a summary judgment. This court 
should review those legal conclusions for correctness. Atlas Corp. 
v. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). 
When there are material issues of fact, is it proper for the 
trial court to ignore them and offer no analysis or explanation? 
Defendants think not. We are entitled to a response. The standard 
set forth in Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982) 
requires the court to evaluate all evidence, and reasonable 
inferences fairly drawn from the evidence, in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. 
The trial court did not do this. 
There were at least fourteen disputed facts supported by at 
least two affidavits to the trial court which did not rationalize 
them away. (R 163-184; 203-207; Addendum Items 10 and 11. See also 
TR Oct. 3, 1988 pp.1-10). The issues of material fact before the 
trial court are numerous, (R 166-7; 204-7), and at least include 
these subjects: 
1. The Complaint sought to change and improve the 1979 
judgment, rather than just renew it. The trial court 
ruled that asking for interest on that judgment was not 
a modification of the judgment. (R 43) . The court never 
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made an analysis of that 1979 judgment, or its pleadings, 
to justify its ruling. There is a genuine factual 
question of what the 1979 judgment allows. 
2. Defendants were entitled to have a credit for the 
unconditional $20,000 bid made by the Plaintiffs on an 
execution sale. (R 213) . The court had even required the 
Barbers to enter a credit for their bid before issuing 
subpoenas in the original action. April 24, 1987 the 
trial court entered a Finding in Case No. 17630, which 
stated : 
(9.) Plaintiffs have not filed Partial 
Satisfaction of Judgment required after the 
December 3, 1986 sheriff's sale, where $20,000 
was paid by the Plaintiffs toward the 
judgment. (R 17630, p. 380). 
The Conclusion of Law which followed that Finding was: 
(7.) Plaintiffs are required to first enter 
partial satisfaction of judgment from the sale 
of one Defendant's interest in property on 
December 3, 1986. (R 17630, p. 380). 
That never happened. (R 213-214). The court renewed the 
1979 judgment without doing that. There is a legal and 
factual question as to why the trial court's prior order 
was not complied with. Defendants are entitled to legal 
offsets for that bid. (R 211-214; 108-110) The argument 
was ignored because the trial court mistakenly believed 
changes to the 1979 judgment had been affirmed by the 
Supreme Court and all Barbers were doing was renewing the 
same judgment (TR 12, lines 2-5). A factual question 
exists about what the Appeals Court really did. The 
trial court was inattentive to believe either offset or 
interest issues had been settled in the appeal. (R 149-
151). CTR 1-10, esp. p.2, lines 14-25; 3-4). 
3. Defendants are entitled to an equitable offset for 
their equity after Barber's purchase of the Stocking 
property. The court made no statements justifying the 
rejection of Stocking's affidavits or the Defendants' 
argument. The amount claimed to be fair is between 
$11,808 and $26,808. (See Point III). 
4. Payment made December 31, 1982 by the Plaintiffs in 
the amount of $866.47 was only credited by Barbers 
against interest. The Defendants argued it should be 
credited against principal. The face amount of the 
judgment only requires that Barbers receive $21,211.30. 
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5. The renewal Complaint sued for 341,751.43. The 
court ignored the factual issues about the reason the 
actual amount of the 1979 judgment is less. It did not 
explain its allowance of a higher amount in legal or 
factual terms. Yergensen v. Ford, supra, would not allow 
a renewal judgment to look again to the note. So how did 
the trial court amend the 1979 judgment? (R 30-31). The 
contract had been replaced by the judgment. The trial 
court never explained why the renewal judgment could add 
terms not part of the original judgment. 
6. Without initially taking any evidence, the court 
awarded "sanctions" against the Defendants. Attorney's 
fees on the renewal judgment are disputed. When 
testimony was introduced on attorney's fees, Barber's 
attorney ultimately said "This case is on a contingency 
basis . . . We do not bill (Barbers) for our time. It 
is on a one-third contingency basis of anything we 
collect." TR 16, lines 20-23. The court abused its 
discretion by ordering Defendants' attorney to pay $3,000 
in fees for sanctions. The court never made timely, true 
or adequate findings. (R 246-248) . After repeated 
efforts by Defendants (R 6-9; 29-30; 222-3) Barbers 
finally admitted one item - that they were not entitled 
to a joint and several judgment (R 222-3; TR 6, lines 12-
24) . There is a factual issue of what acts justify 
sanct ions. 
7. The partnership's bankruptcy required lifting the 
bankruptcy stay before proceeding with an action or 
judgment. Why wasn't it lifted? How does the court get 
jurisdiction over the partnership? This question mixes 
law and fact. The fact remains that the stay was never 
lifted, the partnership was never a party. The trial 
court abused its discretion. It never attempted to find 
facts to support summary judgment against parties never 
served. 
8. The Counterclaim (R 63) and Affidavits (R 15-17; 
172-84) show Barbers fraudulently and/or intentionally 
breached promises made to the Stockings, by not allowing 
an equitable credit. Did they really buy solely as 
disinterested persons? How can the court find this (it 
didn't) when Barbers don't dispute they bought First 
Federal's beneficial interest? Regardless of their 
intent, they received Stocking's equity (including that 
of Mrs. Stocking), but made no reduction in the debt. 
What findings support this? 
9. Defendants counterclaimed, in part, to seek damages 
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for a groundless lien against real property under U.C.A. 
Section 38-9-1. Whether the lien was justified is 
another question for trial. (R 119, paragraph 6; 127-8; 
170; 206, paragraph 14). 
10. Joint liability issues existed (R 225-228), but were 
resolved only after summary judgment was allowed. 
The foregoing material issues of fact, or mixed questions of fact 
and law, arise from what became of the First Cause of Action in 
the Amended Complaint. The minute factual questions were spelled 
out for the court in the Record on pages 166-7 and 204-207. These 
are shown by the Answer, Counterclaim, and Affidavits opposing 
Summary Judgment. Questions of equitable credit to Mr. & Mrs. 
Stocking; whether Barbers are required to charge each general 
partner a share of the debt; whether Barber's encumbrance of real 
property is actionable, as U.C.A. §38-9-1 says it is, are also 
applicable to resolving the Third Party Complaint. These disputed 
factual issues between the parties are supported by the pleadings. 
(R 216-218). The court abused its discretion by granting partial 
summary judgment to "renew" the judgment and dismiss the 
Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint. 
The Utah Supreme Court said in Bennion v. Amass, 22 U.2d 216, 
500 P.2d 512 (1972) that summary judgment shall not enter if there 
are disputed issues to warrant a trial. In the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Barbers failed to set forth a list of the facts which 
they claim were undisputed. Defendants listed the facts which 
existed that were disputed. (R 164-167; 203-207). The court never 
rationalized these away. Its decision should be reversed. 
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VI. 
THERE WAS NEITHER A LEGAL NOR FACTUAL 
BASIS TO SUPPORT A SANCTION ORDER 
This case presents the question of whether Rule 11 sanctions 
need to be supported by proper findings. The trail court 
gratuitously ignored the record and the pleadings, and imposed 
sanctions without sufficient reason or correct analysis. The court 
ordered attorney's fees in the sum of $3,000 in connection with its 
August 22, 1988 Memorandum Decision. CR 219-220) . The proposed 
form of Findings and Judgment initially referred to this as a 
penalty. (R 228) Yet, there was no competent finding that 
Defendants violated Rule 11. Barbers filed no affidavit supporting 
the amount of attorneys fees reasonably expended. In fact, they 
had no attorneys fees (TR 16) . Plaintiffs themselves suggested the 
question of attorney's fees be deferred and not ruled on in the 
Summary Judgment question. (R 137). The award does not satisfy 
U.C.A. §78-27-56 which requires only reasonable attorney's fees. 
Even assuming the other elements of that statute may have been 
somehow met in the mind of the judge, the court did not make any 
findings to support that amount, or any amount. Where is the 
court's analysis? If there was analysis, it should have been in 
the August 22, 1988 Memorandum Decision. The Decision lacks 
sufficient reasoning to justify what the court did. If the court 
was tired of hearing from Defendants, it should have pondered their 
arguments and recalled that nowhere had it intelligently resolved 
the issues. In the Defendants' objections to the form of the 
pleadings, those arguments are summarized again (R 229-232). The 
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proposed orders came after the fact and cannot be used to justify 
the court . The original proposed findings were retained by 
Plaintiffs. (TR 38, lines 19-23). 
Mow the court has re-styled its contempt decision as a 
penalty. The final form of the judgment leaves in the word 
"contempt", and adds language attempting to justify the Memorandum 
Decision as if it were made under Rule 11. (R 247) . The August 22, 
1988 Memorandum Decision is clearly not talking about Rule 11 
Sanctions. (R 219). Besides, Rule 11 only allows sanctions if "the 
pleading, motion or other papers are signed in violation of the 
Rule". The court made no findings that any pleadings or other 
papers violated the Rule. 
The trial court found contempt too easily. This court in 
State v. Barlow, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, at 29 (Feb. 10, 1989) 
stated : 
We agree that the trial court committed error 
in finding Appellant in contempt, because the 
procedural requirements of Utah Code Ann. §78-
32-3 (1987) were not observed. 
The trial court failed to justify its finding by making an order 
complying with U.C.A. §78-32-3: 
. . . reciting the facts as occurring . . . 
adjudging that the person proceeded against is 
thereby guilty of a contempt and that he be 
punished as prescribed in §78-32-10 hereof. 
The trial court was reversed because : 
. . . no order appeared in the record reciting 
the facts forming the basis for the finding of 
contempt. . . . In addition, U.C.A. §78-32-
10 (1987) limits the maximum find that may be 
imposed on a contempt judgment to $200. IdN at 
29. 
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The court erred in believing all the issues had been sett led . 
What about the other legal issues, including credit for the $20,000 
bid; the Stocking equity; release of one partner by not seeking 
additional money after the trust deed sale; no service on the 
dissolved partnership; no service on one general partner in a joint 
judgment. It is true that the Plaintiffs agree the judgment should 
be joint rather than joint and several, in the end. None of these 
issues was before the Court of Appeals. None were decided by the 
first judgment in 1979. All were brought before the trial court. 
On only the joint v. joint and several liability issue did the 
trial court and the Plaintiffs concede. All the other issues, the 
trial court said, had been resolved. That's just not true. 
Even if sanctions are allowable, only reasonable attorney fees 
can be allowed. Even then this could only be proper under actual 
Rule 11 violations. It would not be proper for a contempt 
punishment. Either way, there are no facts to make the court's 
findings or award reasonable or true. The trial court may have 
believed, as it states in its Memorandum Decision (R 219), that it 
had made repeated findings in the past on the issues. If that is 
true, the Plaintiff and the court ought to be able to specifically 
refer to some analysis. (R 229-232). Plaintiffs and the court 
failed to show how or where the 1979 judgment was ever amended. The 
writs on the 1979 judgment have expired. They did not change what 
the judgment says. The trial court never explained why the court's 
April 24, 1987 ruling, (in Case No.17630, R 17630 pp. 379-38), 
which required the Plaintiffs to enter a Partial Satisfaction for 
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their bid of $20,000, was not applicable before any new judgment 
is entered. (R 213-214). 
Appellants would like to marshall all the trial court's 
evidence that supports what the trial court did, so the Supreme 
Court could review it. However, the trial court never made any 
analysis. It only made a statement that it had been made. (R 
219) . The truth is either that the trial court accepted statements 
by the Plaintiffs about the court's prior conclusions which were 
not true, or it misapprehended what was in the Record. 
No specific violation of Rule 11 is referred to by the court. 
There was no evidence of attorneys fee expenses actually incurred 
by Barbers. Where there is insufficient evidence of the 
reasonableness of attorney's fees, the award must be vacated. 
Associated Industrial Development, Inc. v. Jewkes, 701 P.2d 486 
(Utah 1984) . 
If the court is to make a finding of contempt, it must follow 
the procedures in U.C.A. §78-32-3 et seq. and support the claim 
with an affidavit. Under §78-32-10, U.C.A. , Defendants are allowed 
a hearing on the issues, and §78-32-11 requires the hearing 
determine actual loss or injury. Contempt must be supported by a 
recitation of facts or an affidavit. Penalties for contempt do not 
include unsupported, or any, attorney's fees in facts like these. 
An actual loss or injury must first be determined to be caused by 
contempt before awarding contempt damages. These standards were 
simply not met. There is no provision for an additional penalty 
of attorney's fees for contempt. See Me11or v. Cook, 597 P.2d 882 
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(Utah 1979), and U.C.A. §78-32-10. 
CONCLUSION 
None of the issues argued here were resolved by the Appeals 
Court Decision February 12, 1988. (Case No. 870128-CA, 750 P.2d 
202 (Utah 1988). We should hardly expect they would have been. 
However, the trial court thought everything had been to this court 
already. (TR pp. 1-3). The Appeals Court limited itself solely to 
the question of the timeliness of an appeal of a writ in the 1979 
judgment. It did not address the merits of the questions raised 
herein, but limited itself solely to the timeliness question of 
appeals on a writ of execution. It did not review the 1979 
judgment to see whether post-judgment interest is allowed. 
The factual issues before the trial court are genuine. (R 166-
7; 204-207). Defendants are entitled to be heard by some court 
that will really listen. The legal issues before the trial court 
demand that parts of this matter be dismissed, and that there be 
a trial on the rest. The trial court never answered the questions 
of, "what is the real amount the 1979 judgment; whether it had been 
paid; whether there were equitable offsets available; and, whether 
the Plaintiffs had to honor the bid they had made and the court had 
previously told them to honor. After that, it never got to the 
question of the amount, if any, that could be renewed. All of 
these questions were before the trial court, as well as legal 
questions about the jurisdiction of the court and its ability to 
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enter a judgment at all. If one was to be entered, McCune requires 
the partnership assets pay first. The Counterclaim contained 
Defendants1 claim against the Barbers for overreaching, 
misrepresentation, and even fraud in seeking to enforce the 
judgment. The court did not justify throwing these out. 
All of those questions were before the trial court, and exist 
before this court now. The court abused its discretion when it 
decided to enter judgment against the partnership and general 
partners, where the partnership itself was in bankruptcy and had 
assets and a trustee, but the partnership and one partner were not 
served. 
Alternatively, judgment could not be renewed against joint 
obligors where one obligor was released after negotiations with 
Barber's attorney and Barbers failed to seek a deficiency judgment; 
and another obligor was released because he was not served. 
Failure to amend the prior judgment and statutes of limitation 
problems are valid defenses to efforts to expand the judgment 
beyond its 1979 terms. Even if these issues did not all exist, 
Barbers admit their sole claim to post-judgment interest is 
grounded on U.C.A. §15-1-4. That section should not help them 
because the prayer in the Complaint did not ask for post-judgment 
interest. Even if it had, the judgment was based on a contract and 
Section 15-1-4 was not complied with. 
The damage done to the Defendants would have been far less if 
the trial court had only renewed the 1979 judgment's exact 
language. The trial court did not limit itself to that. It should 
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not even have gone that far, however, because the partnership had 
assets and Plaintiffs elected to only go after two general 
partners, ignoring the other two joint obligors. Now that it is 
past time for their trial, the judgment should be dismissed. 
Defendants seek attorney fees on appeal and ask that summary 
judgment against them be vacated, based on the facts and law 
presented here. 
Dated this 10th day of March, 1989. 
R'aymc^rid N. Malouf 
Attorney for Defendants//and 
Third Party Plaintiffs/Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of March, 1989, 
four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellants 
Case No. 880410, were mailed postage prepaid to the following: 
N. George Daines, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs, Third Party and 
Counterclaim Defendants/Appellees 
108 North Main, Suite 201 




1. Original January 1979 Complaint from Cache County No. 
17630. (R 17630, pp. 1-4). 
2. Original April 18, 1979 Judgment. (R 17630, pp. 40-41). 
3. Complaint to renew judgment, March 27, 1987. (R 25616, 
pp . 1-3) . 
4. Motion to Dismiss Complaint, and Stocking Affidavit. (R 
4-17; 27-38) . 
5. Memorandum Decision, Objections and Order. (R 43-49). 
6. Answer and Counterclaim by Stocking and Malouf. (R 62-
65) . 
7. Rule 54(b) Order, December 27, 1988. 
8. Notice of Appeal. (R 260-261). 
9. Motion to Strike Amended Complaint. (R 93-102; 106-112). 
10. Defendants' Response to Memorandum, opposing partial 
summary judgment, and Affidavits of Stocking and 
Malouf. (R 163-184). 
11. Defendants' response to Supplemental Memorandum, opposing 
partial summary judgment. (R 203-218). 
12. Notice of Objections to proposed findings. (R 221-241). 
case, but it misapprehended the true facts and 





HARRIS, PRESTON & GUTKE 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone: 752-3551 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo — 
NORMAN BARBER and 






hE~*:J BARBER, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, and ) 
K. STOCKING, DON A. WHITE, ) 
and RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR., ) 
ral partners, ) 
Defendants. ) 
C O M P L A I N T 
C i v i l No. 
Comes now the Plaintiffs an3 complain of the Defendants 
and for cause of action alleges: 
1. That the Defendant, Emporium Partnership, is a 
limited partnership under the Limited Partnership Act of Utah 
and the named Defendants are the general partners of said 
partnership. Said partnership is located in Cache County, Utah. 
2. That on or about the 11th of November, 1977, 
Plaintiffs loaned to the Defendants the sum of Fifteen Thousand 
($15,000.00) Dollars. Defendants executed the attached note 
marked Exhibit "A" payable to Plaintiffs, and delivered the 
same to Plaintiffs. 
3. That the Plaintiffs have made repeated demands 
upon the Defendants for payment of said note and interest and the 
Defendants have refused to pay any part or portion thereof. That 
the full amount of the said note of Fifteen Thousand ($15,000.00) 
Dollars is due plus interest to date hereof in the amount of 
Twenty-one Hundred Eiahty and 88/100 ($2,180.88) Dollars. 
H A * M M PRKSTON ft Q u T K E I 
ATTOW N C V S - A T . I A * 
I t r C O K H A L A V S ^ u C 
L.OOAM UTAH M S * | 
•MOW* * « • 1M1 
;;,,^J_7M* 
ID 
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4. That the said note provides for the payment of 
reasonable attorney's fees in the event of collection and suit 
and that the Plaintiffs allege that the sum of Four Thousand 
($4,000.00) Dollars is reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded 
the Plaintiffs for use and benefit of their attorney in bringing 
this action. 
Wherefore, Plaintiffs pray ludgment against the 
Defendants for the principal sum of Fifteen Thousand ($15,000.00) 
Dollars, interest thereon of Twenty-one Hundred Eiahty and 88/100 
($2,180.88) to date hereof plus interest additional at the 
rate of twelve (12) percent per annum until judgment plus court 
costs herein expended and reasonable attorney's fees as may be 
awarded by the Court. 
BtORMAN BARBER 
f U.£. L%" , L UAL 
VIS PWCSTON * CUTKC 
kO**M UTAM H i l l 




HARRIS, PRESTON & GUTKE 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, UT 84321 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
County of cache ) 
NORMAN BARBER AND HELEN BARBER, first duly sworn deposes 
and say: That they hive read the above and foregoing complaint 
and know the contents thereof and that the information contained 
therein is true except any matters that are stated on information 
and belief and as those matters, they believe them to be true. 
bRMAN'BARBER 
111 
'' h i^&LLLL~-JJL±Jll 
HELEN BARBER 





Commission Expires: 10/29/82 
Residing at Logan, Utah 
H**KM FRCSTON * CUTKK 
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 r _ . . . . « iv puy to me order of 
Hyrutn 
in Utoh, or at such other place as*the holder hereof may designate 
ie sum of - F i f t e e n Thousand Do! l a r s * Donor. ($15,000.00), payable as follows, 
T/ump sum May 1 1 , 1978 
1 before and after judgment, with interest on fhcr unpoid b i lonce thereof from date until pmd at the rate of t W e l V f l e r cent ( 1 2 \ \ 
nterett payable os followsi 
11th of each month 
>*r\\ of this note with interest to date of poyment may be made at any hm* wthout penalty. 
tolder deems itself insecure or if default be mode in payment of the whole or any port of any installment ot the time when or the ploce 
jme becomes due and payable as aforesaid, then the entire unpaid balance, with interest a\ aforesoid. shall, at the election of the holder 
without notice of said election ot once become dee and payoble. In event of any such default or acceleration, the undersigned, jointly and 
r t fsJf l i pay to the holder hereof reasonoble attorney's fees, legal expenses and lawful collection costs in addition to oil other sums duo 
nent, deetand, protest, notice of dishonor and extension of t ime without notice ore hereby woived and the undersigned consent to the 
iy security, or ony part thereof, with or without substitution. 
N. Main Emporium Partnership *^/Swh./t> rf&rv&^rp-
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HARRIS, PRESTON & GUTKE 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone: 752-3551 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER, 




Civil No. 17630 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, and 
VON K. STOCKING, DON A. WHITE, 




THIS MATTER came on regularly for hearing before the Court 
without a }ury on the Plaintiff's Motion for Judgement on the 
Pleadings. The affidavits and memorandum having been submitted 
to the Court by the parties and the Court having entered its 
Memorandum Decision on the 11th day of April, 1979, and based 
thereon, the Court having made and filed herein its Findings of 
Facts and Conclusions of Law and based thereon; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiffs 
have recovered 3udgement against the Defendants in the amount due 
on a promissory note in the amount of Fifteen Thousand (§15,000.00 
Dollars plus accrued interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum 
from date hereof until paid in the amount of Twenty-one Hundred 
Eighty ($2,180.00) Dollars, attorney fees in the amount of 
Four Thousand ($4,000.00) Dollcrs and court costs in the amount 
of Thirty-one and 30/100 ($31.30) Dollars. 
rn
-:D APRI 
V't *1 JO::? 
DATED this 17 
-2-
day of April, 1979« 
/ / 
DISTRICT 'jjUBGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Judgement to Raymond N. Malouf of MALOUF & MALOUF, 
Attorney for Defendants, 21 West Center, Logan, Utah 84321, this 
day of April, 1979. 
HARRIS PRESTON* CUTKK 
3 1 F I P C R A L t V I N U I 
lOOAM UTAH t4S«l 
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Tab 3 
N. George Daines - 0803 
DAINES & KANE 
108 North Main, Suite 200 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-4403 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN 
BARBER, husband and wife, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, 
and VON K. STOCKING,, 
DON A. WHITE, JR,, and 
RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR., 
general partners, 
Defendants. 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs and complain of the Defendants as 
follows: 
1. That Plaintiffs are residents of Cache County, Utah. 
2. That this court granted judgment against the Defendants 
in this jurisdiction on April 18, 1979, Civil No. 17630. 
3. That Defendants have failed to fully pay and satisfy 
said judgment. 
4. That Defendants have made one payment in the amount of 
$866.47 on December 31, 1984 toward the interest on said judg-
4. That there are sums due and owing to Plaintiff on said 
Jumfier ^S^fb^f judgment as follows: 
MAR 2 7 1387 ^ 
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COMPLAINT TO RENEW 
* JUDGMENT 
* Civil No. 
$15,000.00 Principal, 
$ 2,180.00 Accrued interest to date of judgment, from 
November 11, 1977, at the rate of 12% per 
annum, 
$ 31.30 Accrued costs to date of judgment, 
$ 4,000.00 Attorneys fees, 
$ 330.70 Costs accrued in enforcing judgment, 
$ 20,209.43 Interest from date of judgment to March 25, 
1987, 
$ 41,751.43 Total Amount Due 
plus interest thereon at 12% from the 25th day of March, 1987, 
until collected. 
5. That said judgment is due to expire due to the statute 
of limitations on judgments. 
6. That a new judgment should be granted as prayed for in 
this complaint to replace and/or renew the judgment due to 
expire. 
7. That due to Defendants non-payment of the amount due, 
Plaintiffs have incurred further attorneys fees in the bringing 
of this action and should be awarded reasonable attorneys fees to 
be determined by the court in addition to the amounts previously 
complained of. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against the Defendant as 
follows: 
A. To renew previous judgment entered in the amounts set 
forth below: 
$15,000.00 Principal, 
$ 2,180.00 Accrued interest to date of judgment, from 
November 11, 1977, at the rate of 12% per 
annum, 
$ 31.30 Accrued costs to date of judgment, 
$ 4,000.00 Attorneys fees, 
$ 330.70 Costs accrued in enforcing judgment, 
$ 20,209.43 Interest from date of- judgment to March 25, 
1987, 
$ 41,751.43 Total Amount Due 
2. For reasonable attorneys fees to be determined by the 
court incurred in the filing and prosecution of this action. 
3. For costs and such other and further relief as the court 
deems equitable. 
DATED this 27th day of March, 1987. 
DAINES & KANE 
A / S J 
' / 
N. George Dairies 




Raymond N. Malouf/dh (68:EMBAMTD.RDP1 
MALOUP LAW OFFICES 
Attorney for Defendants 
150 East 200 North #D 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone: 752-9380 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiff, MOTION TO DISMISS 
vs. AND TO STRIKE 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, and 
VON K. STOCKING, DON A WHITE, JR., 
and RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR., 
Defendants Civil No. 25616 
Comes now Defendant Raymond N. Malouf, Jr. and moves to 
dismiss the Complaint because the Court lacks jurisdiction to 
grant the relief requested for the following reasons:(1) the 
Court lacks jurisdiction over the person of the Defendant 
Partnership;(2) the Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject 
matter;(3) the Complaint fails to state a legal claim for relief; 
and (4) the Complaint fails to join an indispensible party. 
Defendant further moves to strike certain of the items in 
the second paragraph (4) and paragraphs 6 and 7 in the Complaint 
for alleging immaterial, impertinent, scandalous and fraudulent 
matters. 
This Motion is based upon the Complaint filed herein ,and 
this Motion together with Defendant's Memorandum A in support 
thereof. 
DATED this JO day of April, 1987 
Number< 
APR 2 01337 
SUHSAUBI, Clerk 
'n—' y* vwto 
Raymond N. Malouf/dh (68:EMBAMMTD.RDP) 
MALOUF LAW OFFICES 
Attorney for Defendants 
150 East 200 North #D 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone: 752-9380 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE 
NORMAN BARBER and 
HELEN BARBER, husband 
and wife, 
Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
vs. AND TO STRIKE 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNER-
SHIP, and VON K. 
STOCKING, DON A. WHITE, 
JR., and RAYMOND N. 
MALOUF JR., 
Defendants. Civil No. 25616 
Defendant Raymond N. Malouf, Jr. has filed a Motion to 
Dismiss the Complaint based on the fact that this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to grant the relief requested because the Court: (1) 
lacks jurisdiction over the person of the Defendant Partnership; 
(2) the Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the 
suit; (3) the Complaint fails to state a legal claim for relief; 
and (4) the Complaint fails to join an indispensible party. 
In addition, Defendant has moved that certain of the claims 
in the second paragraph (4) and in paragraphs 6 and 7 in the 
Complaint be stricken for alleging immaterial, impertinent, 
scandalous and fraudulent matters. 
FACTS 
The only undisputed fact is that a judgment was rendered in 
Civil No. 17630 on April 18, 1979. Almost every other allegation 
Number ,:-3-*%*>( fa - J> 
'u-'p > : 13S7 
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in the Complaint will be contested if a response is required. 
For purposes of this Motion, it is sufficient to say that the 
present Complaint most definitely is not a legal effort to renew 
the prior judgment, but instead is an attempt to obtain an 
entirely different judgment, and is beyond the scope of the prior 
judgment. Thus, this motion. Relevant facts for each point will 
be referred to hereafter. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER THE 
PERSON OF THE PARTNERSHIP, AND THE COMPLAINT 
FAILS TO JOIN AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY 
Plaintiff attempted to serve the Defendant Emporium Partner-
ship by serving one of the partners, to wit: the undersigned. 
The Partnership no longer continues to operate its normal 
business and jurisdiction over the partnership cannot be obtained 
by serving the undersigned for the following reasons: 
1. The Defendant Partnership is in bankruptcy, No. 79-
01412, converted to Chapter 7 bankruptcy May 22, 1982 in the 
District of Utah. 
2. The trustee of the Emporium Partnership is James Z. 
Davis, attorney at law, 1020 First Security Bank Bldg, 2404 
Washington Blvd., Ogden, Utah 84401. 
3. The fact of bankruptcy of the Defendant Partnership is 
sufficient to cause the dissolution of the partnership, and the 
Partnership has either ceased or is in a stage of dissolution. 
4. The bankruptcy of the partnership is sufficient to give 
rise to the protection and requirements of 11 USC §362, which is 
an automatic stay against any continuance or furtherance or 
initiation of any action against the partnership, including this 
action. 
5. Plaintiffs have not obtained relief from the automatic 
2 
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stay, which they must do, before proceeding against the Partner-
ship or any of its assets. 
6. The trustee in bankruptcy has not been named as a party 
in this action, so process is insufficient. Since the trustee is 
not named, he obviously has not been served, so there is no 
jurisdiction over the Partnership in any event. 
Inasmuch as Plaintiff has failed to even allege a cause of 
action that would result in jurisdiction over the Partnership, 
the Complaint should be dismissed. 
II 
THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION 
OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE SUIT, 
AND CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE COMPLAINT 
SHOULD BE STRICKEN 
The original action was for suit on a note signed by Von 
Stocking and Don White. The statute of limitations on that note 
expired, according to Section 78-12-23 U.C.A., 6 years after the 
note, more than 2 years ago. Plaintiff seeks to renew its 
judgment barely before the expiration of the 8 year statute of 
limitation provided in §78-12-22. Such an effort is strictly 
limited to the judgment itself. In the renewal action, the prior 
note has become merged wtfojhi the judgment and ceases to exist. 
The present action, then, is no longer an action founded on 
contract. See Yergensen v. Ford, 16 U.2d 397, 402 P2d 696 (1965) 
and Gossner v. Dairymen Assoc. 611 P2d 7lft (Utah, 1980). The 
judgment, as entered, limits the relief the Plaintiff can seek to 
renew in this action to the award actually made and enforceable 
in the prior action. The relief Plaintiff is seeking in this 
action is in excess of what was allowed by the prior judgment. 
The Court lacks jurisdiction to grant any relief in excess of 
what the prior judgment actually allows. 
The prior judgment does not allow interest, except for 
$2,180 from the date of the judgment until that judgment is paid. 
3 
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That language limits the amount of interest that can be collected 
or sued on in this action. The language in the prior judgment is 
not a mere failure to record the judgment as entered, inasmuch as 
it is consistent with the findings of fact, conclusions of law 
and even the prayer in the prior Complaint. The pleadings were 
all prepared by the Plaintiff. They do not amount to a mere 
error to be reformed. To get any more, the judgment would have 
to be worded differently than it is. The standard for changing 
words in a judgment is set forth in Richards v. Siddowav, 24 U.2d 
314, 471 P2d 143 (1970). The only way to change the amount of 
money allowed by a judgment is for the judgment to be amended. 
The error in the prior judgment is at most a judicial error in 
rendering the judgment. Judicial errors can only be cured by a 
timely motion for a new trial, amended findings, appeal or a new 
action. 
The prior judgment is clear in limiting the interest to the 
amount specified from the "date hereof until paid." The Court 
does not have the power to modify the judgment, even to make 
technical changes, since the time for appeal expired and that 
item was not appealed. See Benson v. Anderson, 14 U. 334, 47 P 
142 (1896) and Frost et. al. v. District Court, et. al. , 96 U. 
106, 83 P2d 737 (1938): 
"... After the time for appeal has expired, the 
Court has no power to modify a judgment in a 
substantial or material respect. This is well-
settled law." 
Allowance of the present suit would of course amount to an 
amendment of the judgment, which is not allowed. The present 
suit, seeking more than the prior suit, should be dismissed. 
In other parts of the second paragraph numbered (4) of the 
Complaint, Plaintiff seeks another item clearly not included in 
the prior award: $330.70 in costs incurred in enforcing the prior 
judgment. Those costs were not allowed by the prior judgment, and 
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the prior judgment has expired. It also illegally seeks interest 
after March 25, 1987, which is an additional attempt to expand 
the prior judgment. Since the prior judgment already specified 
the dollar amount of interest that could be collected, and since 
Plaintiff alleges the prior judgment is unpaid, the new action 
cannot seek to expand the prior judgment for more money. 
Paragraph (6) asks a new judgment not according to the prior 
judgment, but as Plaintiff has reworded it. This clause cannot 
stand. Finally, paragraph (7) in this new action seeks for 
attorneys fees in bringing this complaint. That is not allowed 
by the prior judgment anywhere. The underlying note has long 
since expired, and there is no currently enforceable note or 
other agreement for attorneys fees, so there is no basis to seek 
additional attorneys fees. Accordingly, paragraph 7 must also be 
stricken. 
Ill 
THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A LEGAL CLAIM 
FOR RELIEF 
Plaintiffs1 claim is limited to the relief actually allowed 
by the prior judgment. Its claim for relief is far in excess of 
the limits of the prior judgment. Inasmuch as this new complaint 
seeks funds not allowed by the underlying judgment, it must be 
dismissed for failure to state a legal claim. 
In addition to failing to state a legal claim for matters 
beyond the prior judgment, the prior judgment has been paid, 
witi^ the possible exception of $344.83, and, it should be dis-
missed on the merits. The Complaint alleges in the first para-
graph numbered (4) that the (only) payment was $866.47 made 
December 31, 1984. In fact, on December 3, 1986 Plaintiffs 
appeared and actually bid the amount of $20,000 plus costs for 
the right and interest of the undersigned in certain real 
property, which Plaintiffs caused to be advertised in advance of 
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sale. This Court refused to quash that execution when the 
undersigned showed he had no interest. The sale took place. 
That proceeding was in connection with Civil No. 17630. Plain-
tiffs have so far wholly refused to enter a partial Satisfaction 
of Judgment for that additional amount, and must before bringing 
this present action. 
The $20,000 paid by the undersigned, plus $866.47, which is 
shown at page 254 in the Record of Civil No. 17630 to have 
actually been credited December 31, 1982, makes a total of 
$20,866.47, plus ail the costs of the Sheriff's sale, which 
should show as a satisfaction of the judgment against the 
undersigned. 
The point being made here is that there can be no legal 
claim for relief when the judgment itself has been paid. If 
there is still any question as to whether the undersigned has 
paid all that is required of him on the judgment, reference to 
page 256 of Civil No. 17630 shows a letter from counsel for 
Plaintiff in this same action, dated October 3, 1986, 2 months 
before the execution sale wherein it is plain that the Plaintiffs 
claimed only one-third of the amount they claim due on the 
judgment from this Defendant. They specified that amount to be 
about $12,500. Thus, the Plaintiffs have been overpaid from this 
Defendant. Payments of $20,866.47 less $12,500 is $8,366.47 
(plus costs) beyond the $12,500 the Plaintiffs wanted from him. 
Attached hereto in support of this Motion is a copy of the 
certificate of sale evidencing the payment of $20,000 which has 
not been satisfied on the prior judgment. 
The total original judgment was $21,211.30, as can be seen 
from page 40 of the record in Civil No. 17630. That is only 
$344.83 more than what this Defendant alone has paid on the 
judgment. The most, therefore, that Plaintiffs could seek for a 
legal cause of action would be $344.83. Far more than that 
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amount was collected from Defendant Von Stocking, or Plaintiffs 
waived the right to collect anymore from Mr. Stocking when, after 
November 4, 1983 they failed within 90 days to seek a deficiency 
judgment after a trxistee's sale of property in which the Plain-
tiffs were beneficiary of a trust deed which secured any and all 
indebtedness of any kind whatsoever from Mr. Stocking to the 
Plaintiffs. 
August 29, 1983 by letter written from the attorney for 
Plaintiffs, within nine weeks before the trust deed sale, counsel 
for Plaintiffs agreed that the Von Stocking property was worth 
between $45,000 and $60,000. The letter also attests to the fact 
that at least some of the equity, of Von Stocking should go to 
offset the judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs herein. A copy of 
the letter, together with an affidavit of Von Stocking is 
attached. The equity by Plaintiffs1 own admission in the letter, 
is between $11,808.06 and $26,808.06. 
Mr. Stocking's affidavit states the Plaintiffs went forward 
with the purchase of the trust deed sale and purchase of the 
beneficial interest in it to secure Plaintiffs1 position in the 
prior judgment. 
Because the entire underlying debt has been paid, it would 
appear that Plaintiffs have failed to state a legal claim for 
which relief can be granted and the entire Complaint should be 
stricken on the merits as impertinent and fraudulent. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons specified, the Court lacks jurisdiction to 
proceed on this case and must dismiss the action for lack of 
jurisdiction over the partnership as well as Jack of jurisdiction 
over the subject matter. Plaintiffs have failed to include an 
indispensable party and have failed to obtain relief from the 
automatic stay in bankruptcy, without which they cannot pursue 
7 
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any of their allegations herein. The Complaint should be dis-
missed until relief from the stay has been obtained. Further, 
the Complaint actually fails to state a legal claim for which 
relief can be granted. It claims far and beyond what the 
underlying judgment permits. The underlying judgment has not 
been amended and cannot be amended now. Moreover, it appears as 
if the underlying judgment has more than been paid. Therefore, 
there is no cause of action to proceed on. 
The matters in the Complaint are in excess of the underlying 
claim and are clearly immaterial, impertinent, scandalous and 
fraudulent in view of the pleadings and affidavits. Moreover, 
since the judgment has been paid, the entire Complaint should be 
stricken as being impertinent. 
DATED this 20th day of A$&il^l9B7 
</^ oi nuM.W0"IH& 
Raymond /N. Malouf 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of April, 1987, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Dismiss and Motion to Dismiss was mailed postage prepaid to 
the following: 
N. George Daines, Esq. 
DAINES & KANE 
Attorneys at Law 
108 North Main 











' P^MOOM po» p a n * JO) p » M 
-I "HVUk JO XI. #4* 
M4XK 4»i«j p a w m 
«• -
HVJil JO IXVJJ 
JLLNAOO SC3V3 JO JUDIXHS 
I iooe '4 4M>PT« 
• |0$ |Q «|0»|}{4i0 
""•N 









12t NORTH MAIN 
LOGAN UTAH §4321 
(M1)TO-4403 
N O f OMOE DAINES 
KEVIN E KANE 
29 August 198 
Mr. Raymond Malouf 
150 East 200 North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
#D 
Re: Barber v. Emporium 
Dear Ray: 
Norm Barber^ana I have examinedrlre^^yon 
Stocking home and Relieve that its worth wouldNprobably 
be somewhere in the range of $45-60,000.00. Wejbelieve 
to determine its "walue accurately, a professiopfel appraisal 
should be done. InVcJiscussing various appjA^sers , Norm 
Barber and I felt «-*>«>,«-»ii*> hgft flpprs1sH*'vnn1 ri probably 
be Tom Singleton, but perhaps, if you have someone else in 
mind, we would accept an appraisal upon advance clearance 
of the individual involved. 
It would be my suggestion that you prepare that 
appraisal at your expense and submit it to us for our review. 
Upon reviewing that we may well be able to consummate some 
kind of an arrangement regarding your liability to Norm Barber. 
Anticipating that this is going to take several weeks 
to determine what the appraisal of that home is and the 
likelihood that the home is insufficient to pay the full 
amount of the judgment. If think it is advisable that we 
continue with the Supplemental Order that was started 
VTTT this wct*k - Please consider this formal notice, pursuant 
to our arrangement, that you should be prepared and at court 
the next motion and order day to continue answering questions 
regarding this supplemental proceedings. You should also 
be advised that we have served a notice to appear on your wife, 
your father and also Carl Malouf, to determine more concerning 
the arrangements between yourself and these individuals. 
I also anticipate preparation and perhaps filing of a lawsuit 
Involving j-r-*iidul *»*">*• mmrcyanoe agninnt some of these parties. 
I fees strongly that you should come forward now and make some 
Mr. Raymond Malouf 
25 August 1983 
Page Two 
definitive arrangements to take care of your obligation in 
this situation. Mr. Barber is insistent that you do so. 
Sincerely, 
DAINES & KANE 
Attorney at Lew 
le 
cc Norm Barber 
Raymond N. Malouf/dh (68:EMBAAFV.RDP) 
MALOUF LAW OFFICES 
Attorney for Defendants 
150 East 200 North #D 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone: 752-9380 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiff, AFFIDAVIT OF VON STOCKING 
vs. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, 
and VON K. STOCKING, DON A. WHITE, 
JR., and RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR., 
Defendants. Civil No. 25616 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF CACHE ) 
Comes now Von K. Stocking and being first duly sworn deposes 
and states the following of his own personal knowledge: 
1. That he is a Defendant in the above named action. 
2. That; he was a Defendant in Civil No. 17630. 
3. That he owned the property described in book 189 page 
458 in a Trust Deed given to First Federal Savings & Loan on 
March 18, 1976. 
4. That the afore-described property was a home with a 
basement apartment worth far in excess of $33,191.94 that 
Plaintiffs Norman and Helen Barber paid First Federal for in 
Jtheir purchase of the beneficial rights on or about November 3, 
1983. 
5. That he knows Norman and Helen Barber bid $33,191.94 at 
the trust deed sale on this property on Ngyftfrbpr 4, 1983. 
'•PP l ' H37 
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6. That he .is familiar with the representations from 
Plaintiffs made by letter dated August 29, 1983 where Barbers 
alleged that the property was worth between $45,000 and $60,000, 
and knows that, for the date of the sale, such values were 
conservative, 
7. On November 2nd and 3rd, 1983 he was involved in 
several conversations initiated by George Dalnes, attorney for 
Plaintiffs who asked him to agree to let the Barbers take over 
this property aforementioned by paying First Federal, and 
applying between $12,000 and $15,000 against the prior judgment 
to his credit, plus giving Von Stocking an additional $3,000. 
8. That Mr. Daines continued these conversations while 
the undersigned was trying to cure the default with First Federal 
and until the morning of the trust deed sale on November 4, 1983. 
9. That there was no doubt that the Barbers wanted to take 
over this property in order to collect from me on the judgment 
they had against the Emporium, the undersigned, Don and Ray. 
10. That he relied on the representations by Mr. Daines on 
behalf of Plaintiffs that he would credit the prior judgment, and 
believed he had kept his word, which the undersigned has very 
good notes on, because Plaintiffs took no further action to 
collect from the undersigned until the prior judgment almost 
expired. 
11. That Mr. Daines represented that he wanted each of the 
individual Defendants in the prior judgment to pay only the 
percentage of the prior judgment equal to their percentage of the 
Emporium Partnership. 
12. That if Mr. Daines did not intend to go through with 
what he promised on behalf of his clients, the Plaintiffs should 
be required to honor his promises since Plaintiffs in fact 
proceeded to take over the property, and the undersigned relied 
on these representations by their attorney. In fact, Mr. Daines 
was fraudulent in his representations, but this fraud, of not 
crediting the prior Barber judgment, did not become apparent 
until 
2 16 
February 7, 1987 when Mr. Daines again served Mr. Stocking's wife 
with a Motion and Order for Mr. Stocking to appear in Supplemen-
tal proceedings on the prior judgment. 
DATED this J3 day of April, 1987. 
Vnn K. Stnckina / Von K. Stocking 
Von K. Stocking having been duly sworn on oath deposes and 
states that he is the affiant and that he has read the foregoing 
Affidavit, knows the contents thereof and believes the same to be 
true and as to items stated on information and belief, the same 
are believed to be true. 
y^^/^/^r^y 
Von K. Stocking ' fttrk-SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 13c day of April, 
1987. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ^0 day of April, 1987, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Von Stocking was 
mailed postage prepaid to the following: 
N. George Daines, Esq. 
108 North Main 
Logan, UT 84321 
Secretary 
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Raymond N. Malouf/md 
MALOUF LAW OFFICE 
Attorney for Defendants 
ISO East 200 North #D 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone: 752-9380 
C;
»CHE nj./tl ,,,raK 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, and 
VON K. STOCKING, DON A. WHITE, 
JR., and RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR. 
Defendants. 
ENTRY OF APPEARANCE FOR VON K. 
STOCKING AND JOINDER IN MOTION 
Civil No. 25616 
Comes now Von K. Stocking by and through his attorney 
Raymond N. Malouf and enters his appearance in this matter and 
joins with the Motion dated April 20, 1987. Entry of this 
appearance was approved by the Court in chambers Monday, May 4, 
1987. 
The Motion to Dismiss and to Strike was initially made on 
behalf of Defendant Raymond N. Malouf. It was supported with the 
Affidavit of Von K. Stocking. Mr. Stocking now joins in the 
Motion and requests the Court grant the relief requested therein. 
DATED this 8th day of May, 1987. 
\c^bsipuikH&Mk W Raymond If. Malouf 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of May, 1987, a 
and correct copy of the foregoing Entry of Appearance for Vo 
Stocking and Joinder in Motion was mailed postage prepaid to 
following: 
N. George Daines, Esq. 
DAINES & KANE 
Attorneys at Law 
108 North Main Street 
Logan, Utah 84321 
2? 
Raymond N. Malouf/md 
MALOUF LAW OFFICES 
Attorney for Defendants 
150 Bast 200 North #D 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone: 752-9380 
RECEIVED 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OP UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, 
and VON K. STOCKING, DON A. WHITE, 
JR., and RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR., 
Defendants. 
REPLY, IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS1 MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND TO STRIKE 
Civil No. 25616 
Come now the Defendants appearing herein and reply, in 
support of the Motion to Dismiss and to Strike, and answer the 
Plaintiff's Response as follows: 
30 
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The first point made in the Motion to Dismiss and to 
Strike was that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the person of 
the partnership. Unrefuted are the facts that Plaintiffs have 
neither properly served the partnership itself, nor properly 
named the partnership a party. The Complaint fails to join an 
indispensable party, the Trustee of the Emporium Partnership's 
bankruptcy. 
In their response, Plaintiffs admit the critical elements of 
this first argument:: (1) that the Emporium Partnership is in 
fiinkruptcy; (2) that the effect of the bankruptcy is an automatic 
££ay against the continuance and furtherance of any action 
against the partnership; and, (3) the st^y has not been lifted, 
aintiffs seek to collect, assess or recover a claim which arose 
fore the partnership's bankruptcy, contrary to 11 U.S.C. 
152(a)(6). Plaintiffs further acknowledged that since they have 
not obtained a lifting of the automatic stay, the limitations of 
the automatic stay are fully enforceable against any action 
against the Partnership. They said it was okay if the Complaint 
against the partnership is dismissed. 
Plaintiffs seek to distinguish this action as one not 
requiring a lifting of the automatic stay to proceed against the 
other Defendants. However they cite no authority for this claim. 
While generally the automatic stay is not a bar to proceeding 
against a surety, co-debtor or guarantor who is not in bankrupt-
cy, there are circumstances in which the automatic stay against a 
partnership will bar proceedings against other defendants. This 
is the case where the debtor partnership must be sued with the 
other Defendants. The original judgment in Civil No. 17630 was 
not obtained against: the other three Defendants as sureties, co-
debtors or guarantors, but solely on the basis of their status 
as alleged general partners. Their liability only exists if they 
are general partners. If the partnership is not a party then the 
partners cannot be sued. Liability is limited to the provisions 
of Section 48-1-12(2), U.C.A. These Defexidants can only be 
liable jointly for the debt, which is and was only a partnership 
debt. The Plaintiffs never alleged the partners were liable as 
sureties, co-debtors or guarantors, but merely as partners. The 
original judgment is not entered jointly and severally. It 
cannot be entered jointly and severally because its terms did not 
provide for joint and several liability, the Complaint did not 
allege joint and several liability, and Section 48-1-12(1) limits 
joint and several liability to certain kinds of partnership debt 
arising from wrongful acts of a partner or a partner's breach of 
trust, neither of which were alleged in the first action. If 
there is no obligation of the partnership, by definition the 
partners cannot be liable. 
Accordingly, the partners can only be liable jointly. By 
definition, to sue someone jointly, the partnership and all the 
members thereof must be made parties. See Palle v. Industrial 
Commission, 79 U.47, 7 P2d 284 (1932). Inasmuch as the partner-
2 
ship has not been, and cannot be, presently made a party, the 
Complaint must be dismissed until such time as the Plaintiffs 
obtain a lifting of the automatic stay and join the Trustee in 
the suit. Until that time, allowance of this action violates the 
automatic stay and the Court has no jurisdiction to proceed. If 
the Plaintiffs cannot prove a judgment against the partnership, 
they are not entitled to a renewal against the general partners. 
Only if the original judgment had been for joint and several 
liability could Plaintiffs proceed against some of the Defen-
dants. Since liability is only joint, all must be joined, or the 
suit cannot proceed against any. To do that, the automatic stay 
must be lifted first.. Section 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(6) has been held 
in at least one instance to prohibit a creditor from asserting a 
claim against a surety, co-debtor or guarantor of a debt. See Re 
Smith (1981, BC DC Conn.) 14 BR 956, 8 BCD 417, 5 CBC2d 545. 
Even though Defendants herein are not sureties, co-debtors or 
guarantors, this is an instance where the automatic stay properly 
may not, under Utah law, be violated to permit Plaintiffs to 
proceed against Defendants without proceeding against the 
partnership, which Plaintiffs admit could be dismissed because of 
the automatic stay. 
Defendants have shown sufficient reason to require the 
action to be dismissed entirely because Plaintiffs have not 
obtained permission to proceed against the partnership. In 
addition, Plaintiffs have entirely failed to state a cause of 
action for a partnership debt, which must be done to get a 
renewal of this judgment. 
II 
Defendants1s second argument to the Court was that it lacked 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, and that 
certain elements of the Complaint should be stricken. Plaintiffs 
fail to refer to a specific earlier decisic^ p of this or any other 
Court supporting their response. Plaintiffs1 attempt to justify 
some of the relief prayed for in the Complaint by alleging the 
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costs and attorney Jfee provision of the original note to the 
partnership survived to be ruled on again in a renewal action. 
In the State of Utah this is completely false. Plaintiffs failed 
to offer any authority to overcome Defendants1 point the statute 
of limitations has run on the note itself, or to refute the Utah 
decisions of Yergensen and Gossner which squarely hold the note 
has become merged with the judgment and ceases to exist. Plain-
tiffs say there are numerous courts holding to the contrary, but 
fail to refer to a single one. Clearly that is not the law in 
the State of Utah. Thus, paragraph 7 of the Complaint must be 
stricken. 
The prior judgment only allows a specific dollar amount of 
interest until the judgment is paid. The judgment has not been 
paid. On the very face of it, the judgment does not accrue 
interest. This drafting failure in the judgment is not cor-
rectable now, as has been adequately briefed in Defendants1 
Memorandum. First, the relief actually allowed is consistent 
with the prayer in the Complaint. Second, the error, if it is an 
error, is not curable under the holdings of Richards, Benson and 
Frost, all of which were argued, without rebuttal by Plaintiffs. 
There has never been an earlier decision by this Court 
allowing interest to accrue on the previous judgment in the 
manner in which the Plaintiffs seek to accrue it in paragraph 6. 
Plaintiffs seek to correct the deficiency in the prior judgment 
illegally. Although they claim their judgment is a renewal, it 
actually is an attempt at an entirely additional cause of action 
going far beyond the relief allowed in the first judgment. 
Plaintiffs misrepresent the facts when they pretend there is an 
earlier decision by the Court allowing interest to accrue as they 
have prayed in this Complaint. They refer to no such decision, 
gttid none exists. 
The very fact that instead of seeking to renew the prior 
judgment, Plaintiffs have attempted to sta^e a separate cause of 
action, is a basis to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety. 
4 
Defendants are not limited to merely raising the defense that 
Plaintiffs ask more than they are entitled to. 
In previous decisions by this Court in Civil No. 17630, the 
issue of interest accruing beyond that allowed by the face of the 
judgment has not been ruled on. What was ruled on, September 12, 
1986, was that the Court would not allow the Defendants to change 
the judgment to a different amount. The Court never did say what 
interest existed, and did not change the limitations of the 
judgment. At the time Plaintiffs were not threatening to collect 
any more than the judgment's face allowed. Defendants1 Motion 
was to remove the attorney fees awarded under the prior judgment, 
as one of those items which they were allowed to do when the 
Court made its decision May 21, 1979 that the questions of 
attorney fees and enforceability of a judgment by limited 
partners who were also creditors, went not to questions of the 
amount of the judgment or entry of a judgment, but to questions 
of enforcement and priorities. The Court specifically said that 
the Defendants could, without prejudice, take any appropriate 
action when the judgment was sought to be enforced. From time to 
time as Plaintiffs have attempted to enforce the judgment, 
Defendants have taken sufficient appropriate action to deny 
Plaintiffs any illegal recovery. Later, on November 20, 1986, 
the Court said that its previous decision on September 12, 1986 
already covered the elements of a latter Motion to Quash writs of 
execution. It did not. Neither decision allowed the Plaintiffs 
to accrue interest beyond the amount limited by the judgment. 
Plaintiffs have failed to show any authority justifying 
their facetious claims of an earlier decision or numerous Courts 
holding against the position of the Defendants. The Court does in 
fact lack jurisdiction over the subject matter of much of this 
Renewal Complaint, because the Complaint seeks an entirely new 
cause of action. Since it does not limit the requested relief to 
an extension of the prior judgment, it should be dismissed in its 
entirety. Paragraphs 4, 6 and 7, as specified in the Motion, 




The third item shown by Defendants in their Memorandum is 
that the Complaint failed to state a legal claim for relief. 
This has already been partly discussed here by the showing that 
the relief prayed for goes beyond the judgment which previously 
existed. Plaintiffs try to argue out of the rest of the issues 
by saying they are not obligated to credit the judgment with 
their December 3, 1986 bid. The Complaint fails to state a legal 
claim for relief by completely ignoring the requirement that 
Plaintiffs must credit the $20,000 bid December 3, 1986. 
Plaintiffs somehow think they are not required to credit this 
until they have possession of the property. They offer no 
credible authority for this proposition. Possession has nothing 
to do with the fact: of the bid. To argue under Rule 69(g)(2) 
that there might be a way for the Court to back them out of the 
bid is ridiculous. There is no possibility there can be an event 
to apply those provisions, for the reason that all of the 
interest of the Defendant Ray Malouf was bid for, without any 
guarantee that there in fact was an interest. To suggest there 
could be an irregularity in the sale is without merit. Any 
irregularity could only go to the benefit of Defendants. In 
fact, that there was no equity or interest to be sold was one of 
the arguments' in the Motion to Quash the writ of execution filed 
August 22, 1986 in Civil No. 17630. In withstanding Defendants1 
argument, Plaintiffs themselves said " whatever that 
Interest is can be sold by the Plaintiff for satisfaction of the 
judgment. The interest is sold without warranty . . . No one 
is warranting that the interest is substantial and that it 
exists." ( R 234, 235) Defendants already attached a copy of the 
bid, and Plaintiffs cannot deny it was made. Just so there will 
be no doubt about whether that must be credited, Defendants point 
first of all to the Court's ruling September 12, 1986. It 
required Plaintiffs to show partial satisfactions of all ap-
propriate amounts. Second, the Utah decision of Randall v. 
Valley Title, 681 P2d 219 (Utah, 1984) held that a creditor 
bidding at a sale cannot bid all or part of the amount of Its 
Interest and then fail to pay cash or discharge its claims to the 
extent of the bid. 
Plaintiffs err in thinking they can wait until after the 
redemption period to see whether they feel like crediting the 
amount of their bid. It is contrary to all authority. The Court 
must require Plaintiffs to credit the amount of the bid, (plus 
the costs they bid) against the prior judgment before allowing 
this action. Until they do so, this action should be dismissed. 
Once the proper partial satisfaction of judgment has been 
entered, Defendants1 Memorandum has shown why the remaining 
amount on the judgment is $344.83, or less. Defendants explained 
why credit should also be allowed to the extent of equity in the 
former Stocking home obtained by Plaintiffs November 4, 1983. 
Attached to the Motion was a copy of Plaintiffs1 letter ack-
nowledging the value of said home. Completely unrefuted is the 
Defendants' point that Plaintiffs only had an interest in bidding 
on Von Stocking's home as a result of their judgment against Von 
Stocking in Civil No. 17630. No possible other explanation is 
offered as to why they were even interested in that sale. 
Plaintiffs persist in saying their appearance at the Stocking 
Trust Deed sale was completely irrelevant to this judgment. That 
completely misrepresents what happened. Plaintiffs have not 
refuted Mr. Stocking's affidavit. In the prior action, the 
Plaintiffs said they " . . . simply went to the Trustee's Sale 
and purchased the property for the amount owing on the first 
mortgage. There was no credit to Mr. Von Stocking or to this 
judgment in the matter of that purchase." (Record 229) Those 
words are a lie. The attached copy of an Assignment of Trust 
Deed proves that on the day before the sale, Plaintiffs obtained 
the entire beneficial interest of the Trust Deed, and then only 
bid the first mortgage deficiency on the* very next day. That 
enabled them to ^ onna Stocking's equity share in the home, and 
allowed avoiding a homestead claim. Mr. Stocking's affidavit 
explains that Plaintiffs' attorney was calling him to arrange for 
the amount of credit that would be allowed against Civil No. 
17630 if the Plaintiffs obtained Mr. Stocking's house. They did 
obtain the house and Mr. Stocking relied upon the promises. 
Plaintiffs were initiating conversations directly with Von 
Stocking while in the very act of dirtying their hands by the 
purchase of the beneficial interest in Stocking's prior Trust 
Deed. They should be equitably estopped from denying the home 
equity as credit on this judgment. The Plaintiffs in fact 
remained silent in excess of three years and made no efforts to 
collect another dime from Mr. Stocking. It appeared to Mr. 
Stocking that Plaintiffs indeed considered his part of the debt 
paid as a result of taking over his house. In saying no equity is 
owed Mr. Stocking over this, Plaintiffs are lying. They have 
failed to come clean with the Court. It is perjury to represent 
that they "simply went to the sale". What they did was bid as 
the sole beneficiaries of the Trust Deed, a position into which 
they had inserted themselves one day before the sale, solely for 
an advantage in collecting on this judgment. 
The very fact that Plaintiffs1 bid at the Stocking Trust 
Deed sale November 4, 1983 as sole beneficiaries, is an 
additional reason this lawsuit must be dismissed. When Barbers 
bid at the Trust Deed sale November 4th the sum of $33,191.94, 
they not only breached their agreement upon which Mr. Stocking 
relied which was made with him directly as per his affidavit, but 
they bid as the beneficial holder of the Trust Deed. 
As the owner of the trust deed's beneficial interest at the 
time of the trust deed sale on November 4, 1987, Plaintiffs had 
the benefit of that trust deed to secure all of their judgment 
against Von Stocking. Plaintiffs themselves now claim this 
judgment was fully payable by Mr. Stocking. Plaintiffs not only 
failed to bid what the house was worth, but also did not there-
after seek a deficiency judgment against4 Mr. Stocking. Under 
Section 57-1-32, U.C.A. they should have done so within three 
months, and since they did not, they cannot sue Von Stocking for 
any more. Plaintiffs would be hard pressed to argue that they 
became the beneficial owners of that trust deed for any other 
reason than to obtain security on their judgment against Mr. 
Stocking in Civil No. 17630. They haven't offered any other 
explanation. Having failed to seek and obtain a deficiency 
judgment, they have effectively released Mr. Stocking from any 
exposure or liability for the renewal judgment. Since he cannot 
be sued, and since all the Defendants are only joint obligators, 
the suit must be dismissed. Under the provisions of Section 15-
4-4 of the Utah Code, the release of Mr. Stocking for failure to 
seek a deficiency judgment effectively acts as a release against 
the other Defendants, since they can only be liable jointly. 
CONCLUSION 
The whole thrust of Plaintiff's arguments and the renewal 
action is to try to chastise Defendants for continually refusing 
to accept more responsibility, as they put it, for this judgment. 
ha a matter of fact, this Court itself excused them from respon-
sibility on May 21, 1979 wht*n in Civil No. 17630 the Court said 
Defendants could take any appropriate action when the judgment 
was sought to be enforced. 
Because the prior judgment only exists from a partnership 
debt, the partners of the partnership cannot be sued unless the 
partnership is joined. Since the automatic stay has not been 
lifted, the suit cannot proceed until it has been. Meanwhile, it 
and should be dismissed. 
The renewal Complaint does not seek a renewal of the 
judgment. Instead Plaintiffs have tried to rewrite the judgment 
and cure its defects. They seek a new judgment entirely, not a 
renewal. They cannot do this. 
Plaintiffs have failed to credit amounts they bid on the 
judgment. They have fraudulently misrepresented to the Court the 
true amount of the debt. Plaintiffs have further fraudulently 
misrepresented their responsibilities to allow equity in Von 
Stocking's house to apply on the judgment. That Deed was 
assigned to them to specifically provide security for this debt. 
They have forfeited their right to any further recovery against 
Von Stocking by not seeking a deficiency judgment on the Trust 
Deed. 
Plaintiffs have failed to cite any cases supporting their 
arguments and have failed to refute the statutes, cases, and 
affidavit submitted by the Defendants. 
The relief requested by the- Plaintiffs to dismiss the 
complaint with prejudice, should be granted. The provisions in 
the Complaint which seek for relief beyond the former judgment 
should be absolutely stricken. 
DATED this 8th day of May, 1987. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of May, 1987, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Reply, In Support Of Defen-
dants1 Motion To Dismiss And To Strike was mailed postage prepaid 
to the following: 
N. George Daines, Esq. 
108 North Main, Suite 200 
Logan, UT 84321 
Secretary 
FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged. 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN hereby asigns to NORM BARBER 
AND HELEN BARBER without warranties or representations of any kind and without 
recourse, all the beneficial interest and rights accrued or to accrue under 
that certain Deed of Trust, together with the indebtedness secured thereby, 
which Deed of Trust is dated March 16, 1976, was executed by Von K» Stocking 
and Donna L. H. Stocking, as Trustor, for First Federal Savings and Loan 
Association of Logan as Beneficiary, way recorded on March 18, 1976, as Entry No. 
391882, in Book 189, Pages 458 - 61 of the records of the County Recorder of 
Cache County, Utah and covers real property situated in said county described 
as followst 
Part of Lot 2, Block 22, Plat MD" Logan City Survey 
described as followst '&$£ 
Beginning at a point 27 rods South and 10 rods Wust 
of the Northeast corner of said Lot 2, and running 
thence West 5 rods; thence South 8 rods 8 feet and 
2 inches, more or less, to the North line of Third 
South Street; t.hence East 5 rods; thence North 8 
rods 8 feet and 2 inches, more or less, to the place 
of beginning, being situated in the North half of 
Section 3, Township 11 North, Range 1 East of the 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
DATED this 3rd day of November, 1983. 
Attest: 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN 
"Fred R. Hunsaker, President 
On the 3rd day cf November 1983, personally appeared before me 
Fred R. Hunsaker, President and Gordon W. Haws, Secretary of First Federal 
Savings and Loan Association of Logan, the signers of the foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed the same for 
and on behalf of the said corporation. 
^XOA^^TYX 7 ^ A 
Notary Public 
Commission Expires / / * / / / / Residing a t / W ^ u '%LM^IM l/AJ*-
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN 
BARBER, husband and wifef 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERHSIP, 
and VON K. STOCKING, DON A. 




Civil No. 25616 
The plaintiffs have filed a complaint to re-new a judgment. 
The judgment being granted in Civil No. 17630 on April 18, 1979. 
Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of 
jurisdiction in failing to join an indespensible party and failing 
to state a legal claim. 
Plaintiffs are not seeking to bring any new suit on any 
other claim except to re-new a judgment already granted. An 
existing bankruptcy may stay proceedings that is working toward 
a judgment, but it does not estop the plaintiffs from re-newing 
a judgment already received prior to any bankruptcy proceedings. 
From a review of the pleadings it does not appear that there 
is any modification or change in the relief sought except the re-
newal of the judgment. There is included in the renewal coutinuing 
of interest on the judgment. This is not a modification. The 
question the Court mciy have would be the suggested attorney's fees. 
AI llf;7 1QQ 
Barber v. Emporium et al 
Civil No. 25616 
Page Two 
Therefore, defendants motion to dismiss is denied and 
counsel for plaintiff to prepare the appropriate order. 
Defendants have 10 days within the filing of said order to answer 
the complaint. 
Dated this 18th day of May, 19 87. 
BY THE COURT: 
V e f t f o ^ t h i ^ t o f f e r s e n 
D i s t r i c t ' J u d g e 
N. George naiaesis" - £€8 No. Malt^'Suite 200 - Logan, Utah 84321 
Raymond N, MUftif --"WO-East*2pfi:Nor;» Suite D - Logan, Utah 84321 
'•vjteaaesi <l&'^  AA n m ^ 9(in 
Raymond N. Malouf/md 
MALOUP LAN OFFICES 
Attorney for Defendant 
150 Bast 200 North, Suite D 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 752-9380 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER, 
husband and wife, et. al. 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, et. al. 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF OBJECTIONS 
1 TO PROPOSED FORM OF 
1 ORDER AND REQUEST FOR 
NOTICE 
1 Case No. 25616 
Come now the Defendants and serve notice under Rule of 
Practice 2.9(b) that they object to the form of the Order offered 
by Plaintiff after the Court's May 18, 1987 Memorandum Decision. 
Defendants further request Notice of the actual filing date and 
Order filed after the Court has considered these objections. The 
objections are as follows: 
1. In the first paragraph Plaintiffs omit the Court's 
findings that an existing bankruptcy may stay a proceeding 
working toward a judgment. That very language conflicts with the 
proposed language for the first Finding. Because there is an 
existing bankruptcy by the Emporium Partnership, an undisputed 
fact, it shtiuld stay these proceedings against the Emporium 
Partnership entirely. The old judgment expired. This action is 
working toward judgment. Not to stay these proceedings violates 
provisions of 11 U.S.C. Section 362(a)(1) and (2). This is 
because this attempt to renew a judgment is the continuation and 
employment of process in a judicial proceeding against the Debtor 
that was commenced or could have been commenced before the 
bankruptcy. It is to try to recover a disputed claim against 
the Emporium Partnership that arose before the bankruptcy. 
Neither the Plaintiff nor the Court referred to any legal 
authority for any exception to this automatic stay provision. 
The Defendants have pointed out why the stay not only applies to 
the Emporium Partnership, but also to the General Partners who 
AX 
are only liable if the Partnership is liable. It is critical 
that the Order recite the fact that an existing bankruptcy stay 
may stay proceedings working toward a judgment, as these proceed-
ings are, and that the other Findings and the Order be consistent 
therewith. 
2. The second paragraph does not state as a separate idea 
the Court's finding that, included in the renewal effort was an 
effort to get continuing interest on the judgment. The proposed 
form of the Order Implies that the prior judgment allowed 
continuing interest. Since it did not, no more import should be 
given to this than the Court stated in its Memorandum Decision. 
Continuing interest was something the prior judgment did not 
allow. Therefore, the Memorandum Decision and the form of the 
Order should admit that the renewal effort represents a modifica-
tion of the prior judgment. If the form of the Order is entered 
as proposed, the Court should be required to amend its Memorandum 
Decision before requiring Defendants to file their answer. 
3. The third paragraph of the Order should not recite that 
the Court will consider awarding attorney fees, but that the 
Court will consider whether it has any jurisdiction to award 
these in the renewal action. Since attorney fees after judgment 
are not part of the prior judgment, the Court should state in the 
Order that it lacks jurisdiction to award attorney fees in this 
renewal action. Because in the Memorandum Decision the Court 
said it questioned this, the Complaint should be dismissed at 
least as to that portion. 
Dated this 1st day of J\tfie7~l>87. 
Raymond 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 1st day of June, 1987 a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Objections To 
Proposed Form Of Order, re Civil No. 25616, postage prepaid to 
the following: 
N. George Daines, Esq. 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNT? OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN 
BARBER, husband and w i f e , 
Plaintiffs 
v. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, 
and VON K. STOCKING, DON A. 




Civil No. 25616 
The Court made its memorandum decision regarding the questions 
raised in this matter. The defendants have objected to the 
proposed order based on that memorandum decision. 
The Court has compared its memorandum decision with the order 
and sees no reason to change the order. 
Therefore, the same will be signed as of this date. 
Dated this 18th day of June, 19 87. 
BY, THE COURT: , 
ersen 
N. Gfeorge Daines - 108 J o , fllain, Sufte £00, - Logan, Utah 84321 », , ^ < C 7 - / A „ / < 
Raymond N.' Malouf - X5Dj£aaL.ioa Berth,; Suite D - Logan, Utah 8432rriD5r ^ ' ~ ^ ' " — L " 
•:?s 18th d*yof..June 19 -87< f } 
ZM 3. ALLEN, Clerk ,, , . 
Jyi>5tt3. C tf^f^l . . • / JUN131387 
"
ty V
" ' ^ f|R7
 rrR9n titfH&/IUflHCfc* 
'-Wit. U h / lACfD^U^ p , n_..^ 
N. George Daines - 0803 
Daines & Kane 
108 North Main, Suite 200 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-4403 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN * 




THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, 
and VON K. STOCKING, DON A. * Civil No. 25616 
WHITE, JR., and RAYMOND N. 
MALOUF, JR., * 
Defendants. * 
The Defendant having filed a Motion to Dismiss this action 
on the grounds of jurisdiction or failing to join an 
indispensable party and/or failing to state a legal claim and 
Plaintiff having responded to said Motion, 
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court enters its Order based upon its 
Memorandum Decision of May 18, 1987, as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs are not estopped from renewing a judgment 
already received prior to any bankruptcy proceeding bv an 
existing bankruptcy stay. 
2. There is no modification or chancre in the relief sought 
except the renewal of the judgment including continuing interest. 
This is not a modification. 
3. There is a reguest for additional attorney's fees and as 
to those, the Court will consider subsequently whether additional 
attorney's fees should be awarded but that doe^ riot constitute a 





valid basis for a Motion to Dismiss. 
BASED THEREUPON, the Court hereby Orders that Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss is denied and Defendants have ten (10) days 
from the date of filing of this Order to answer the Complaint. 
DATED this / ff day of (Jtoy^  1987. 
BY THE iCOURT: 
District qourt 
MAILING CERTIFICATION 
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of May, 1987, I mailed 
a true and correct cop/ of the foregoing ORDER to the following: 
Raymond N. Malouf 
150 East 200 North, Suite D 
Logan, UT 843 21 
S e c r e t a r y 
BOOK 067 mG22 
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Raymond N. Malouf/md 
MALOUF LAW OFFICES 
Attorney for Defendant 
150 East 200 North, Suite D 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephones (801) 752-9380 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER, ] 
husband and wife, et. al. : 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, et. al. : 
Defendants. 
1 ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
1 Civil No. 25616 
Cone now Defendants Von K. Stocking and Raymond N. Malouf, 
Jr., the only Defendants who are parties to this action, and 
reserving the right to answer for Don A* White, Jr., if and when 
he becomes a party, answer the allegations of the Complaint as 
follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The Complaint fails to state a claim against Defendants upon 
which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
The Court* lacks jurisdiction over the Defendant partnership, 
which is in dissolution and has filed bankruptcy, and Plaintiff 
has failed to remove the effect of the automatic stay under 11 U. 
S. C. Section 362, and has not attempted to name the bankruptcy 
^Trustee or serve him as a party, all of which is necessary to 
>btain jurisdiction over the partnership, and the other Defen-
dants, who may only be liable if the partnership is liable. 
i THIRD DEFENSE The court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of this 
jsuit, which is for an amount in excess of the judgment which 
^Plaintiff seeks to renew. The excess Complaint is barred by the 
six-year statute of limitations. Section 78-12-23 U. C. A., so 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
The renewal judgment seeks an award in excess of the prior 
judgment by seeking to modify the prior judgment to include 
interest which is specifically not included in the prior judg-
ment. The Complaint further seeks $330.70 in costs allegedly 
incurred in ineffective attempts to enforce the alleged prior 
judgment, which costs were not allowed by the prior judgment, and 
are illegal. The Complaint further illegally seeks attorneys 
fees for renewing the judgment, which is not allowed by the prior 
judgment• 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
The Complaint fraudulently fails to admit the 320,000 plus 
coats they bid at the Sheriff's sale held by Plaintiffs on this 
judgment, which amount Plaintiffs have fraudulently failed to 
credit against their alleged claim. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
The Complaint fraudulently fails to give any credit on the 
prior judgment for equity in real property Plaintiff realized by 
taking an assignment of the beneficial interest in real property 
owned by Von K. Stocking, then proceeding to a trust deed sale, 
after which Plaintiffs failed to seek a deficiency judgment, and 
Plaintiffs failed to credit any amount towards the prior judgment 
when Mr. Stocking's property had, by Plaintiffs' own admission, 
equity between 311,000 and 327,000. The failure to seek a 
deficiency judgment was a waiver of receiving any more from Von 
K. Stocking and all other Defendants, and Plaintiffs are estopped 
from this action. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
The judgment has more than been paid, inasmuch as the 
original judgment was 321,211.30, and the Plaintiffs have already 
realized the equity in Von K. Stocking's home, plus 320,000, plus 
costs of the foreclosure sale, plus 3866.47 on the judgment, and 
Defendants are entitled to a refund of the excess, plus interest, 
plus costs and attorney fees, plus punitive damages. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
Answering the specific allegations in the Complaint, 
Defendants lack information to admit the allegations in the first 
paragraph and deny the same. Defendants further deny that the 
judgment entered April 18, 1979 is the one this Complaint is 
attempting to renew and deny each and every allegation in 
paragraphs 2, 3, 4 (1st), 4 (2nd), 5 and 7 of the Complaint. 
NINTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs have waived or compromised their claim against 
each of the answering Defendants, either by specific agreement to 
release, operation of law, or laches. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that the Complaint be dismissed 
with prejudice and the Plaintiffs take nothing thereby. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
For cause of action against the Plaintiffs, Defendants 
incorporate by reference as if fully set forth all of the 
allegations and responses in the answer and further allege: 
1. The prior and underlying judgment has either been paid 
or Plaintiffs and/or their Counsel are required to credit the 
judgment as paid and more than paid, and Plaintiffs and/or their 
Counsel have fraudulently refused to credit equity in Von K. 
Stocking's home and fraudulently and illegally failed to credit 
$20,000, plus costs of sale in a Sheriff's sale, which together 
with the $866.47 more than pays the prior judgment and for which 
actions the Defendants are entitled to damages in the amount of 
the excess payment, interest, costs and attorney fees, plus 
punitive damages. 
2. Plaintiffs and/or their Counsel have maliciously, 
wrongfully and intentionally or with gross negligence, pursued 
their alleged claim and have now attempted to renew their alleged 
judgment which action was done wrongfully and contrary to law, 
and with a malicious intent to disrupt the lives and property of 
the Defendants, and for which the Defendants are entitled to 
damages in the amount of at least $75,000 each. 
3. Plaintiffs and/or their Counsel have intentionally 
abused the legal process in attempting to expand the terms of the 
prior judgment to collect money in excess of what was allowed, 
for which Defendants are entitled to their actual damages, 
interest and attorney fees, plus punitive damages in the addi-
tional amount of at least 360,000 each. 
4. Plaintiffs and/or their Counsel fraudulently and 
intentionally breached their agreements with the Defendants as to 
the application and amount of credit to be allowed on the prior 
judgment for the equity of Mr. & Mrs. Von K. Stocking (Mrs. 
Stocking not ever being a party herein) in real property, and 
also as to the percentage of the alleged judgment to be paid from 
each Defendant, for which the Defendants are entitled to actual 
damages, interest and attorney fees, plus punitive damages in the 
additional amount of at least $90,000 each. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray for judgment against the Plaint-
iffs in an amount of the excess payments on the prior judgment, 
plus interest, plus punitive damages in the amount of $225,000 
each, plus costs of this suit and legal costs, and such other and 
further relief as is allowable under the law. 
DATED this t*3 day of July, 1987. 
aymona N. Malouf R  
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the £T^ay of July, 1987 a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
regarding Civil No. 25616, postage prepaid to the following: 
N. George Daines, Esq. 
DAINES & KANE 
108 North Main, Suite 200 
Logan, Utah 84321 ( r>
 r 
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Raymond N. Malouf/bh (#2067) 
MALOUF LAW OFFICES 
Attorneys for Defendants 
150 East 200 North, Suite D 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone (801) 752-9380 
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
CACHE COUNTY, UTAH 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN 
BARBER, husband and wife, 
RULE 54(b) ORDER 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, 
et al., 
Case No. 25616 
Defendants and 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
N. GEORGE DAINES and 
DAINES & KANE, 
Third Party and 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
COMES NOW the Court and enters this Order, effective October 
4, 1988, affirming that on that date this Court ruled that the 
Order entered October 4, 1988, and all previous Orders of the Court 
pertaining to the Complaint, Amended Complaint, Counterclaim, 
Amended Counterclaim and the Third Party Complaint were final and 
appealable orders under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P., and there is no just 
reason for delay in allowing the Defendants and Third Party 
Appellants who are parties in this action to bring their appeal. 
Dated this day of December, 1988. 
VeMOY OtftoTOFFBSON 
District Court Judge 
1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the J. day of December, 1988, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing RULE 54(b) ORDER, Case No. 
25616 was mailed postage prepaid to the following: 
N. George Daines 
DAINES & KANE 
108 North Main, Suite 200 
Logan, Utah 84321 
MT •^//*4:, 
Raytoond~N. Mal-ouf " 
2 
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Raymond N. Malouf/md (#2065) 
Attorney for Defendants 
150 East 200 North, Suite D 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone (801) 752-9380 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN 
BARBER, husband and wife. 
Plaintiffs, NOTICE OF APPEAL 
vs. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, 
et al • , 
Defendants and Case No, 25616 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
N. GEORGE DAINES and 
DAINES & KANE, 
Third Party and 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
Notice is hereoy given that Defendants Von K. Stocking and 
Raymond N. Malouf hereby appeal to the Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah from the Orders entered in this action on or about October 
4, 1988, in this First District Court by Judge VeNoy 
Christoffersen, which Orders were declared by the Judge October 4, 
1988, to be a Final and Appealable Partial Summary Judgment, and 
also appeal from all related, underlying or preceding orders and 
issues related thereto, preserved by the Court or the parties and 
now ripe for appeal, including those issues raised by Defendants1 
Petition for Permission to Appeal, filed July 9, 1987 (Supreme 
Court No. 870232) the issues of which Interlocutory Order are now 
final and appealable. 
Defendant Don A. White, Jr. appears specially, solely to the 
extent necessary to appeal the Orders which apply to him, and he 
. J 
denies that the Court has jurisdiction over him in this case 
because he was not served. 
Dated this 2nd day of November, 1988 
<2 jfffr/yM. 
Raym/n^f N. M£louf F tfr 
>ttc£r A t t o r n e y fo r A p p e l l a n t s / D e f e n d a n t s 
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t on t h e 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
2'"' day of November, 1988, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal, Civil No. 
25616, was mailed, postage prepaid to the following: 
N. George Daines, Esq. 
DAINES & KANE 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
108 North Main, Suite 200 





ymond N. Malouf/md (Bar No. 2067) 
LOUF LAW OFFICES 
torney for Defendants 
0 East 200 North, Suite D 
>gan, Utah 84321 
dephone: (801) 752-9380 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
>RMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER, 
isband and wife, et. al. 
Plaintiffs, 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
IE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, et• al 
Defendants* 
Cache County 
Civil No. 25616 
COME NOW Defendants, with the exception of Logan Savings and 
>an who is not represented by the undersigned, and move to 
rike the Amended Complaint because the Complaint: (1) Violates 
ie Rule for amending a complaint; (2) is an improper attempt to 
d additional parties; (3) is unrelated to the Complaint as 
led; (4) asks for relief which the Court does not have juris-
ction to grant and which is not allowed by the rules; (5) is 
irred by statutes cf limitations; and (6) improperly asks for 
xtition. 
This Motion is supported by Defendants Memorandum in Support 
Motion to Strike, filed concurrently herewith. 
DATED this day of August, 1987. 
idgLlLsM&ti 
Raym N. Malouf 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the PV^day of August, 1987 
"rect copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prep 
ie following: 
N. George Daines, Esq. 
DAINES & KANE 
Attorneys at Law 
108 North Main, Suite 201 






Raymond N. Malouf/md (Bar No. 2067) 
MALOUF LAW OFFICES 
Attorney for Defendants 
150 East 200 North, Suite D 
Logan, Utah 34321 
Telephones (301) 752-9380 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER, 
husband and wife, et• al. 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, et• al. 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS ' MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO STRIKE 
Cache County 
Civil No. 25616 
In support of Defendants1 Motion to Strike, Defendants set 
forth the following reasons why the Court should strike the 
Amended Complaint. 
FACTS 
1. Defendants have already filed an Answer and Counter-
claim to the Complaint. When the Answer was filed July 23, 1987 
at 3:01 p.nu, the Plaintiffs had not filed an Amended Complaint. 
2. The Complaint seeks to renew a judgment. The prior 
judgment has expired. The Plaintiffs have no present right to a 
lien against any of the Defendants1 property. The Amended 
Complaint seeks to add additional parties, but does not allege 
any of the additional parties are or may be liable to the 
Plaintiff for all or part of the Plaintiffs* claim against the 
Defendants. 
3. The Amended Complaint only adds a second and third 
cause of action. It alleges matters wholly unrelated to whether 
the Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment on the Complaint 
itself. 
4. Plaintiffs have neither admitted .nop alleged there^waq 
94 
•MIC261387 
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either an irregularity in the sheriff's sale December 3, 1986# 
or that the property allegedly sold was not subject to execution 
and sale. 
5. More than four years have expired since Logan Savings 
and Loan executed and recorded an assignment of its beneficial 
interest in a trust deed to Raymond N. Malouf, one of the 
additional Defendants Plaintiffs seek to add. No action other 
than the Amended Complaint has been taken against the assignment. 
6. Plaintiffs have never acknowledged their obligation to 
offset the prior judgment, now expired, with the amount of their 
bid at a sheriff's sale. They thus, cannot own any part of the 
property they want to partition. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
NO RULES PERMIT FILING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Plaintiffs did not file the Amended Complaint before 
Defendants' responsive pleading for the Complaint was filed July 
23, 1987. The Plaintiffs have not obtained leave of Court to 
file an Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs have not obtained the 
consent of the adverse parties to file an Amended Complaint, nor 
can they obtain the same. Rule 15(a) U.R.C.P. does not allow the 
filing of an Amended Complaint in this circumstance. The Court 
therefore lacks jurisdiction to consider the same, and the 
Amended Complaint should be stricken. 
II 
THERE IS NO JURISDICTION TO ALLOW THE 
ADDITION OF ADDITIONAL PARTIES 
Rule 14 . Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, governs the cir-
cumstances in which either the Plaintiffs or Defendants may bring 
in additional parties. The conditions for adding additional 
parties have not been alleged or satisfied by Plaintiffs. The 
2 
Plaintiffs have not alleged that any of the additional parties 
are or may be liable for all or part of Plaintiffs' claim against 
the Defendants. In fact, there is no way any of the additional 
Defendants could be liable for the claim in the first cause of 
action, because the prior judgment was not against those Defen-
dants. The Amended Complaint illegally 3eeks to bring in 
unrelated matters in an effort to prematurely satisfy a claim 
against someone else for which Plaintiffs have no judgment. 
There is no basis or justification in the Rules of Procedure or 
in the Law to permit Plaintiffs to proceed against parties who 
may have some title or interest in real property, when the Plain-
tiffs do not even have a judgment on which they can execute. The 
Court lacks jurisdiction to permit Plaintiffs to amend their 
pleadings to add the additional parties for the purposes alleged. 
The Amended Complaint should be striken as to the third parties 
Plaintiffs seek to join, and as to all claims made. 
Ill 
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT EXCEEDS THE 
SCOPE OF THE COMPLAINT 
The Amended Complaint seeks to add two causes of action. 
One cause of action is for a declaration of ownership of property 
disputably partly owned by an original Defendant. Plaintiffs bid 
on the interest of that Defendant after the prior judgment, which 
is now expired. The other cause of action is for partition of 
the same property. Both causes of action are unrelated to the 
Complaint which seeks to decide whether Plaintiffs are entitled 
to a renewal judgment. The Amended Complaint is inappropriate. 
Plaintiffs should net be allowed to piggy-back the outdated 
enforcement efforts onto a claim to renew a judgment. The 
enforcement efforts are completely separate and should be kept 
that way. The underlying judgment expired, and with it all of 
Plaintiffs' rights to take any action against the property of the 
Defendants in that action. Plaintiffs will only be able to take 
action against property of the Defendants if and when they obtain 
a renewal judgment. 
IV 
THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION DOES 
NOT STATE A CLAIM 
The second cause of action^for determination of the Plain-
tiffs* interest in the property they executed on December 3, 1986, 
is alleged by the Plaintiffs to be brought under Rule 69(g)(2) 
U.R.C.P. Thus, any relief under the second cause of action is 
dependant on an irregularity of the sale or on the fact the 
property was not subject to execution and sale. Plaintiffs have 
alleged neither an irregularity in the sale nor that the property 
executed on was not subject to execution and sale. Since they 
have not alleged these things, and since these things in fact do 
not appear to be the case, the Court has no jurisdiction to 
grant the relief under Rule 69(g)(2) U.R.C.P. In Randall v. 
Valley Title 681 P2d 219 (Utah, 1984), the Utah Supreme Court 
required a creditor bidding at a sale to credit his judgment and 
discharge the claim to the extent of the bid. Plaintiffs have 
not even done that. The only way Plaintiffs can have the benefit 
of Rule 69 is to allege there was an irregularity in the sale or 
the property was not subject to execution and sale. If they 
could successfully prove either of those things, then they could 
be excused from having to credit the prior judgment. Since they 
have not credited the judgment, however, they are not entitled to 
any claim of ownership in the property. They are not entitled to 




THE AMENDED COMPLAINT IS BARRED 
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Section 78-12-25, U.C.A., provides a four year bar to 
bringing actions of the type alleged in the second and third 
causes of action. The second cause of action attempts to 
invalidate the assignment of the beneficial interest in a trust 
deed from Logan Savings and Loan dated June 3, 1982. It has been 
more than five years since the assignment was given and recorded. 
Plaintiffs cannot now claim such assignment was invalid. 
Plaintiffs also appear to be attacking the judgment of Raymond N. 
Malouf against Raymond N. Malouf, Jr. whichi* dated January 15, 
1982. The judgment was docketed in Cache County more than four 
years ago. The amount of the judgment speaks for itself. It has 
not been satisfied, and Plaintiffs allege no reasons why it is 
not a valid claim. Regardless of what Plaintiffs chose to call 
it, their Amended Complaint is dependant on successfully 
contesting these two matters. They are barred from doing this 
not only by §78-12-25, but also by §78-12-26. 
VI 
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO 
PARTITION ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiffs have repeatedly refused to credit the prior 
judgment or acknowledge they are obligated to pay what they bid 
at a December 3, 1986 execution sale. Now in the third cause of 
action they claim they own part of the property for which they 
have paid nothing. Such an action, if brought at all, must be 
brought separately, and only after Plaintiffs have credited the 
prior judgment. Defendants hereby request Plaintiffs to im-
mediately release the lis pendens. Plaintiffs have shown no 
basis for the Court to have jurisdiction over proceedings for 
partition. The Court should strike the Amended Counterclaim and 
should also order the lis pendens removed. The lis pendens 
Plaintiffs admit they filed in paragraph 4 of the third cause of 
action in the Amended Complaint is groundless. 
5 
CONCLUSION 
The Amended Complaint adds two causes of action to the 
Complaint. Neither cause of action is related to the Complaint. 
Both are improper. The Court lacks jurisdiction to consider 
them. Statutes of limitation bar the bringing of these actions. 
The Rules which would permit an Amended Complaint to be filed 
have not been followed. The additional parties which the Plain-
tiffs seek to bring in are not brought in pursuant to any 
applicable Rule. Th€> Court lacks jurisdiction to allow these 
additional parties. The Amended Complaint is a veiled attempt to 
execute on a claim for which the Plaintiffs do not even have a 
judgment. The lis pendens Plaintiffs admit they filed is 
groundless and false. Plaintiffs have not established any 
rights in the property, have not credited what they bid, and have 
no right to proceed with a partition hearing. For all of these 
reasons the Amended Complaint should be stricken. 
Dated this day of August, 1987. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the -lH day of August, 1987 a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Strike, Civil No. 25616, was mailed, postage prepaid to the 
following: 
N. George Daines, Esq. 
DAINES & KANE 
Attorneys at Law 
108 North Main, Suite 201 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Secretary 
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N. George Daines - 0803 
DAINES & KANE 
108 North Main, Suite 200 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-4403 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN * 
BARBER, husband and wife, 
* RESPONSE TO 
Plaintiffs, AUGUST 24, 1987, MOTION 
TO STRIKE AMENDED COMPLAINT 
vs. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, 
and VON K. STOCKING, DON A. * 
WHITE, JR., and RAYMOND A. 
MALOUF, JR., * Civil No. 25616 
Defendants. * 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs, by their attorneys, Daines & Kane, 
and respond to Defendants1 Motion to Strike as follows: 
1. Motion to Amend: Concurrently with this Response, 
Plaintiffs have filed & Motion to Amend their original Complaint. 
Evidently, Mr. Malouf filed a responsive pleading the same day 
Plaintiffs filed the Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs were not 
aware of a respqnsive pleading at the time they filed the Amended 
Complaint. That problem should be remedied by Plaintiffs making 
a formal Motion to Amend Complaint. 
2. Objections to Amended Complaint: The objections of 
Defendants to the Amended Complaint are answered specifically as 
follows: 
(a) Matters are Unrelated: Mr. Malouf alleges the,1 
Second and Third Causes of Action are unrelated yet thely 13? '*2 
c: 
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relate very specifically to whether or not Defendantp^^ ^ 
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Malouf, White and Stocking are to receive a credit against 
the Judgment owing. Mr. Malouf seems to want it both ways. 
He agrees Plaintiffs do not own any part of the subject home 
and alternatively that the amount of their bid should be 
credited. Clearly, one or the other is correct, but not 
both. The Second and Third Causes of Action are related in 
that they will answer that question. 
(b) Compliance with Rule 14: Rule 14(b) specifically 
allows third parties to be brought in by a Plaintiff upon 
the filing of a counterclaim which Defendants have done in 
this case. More specifically, the Fifth Defense of 
Defendants1 Answer and the second paragraph of the 
Counterclaim raise the very issues to be resolved by the 
Amended Complaint and the involvement of additional 
Defendants. 
(c) Failure to State a Claim; Clearly, the Utah Rules 
allow for the Court to determine the interest purchased by 
the Plaintiffs and whether there is an irregularity. 
Presumably, Defendants will set that up as an affirmative 
defense as they have done at the Fifth Defense of their 
Answer. 
(d) Statute of Limitations: Neither Section 78-12-25 
nor 78-12-26 are applicable to Plaintiffs1 Causes of Action. 
The former deals with contracts not in writing and the 
latter with completely unrelated topics. Plaintiffs are 
simply unable to respond intelligently unless Defendants can 
indicate the section they rely upon. ^ 
(e) Right to Partition; There is no obligation to 
bring a partition action separately, it follows regularly 
upon the other Causes of Action. No cases or authorities 
whatsoever are cited by the Defendants. Clearly, Plaintiffs 
are entitled to partition based on their bid, if that is 
determined valid, which is the subject of the Amended 
Complaint. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that Defendants' Motion to Strike 
be denied and that Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint be 
granted• 
DATED t h i s liih day of September, 1987. 
DAINES & KANE ^ 
/ / _ _ 
.,, —^-z,- Daines 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
MAILING CERTIFICATION 
I hereby certify that on the '/ /7'day of September, 1987, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO 
AUGUST 24, 1987, MOTION TO STRIKE AMENDED COMPLAINT to the 
following: 
Raymond N. Malouf 
Malouf Law Offices 
150 East 200 North, Suite 200 
Logan, UT 84321 
Secretary J 
Raymond N. Malouf/md (Bar No. 2067) 
MALOUF LAW OFFICES 
Attorney for Defendants 
150 East 200 North, Suite D 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 752-9380 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER, 
husband and wife, et. al. 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, et. 
Defendants. 
al 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
AUGUST 24, 1987 MOTION 
TO STRIKE AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 25616 
Defendants renew their Motion of August: 24, 1987 to Strike 
the Amended Complaint. The Plaintiffs' response failed to set 
forth any valid reason to allow the amended Complaint. Defen-
dants nevertheless reply to Plaintiffs1 response as follows: 
THE ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM PRECEDED 
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT BY FOUR DAYS 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) requires leave prior to 
filing an amended pleading. It prohibits the filing of the 
amended complaint. Plaintiffs excuse themselves by saying the 
amended Complaint was filed the same day the responsive pleading 
was filed. The Court file says otherwise. On Thursday, July 23, 
1987, at 3:01 p.m., the Answer and Counterclaim was filed. On 
Monday, July 27, 1987, at 9:59 a.m., the Amended Complaint was 
filed - without a mailing certificate. 
The formal motion to amend the Complaint does not solve 
Plaintiffs1 problem. The motion does not have any memorandum or 
xplanation of how justice is served by permitting the amendment 
j g ^ f the Complaint. Thus, it cannot be filed under Rule 15(a) 
R.C.P. The motion Plaintiffs1 filed purportedly is based on 
u^le 14(b) U.R.C.P. That rule does not apply to amended plead-
gs. It applies to third party practice. Reading that Rule 
1 
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leads to the conclusion that Plaintiffs may only bring in 
additional parties if the additional parties might be liable to 
the Plaintiffs as a result of Defendants' Counterclaim. Again, 
Plaintiffs did not accompany their motion with a memorandum or 
any explanation showing how the additional third parties might be 
liable to the Plaintiffs for the Defendants' Counterclaim. Thus, 
the motion to amend the Complaint cannot be allowed merely 
because Plaintiffs filed a motion under Rule 14(b) U.R.C.P. 
There is no showing of how the Plaintiffs could think that 
the proposed third parties are liable to the Plaintiffs because 
of Defendants' Counterclaim. Plaintiffs replied July 28, 1987 to 
the Counterclaim. Nowhere in the Reply is a defense set forth or 
reference made that the additional proposed third parties are 
liable to the Plaintiffs because of the Counterclaim. The 
Counterclaim was filed together with the Answer July 23, 1987. A 
reading of the Counterclaim fails to show any other basis for 
Plaintiffs to add the additional third parties as defendants in 
this action, notwithstanding Plaintiffs response referring to the 
Fifth defense, which is treated later. 
The Amended Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice, 
and the Motion to amend the Complaint should be denied. 
II 
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT IS UNRELATED 
The original Complaint seeks to renew a judgment. None of 
the proposed additional third party defendants were defendants in 
the prior case. The judgment was not against them, and it was 
not against specific property. Plaintiffs have not even at-
tempted to show how the additional parties are or may be liable 
for the Plaintiffs1 claim. 
Plaintiffs have admitted both that they bid $20,000.00 
against the interest of Defendant Raymond N. Malouf in certain 
property, and that the Plaintiffs have not offset their judgment 
by that amount. That is the fifth defense- in the Answer and 
Counterclaim filed July 23, 1987. The second paragraph in the 
2 
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Counterclaim alleges that the Plaintiffs wrongfully pursued the 
prior judgment and wrongfully are trying to renew it. Neither of 
these pleadings require the addition of the proposed third party 
defendants or the amending of the Complaint to resolve. Rule 
14(b) U.R.C.P. does not allow third parties to be brought in, 
unless those third parties can be shown to be liable. The claims 
in the first cause of action and the Counterclaim related to it 
are unrelated to the? proposed amendments to the Complaint. The 
proposed third party Defendants are not liable. Plaintiffs 
misapply and misrepresent the pleadings and the rules in att-
empting to expand their complaint. The amended Complaint and its 
attempt to add third party defendants should be stricken. 
Ill 
A BID IS A BID IS A BID 
Keep in mind that the Complaint is only for the renewal of 
the alleged judgment. The Amended Complaint seeks to establish 
ownership or joint ownership in property which Plaintiffs 
allegedly executed on in connection with their original judgment. 
Even though the Plaintiffs have not credited the judgment by one 
cent for their bid, this amendment to the Complaint is a piggy-
back effort to improve their position after the execution on the 
underlying judgment. It has no place in a proceeding to deter-
mine whether the Plaintiffs can even renew their judgment. 
Plaintiffs have thus far been unwilling to admit that there 
is an irregularity in the original sale or that the property was 
not subject to execution. In the underlying action, this Court 
allowed the Plaintiffs, in a disputed motion on the very point, 
to go forward with their execution sale. They must be presumed 
to have proceeded ax their own risk. Who are they to say now 
that the Defendant owned no equity in the property? The only 
possible "problem" to Plaintiffs with their bid is whether they 
paid more than they wish they had paid. Just because Defendants 
may have turned out to have no equity after all is not a reason 
the sale was irregular or that the property not subject to 
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execution and sale. Plaintiffs pretend that Rule 69(g)(2) U.R. 
C. P. allows them to bring the second cause of action in the 
Amended Complaint. It really does not. That rule is specifical-
ly set up to give the third party purchaser at a sale either a 
judgment against the creditor or a judgment against the debtor, 
is he does not end up with possession of the property bid for. 
It does not deal with the question of what happens if the 
Plaintiffs themselves bid for property, or bid for it but don't 
pay for it. Plaintiffs have not gone so far as to allege they 
bid for something that did not exist. (Since they insisted on 
the sale, that would help Defendants abuse of process case). They 
have not alleged that the property sold is not subject to 
execution and sale. After all, they caused it to be sold. They 
have not alleged irregularity in the proceedings. They have not 
denied their bid, and they have not paid it. 
Rule 69(e)(4) U.R.C.P. says that every bid is an irrevocable 
offer. Failure of the purchaser to pay is contempt of the Court. 
Yet, Plaintiffs have refused to pay or enter the credit. 
Plaintiffs say Defendants "want it both ways". Defendants a 
long time ago tried to show the Plaintiffs that Defendants had no 
equity in the home. This Court refused the proof and ordered 
that Plaintiffs could proceed with the sale. Accordingly, all of 
the right title and the interest of the Defendants to the home 
was sold, and the Plaintiffs bid $20,000.00, plus the cost of the 
sale for it. It is the Plaintiffs who chose to proceed and bid 
to buy whatever they bought. If that interest ends up being 
nothing, that does not reduce their liability for payment. The 
sale was offered without guaranty to the buyer, but now the 
Plaintiffs are trying to come back and get a guaranty. Under the 
circumstances, the E>efendants are entitled to have it both ways 
because Plaintiffs elected to proceed with the sale. They are not 
entitled to one. 
IV 
THERE IS NO CLAIM 
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Nothing is clear from Plaintiffs' response about why the 
Rules allegedly allow the Court consider the Amended Complaint. 
To the contrary, an analysis of the pleadings and the Rules shows 
Plaintiffs have wholly ignored all the requirements. The 
interest in the home purchased by the Plaintiffs for $20,000 were 
conditions set by Plaintiff all the interest Defendants owned 
turns out to be nothing. Plaintiffs made a bad investment for 
which they have no claim on the Defendants. 
There is nothing in connection with the Complaint to renew 
the prior judgment that shows that the Court can re-examine the 
question of what was purchased ,by the Plaintiffs. The cnly 
question is how long will it take the Court to order the Plain-
tiffs to credit the judgment with the amount of their bid plus 
costs of the sale, regardless of what it is Plaintiff bought. 
V 
THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD IS OVER 
On the merits, Plaintiffs1 Amended Complaint should fail. 
Even if the Court were to consider the merits, the Amended 
Complaint is barred. 
First, §78-12-25 requires that actions for relief not 
otherwise provided for by law should be brought within four 
years. Plaintiffs have failed to show how their claim could be 
considered after four years. In their memorandum Defendants set 
forth the fact that the beneficial interest in the trust deed 
assigned from Logan Savings and Loan June 3, 1982, might be what 
the Plaintiffs1 attack is all about in the second cause of 
action. The beneficial interest in that trust deed was assigned 
June 3, 1982 for valid consideration and has never been attacked. 
The Amended Complaint is brought more than five years after that 
assignment. 
Second, Plaintiffs appear to be attacking a judgment 
obtained January 15, 1982, by naming the additional third party 
defendants. The only possibility for attack of that judgment is 
if the Plaintiffs think that judgment should not even exist. 
5 
Section 78-12-26 limits actions for fraud or mistake to three 
years. Since the judgment was obtained January 15, 1982 and has 
not been attacked, the Amended Complaint is at least two and one-
half years late. 
If neither of these claims are the basis for including the 
proposed third parties, then the Amended Complaint fails to state 
a claim. It should be stricken. 
VI 
WHAT PARTITION? 
Plaintiffs argued in their Response that (they) Plaintiffs 
do not own any part of the subject home. Now the third cause of 
action seeks to partition that home without having first credited 
their bid! Both procedures (partition and bid crediting) have no 
business in the Complaint - which was and should only be a 
Complaint to renew a judgment. 
If the Plaintiffs had an ownership interest in the property, 
then they certainly might have the right to bring an action for 
partition. However, they have never admitted they have an owner-
ship interest in property, and were not even willing to credit 
their old judgment, as required by the Rules, prior to claiming 
an ownership. Accordingly, it cannot be said they have anything 
to partition. It is interesting that the Plaintiffs filed a lis 
pendens, which Defendants demanded be removed, but have yet to 
credit their bid against the prior judgment. Plaintiffs appear 
to lack faith in the validity of their claim. 
Plaintiffs failed to show any connection between a partition 
and their efforts to renew a judgment. The judgment has not been 
renewed. If Plaintiffs are to file a partition claim at all. It 
must be in some other proceeding. Even if the judgment is 
renewed it only becomes effective the date of the renewal 
judgment. It does not obtain the date of the prior judgment. 
The alleged partition could not be included in any new j\idgment 
because execution ws under the old judgment. Since there is not 
6 
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a renewed judgment, there is no reason to allow Plaintiffs 
request for partition. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants renew their Motion to Strike the 
Amended Complaint fo^ all of the foregoing reasons. 
DATED this £ day of September, 1987. 
Raymond N. Malouf 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the <t3^ day of September, 1987 a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage 
prepaid to the following: 
N. George Daines, Esq. 
DAINES & KANE 
Attorneys at Law 
108 North Main, Suite 201 . , ^n 
Logan, Utah 84321 M ^ ^ W




Raymond N, Malouf - 2067 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Third Party Plaintiffs 
MALOUF LAW OFFICE 
150 East 200 North, Suite D 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 752-9380 
THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN 
BARBER, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, 
et al• , 
Defendants and 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
N. GEORGE DAINES and Civil No. 25616 
DAINES & KANE, 
Third Party and 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
Defendants oppose all the Motions and 3Ubmit Affidavits of Von 
K. Stocking and Raymond N. Malouf, together with this Memorandum. 
Even though Plaintiffs seek to renew a judgment entered in 
April 1979, they acknowledge the Amended Complaint adds additional 
Defendants and additional claims than were part of the prior 
judgment. The prior judgment renewal allegations in the first 
cause of action make an illegal attempt to expand the 'prior 
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RESPONSIVE MEMORANDUM 
FROM DEFENDANTS, OPPOSING 
MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
judgment. The motion for partial summary judgment on the first 
cause of action is not separable from the motion for a partial 
summary judgment on the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint. The Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint, 
however, bear directly on Plaintiffs* allegations in the second and 
third causes of action. In these motions Plaintiffs say nothing 
about summary judgment for that part of the Amended Complaint. 
They obviously want to put off dealing with their burden of proof 
in the second and third causes of action because of disputed facts. 
However, the disputed facts also exist in the part of the case they 
want reviewed now. The whole case and all the pleadings are 
subject to review by the Court in connection with the Motions. 
FACTUAL DISPUTES REMAIN 
Defendants oppose all of the Motions for Summary Judgment, and 
oppose the Motion for Sanctions. The Court has previously held 
there are factual disputes about some of these same issues. 
Defendants assert that if the equities and facts in this case are 
to be resolved summarily, however, justice demands a dismissal of 
the Amended Complaint and a hearing on the damages payable to the 
Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs, plus the award of sanctions 
against the Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs1 Motions are not unlike the motions made on behalf 
of the Plaintiffs and Third Party Defendants herein in a related 
case. Von K. Stocking and Donna Stocking are Plaintiffs against 
the Barbers, Mr. Dames and his law firm, and First Federal Savings 
& Loan, in Civil No. 22183. There this Court has ruled conflicting 
2 
factual matters must be heard, and has rejected Barbers1 and 
Dames' efforts to dismiss the allegations of Mr. Stocking. The 
instant case has several issues which are related to Civil No. 
22183. Summary Judgment is inappropriate here, too. The content 
of the same conversations between Mr. Daines and Mr. Stocking are 
important factual matters which must be heard in determining not 
only (1) the liability of Mr. Daines and the Barbers for their 
wrongful interference with advantageous economic relationships and 
f 
contractual relationship (in No. 22183), but also (2) the 
application of equity from Mr. and Mrs. Stocking's home as a credit 
against the prior judgment here. The amount of that credit must 
be determined, amont other things, before a renewal judgment can 
be considered. 
Another fact issue is the credit to be applied against the 
prior judgment resulting from Plaintiffs* bid of $20,000 plus costs 
for property on Decemoer 3, 1986. Plaintiffs say no credit is due. 
However, this Court ruled earlier on April 24, 1987 that the 
Plaintiffs were obligated to enter a partial satisfaction of 
judgment for the amount bid. Plaintiffs have refused to do this. 
Plaintiffs say nothing needs to be credited and base this on a 
tortured interpretation of Rule 69(g)(2). That requires a factual 
resolution of sale irregularities. Yet, Plaintiffs have not 
alleged irregularities in the sale nor have they alleged that the 
property was not subject to execution. Until they do one or the 
other of these things and prove facts to support the allegation, 
there is no possibility for not crediting 1 he bid. Legally they 
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must now credit the bid against the prior judgment before seeking 
to renew. Defendants briefed that issue to the Court August 24, 
1987, and September 8, 1987. 
Thus, at least the question of those two credits remain as 
factual issuers. In addition, the excesses requested by the 
Plaintiff in the first: cause of action remain as questions of fact. 
Another fact issue is whether the prior judgment was a judgment 
based on a contract which provided for interest (Defendants say it 
was) and whether U.C.A. Sec. 15-1-4 says that a judgment on a 
contract must specify the interest if interest is to accrue after 
the entry of the judgment. Defendants say it says this, and that 
the prior judgment needs to be amended to comply. Defendants note 
that the issue of whether a writ of execution can amend a judgment 
has not been ruled on by the Appeals Court. It is a judgment; not 
a writ, that Plaintiffs must renew if they are to succeed. 
Issues of fact related to the foregoing include: 
(1) wh€ither the Plaintiffs or their attorney agreed 
to discharge Von K. Stocking from liability for the 
judgment if he did not file bankruptcy or if the 
Plaintiffs, in fact, took over the equity in the home he 
and his wife owned in Logan; 
(2) what was the amount of equity in Von's home on 
December 4, 1983, that should be credited to the prior 
judgment; 
(3) whether Mr. Stocking acted or relied on 
representations made by the Plaintiffs or their attorney; 
4 lfJ6 
(4) whether the property bid on by Plaintiffs and 
their counsel December 3, 1986* was subject to the 
judicial sale they caused to happen; 
(5) whether the same sale had irregularities; 
(6) whether the Court earlier required the 
Plaintiffs to enter a partial satisfaction of judgment 
for that $20,000 bid, and what facts, if any, justify 
Plaintiffs not having done so yet; 
(7) what the actual language of the prior judgment 
of April 1979 says and whether that language is being 
exaggerated and added to in Plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint ; 
(8) whether Plaintiffs can get attorney fees, costs 
and after-accruing interest on the prior judgment without 
amending the prior judgment; and 
(9) whether a writ of execution on the prior 
judgment, if for more than the judgment stated on its 
face, can amend the amount that can be awarded on a 
renewal judgment when the prior judgment has expired. 
(10) whether the prior judgment is a lien now that 
it has expired. 
ADDITIONAL ARGUMENT 
It is not always required that a party offer affidavits in 
opposition to motions for summary judgment in order to avoid 
summary judgment • Where a party opposed to summary judgment 
submits no documents in opposition, summary judgment can 
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nevertheless only be granted if the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. That is the purpose of Rule 56, and 
Plaintiffs have not met their burden of proof in establishing as 
a matter of law they are entitled to judgment or even partial 
summary judgment. 
Defendants have submitted responsive affidavits from Von K. 
Stocking and Raymond N. Malouf. The Court must evaluate all 
evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion for summary judgment. (Bowen v. River ton City, 656 P2d 434 
(UT 1982). The Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and Sanctions 
should be denied based on the pleadings and the Affidavits 
submitted herewith. 
The Plaintiffs have failed to set forth the facts they claim 
are undisputed which support their Motions for Summary Judgment. 
All of the material facts are disputed, as well as the facts 
implied and directly raised by the affirmative defenses in :he 
Answer and Counterclaim, Amended Answer and Counterclaim, and Third 
Party Complaint. The Affidavits of Mr. Dames and Mr. and Mrs. 
Barber are disputed by Defendants* Affidavits, except as to 
residency of the Barbers. The allegation in all three of 
Plaintiffs' Affidavits, that they caused a lis pendens to be fiLed 
against real property even after the prior judgment expired, is 
damming to their case and supports Defendants1 position that 
sanctions should be awarded against the Plaintiffs and Third Party 
Defendants. 
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The legal cind factual question of jurisdiction over the 
Partnership and individuals also exists. The Partnership has not 
been served. The Court cannot have jurisdiction, even only on the 
alleged general partners, unless the underlying debtor, the 
Partnership, is properly also a party. 
The Motions by Plaintiff and Third Party Defendants should be 
denied. They would make the facts appear other than they are and 
avoid entirely the tactual questions which are at the center of 
this effort to expand the original judgment in many illegal 
particulars. Plaintiffs1 convoluted analysis and expansion of :he 
Appeals Court decision (rendered on the enforceability of a writ 
on the prior judgment, and which did not address the judgment 
itself), is full of fantasy and embellished with fiction. The 
effect of the Appeals Court ruling on the prior judgment only goes 
to the timeliness ot appeal of a writ of execution. Since that 
judgment has expired, the underlying writ has expired and a ruling 
on the writ has no oearing which controls the present case. To 
grant two partial summary judgment motions, all material facts and 
the law in this case have to be addressed. Inasmuch as the 
Plaintiffs have acknowledged there are new factual and new legal 
issues being brought forward for decision, summary judgment is not 
appropriate. 
In an effort to pretend there is one less factual dispute. 
Plaintiffs acknowledge the weakness of their second cause of action 
and the correctness of Defendants' Counterclaim by abandoning to 
the Court the question of whether their 320,000 bid amount is due 
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as a credit on the prior judgment. The Court already ruled that 
the bid should have been entered as a partial satisfaction. The 
only irregularity alleged by Defendants in that sale (and 
irregularities are needed to justify use of Rule 69(g)(2)) was the 
underlying writ which has been appealed. Irregularities in that 
sale have not been alleged by Defendants. Yet, Plaintiffs rely on 
an argument that Defendants made allegations of irregularities* 
This is an attempt to argue pleadings not actually made by the 
Defendants to meet Plaintiffs1 own burden to prove no credit is 
due. The second cause of action is intertwined with Plaintiffs1 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and the issues directly or 
indirectly related thereto should oe interpreted favorably to the 
Defendants in ruling on the motions. The Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment should be denied, and the second and third causes 
of action ought to be dismissed. 
The Court has not analyzed what is owed to satisfy the prior 
judgment. It has merely allowed the deputy clerk to rubber stamp 
and seal the writ proposed by Plaintiffs. That is not a thinking, 
knowing decision process. Where the rubber stamp is affixed to a 
writ in excess of the judgment, the writ is void and not binding 
on renewal actions. A factual question to be specifically 
addressed by the Court includes a comparison of the prior judgment 
with prior writs, to make sure only the prior judgment is part of 
the action. 
The filing of an illegal lis pendens is indeed actionable 
under U.C.A. Sections 38-9-1 to 4. 
8
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Res judicata does not apply in this case because the 
Plaintiffs have sought to include many more Defendants than were 
part of the original action, and the matters actually disputed in 
this case differ from those heard by the Appeals Court in the prior 
action. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that the Motions for Partial 
Summary Judgment be denied, the Motion for Sanctions be denied and 
that the Court consider granting sanctions against Plaintiffs. 
DATED this — ° day of June, 1988. 
/ 
/ / , . , / 
/ 
Raymond N. Malouf »f 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, first class 
postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing RESPONSIVE MEMORANDUM FROM 
DEFENDANTS, OPPOSING MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, this 
JL^Jr day of *yrftWl 1988, to: 
N. George Daines 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Daines & Kane 
108 North Main, Suite 200 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Secretary 
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Raymond N. Malouf - 2067 . ] JLL ~j ']' \\: ^ 5 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Third Party Plaintiffs CACHh . .,/. ,;-;j; 
MALOUF LAW OFFICE 
150 East 200 North, Suite D 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone; (801) 752-9380 
THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN 
BARBER, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
VS. RAYMOND N. MALOUF 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, 
et al •, 
Defendants and 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
N. GEORGE DAINES and Civil No. 25616 
DAINES & KANE, 
Third Party and 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF CACHE ) 
COMES NOW, Raymond N. Malouf, and deposes and states the 
following in opposition to the Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial 
Summary Judgment and in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Sanctions: 
1. I am counsel for Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs 
herein. ,;LKr-. r'\ I;-A~ ^ ^ ^rCf' J) 
1 •;;; i nsc 
2. I know there are several factual issues which are 
disputed between the Plaintiffs, the Defendants, and the Third 
Party Defendants which include, but are not limited to those shown 
by the Affidavit of Von K. Stocking. 
3. I am not the legally authorised agent to receive process 
on behalf of The Emporium Partnership ard have contested the 
jurisdiction of this Court against the Partnership because the 
Partnership's legal representative is the bankruptcy trustee, James 
Z. Davis. 
4. I know the prior judgment was not against anyone except 
myself, Von K. Stocking, Don White, and The Emporium Partnership, 
and that it was not against any of the other Defendants. The prior 
judgment in No. r?63C was entered more than eight (8) years ago. 
5. Among additional fact issues to be resolved is how much 
should have been credited on the prior judgment because Plaintiffs 
bid 320,000 December 3, 1986 (plus costs), for my interest in 
certain property. Plaintiffs have failed and retused to enter a 
partial satisfaction to the extent of the 520,000 bid plus the 
costs. On April 24, 1987, I know the Court entered its Order 
quashing subpoenas against some of the Defendants. In its Findings 
of Facts and Conclusions of Law, the Court held that the Plaintiffs 
were required to enter a partial satisfaction because of their bid 
at the sale on December 3, 1986, but the Plaintiffs have not done 
so. 
6. Even though the Court found that Plaintiffs should have 
acknowledged their obligation to reduce the prior judgment by the 
2 
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amount of the bid, they did not, and so there are no facts to 
support any Plaitiff interest in the property, and so Plaintiffs, 
as a matter of fact, should not be trying to act on that property 
while they try to renew the old judgment. Factually it is a claim 
for beyond the original judgment. 
7. It is untrue the Court has jurisdiction under Rule 
69(g)(2), U.R.C.P. because the Plaintiffs, who claim the benefit 
of that Rule, have neither alleged nor shown there was an 
irregularity in the sale, and have not alleged that the property 
was not subject to execution. I Know the Defendants have not 
alleged irregular it 12s in the sale. The Defendants have only 
alleged that the property was not subject to execution and have 
asked for damages for that in the amended counterclaim, paragraphs 
2 and 6. The Plaintiffs have not admitted the property was not 
subject to execution-
8. The fact of Plaintiff's bid December 3, 1988, supports 
the factual finding that credit must be made to Defendants for the 
320,000 plus costs bid by Plaintiffs. 
9. Even though the Plaintiffs insist they don't have to make 
said credit, the Court has said they should have done so and the 
Defendants have said they must. There is a question of fact before 
the Court as to the date and amount of credit for that bid to the 
prior judgment, resulting in a factual question of how much, if 
any. remains to be paid on a possible renewal judgment. 
10. October 3, 1986, the Plaintiffs wrote a letter to me 
saying they wanted $12,500 which was what they said was my share 
3 
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of the debt. Onl/ two months later they bid the 320,000 which tney 
have refused to credit on the judgment. The excess bid should be 
paid to Defendants, and it was asked for in paragraph 2 of the 
amended counterclaim. 
11. Based on the foregoing representations from the 
Plaintiffs representations, I believe $7,500 was paid in excess of 
any amount that should legally or equitably be required from me. 
I should not even have been a party to the renewal Complaint. 
12. I know that Plaintiffs and Third Party Defendants have 
not yet paid anything to the Defendants that is or may be required 
by the Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint. 
13. I am familiar with the Affidavit of Von K. Stocking and 
know that I was not part of the negotiations between Mr. Stocking 
and Mr. Daines and did not know that Mr. Daines and the Barbers nad 
acquired the beneficial interest in Mr. and Mrs. Stocking's 
property during the course of those visits with Von K. Stocking. 
The promises made to and negotiations witt* Mr. Stocking were not 
made through me but were initiated and conducted in secret by the 
Third Party Defendants. I know Mr. Stocking relied on the promises 
and statements made by Mr. Daines. 
14. I know the original Complaint in No. 17630 was for 
enforcement of a promissory note or contract. 
15. I know the original Complaint in No. 17630 did not ask 
for interest on the judgment until it was paid, and I know neither 
the Complaint, ncr the Judgment which followel the complaint, were 
ever amended . 
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16. I know that the Judgment was on a contract and that the 
interest which Plaintiffs seek to add to that judgment was not 
specified in the Judgment. The Plaintiffs themselves have 
acknowledged that the language of the judgment does not 3ay 
interest accrues after the judgment. I know that the decision of 
the Utah Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of Plaintiff's 
tortured argument for reading extra words into the judgment. Mor 
did it address the question of amending the judgment to permit 
interest to accrue contrary to its terms. It merely held that the 
Defendants did not appeal the Court's allowance of execution writs 
soon enough. It did not address the question of interest accruing 
after judgment on a contract where the judgment didn't specify the 
rate of interest that proper pleadings might have allowed it to. 
17. I know the original judgment did not provide for the 
Plaintiffs to recover attorney fees incurred in trying to collect 
the judgment, and did not allow a Complaint to renew judgment to 
seek additional attorney fees. 
18. At the time all pleadings in this case were filed, to the 
best of my knowledge, information and belief after reasonable 
inquiry, such pleadings were well grounded in fact and warranted 
by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law, and were not interposed 
for improper purposes or unnecessary delay. 
19. The factual questions about crediting the $20/000 bid, 
and the Plaintiffs' Trust Deed Foreclosure Sale against Mr. 
5 
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Stocking's home are both disputed. Both these factual disputes 
exist in addition to the question of interest accruing after entry 
of the prior judgment. The question of interest accruing on the 
prior judgment still is a factual question. At worst, the holding 
of the appeals court on this point only goes to the question of 
whether a writ of execution was timely appealed from. It did not 
address the substance of the writ. The renewal judgment cannot 
seek to renew writs of execution on the oil judgment, but must be 
limited to the actual prior judgment. The actual prior judgment 
does not support the relief requested by trie Plaintiffs. Section 
15-1-4, U.C.A. does not support it either because this judgment is 
a judgment on a contract, not some other judgment. Only judgments 
other than on contracts may accrue interest after entry whether or 
not the judgment provides it. The Defendants seek and are entitled 
to the strict reading of the statute. 
20. PlaintLffs alleged they made a demand for changes to 
Defendants' pleadings, and demanded that Defendants accept their 
interpretation of the breadth of the appeals court decision, on 
Thursday. June 16, 1988. Without any consideration for the 
undersigned's schedule or availability, they insisted on an 
affirmative written response by 1:00 p.m four days later, or by 
Monday, June 20. As a matter of fact, I was gone Thursday and 
Friday and knew nothing of their demand. Nevertheless, at 12:10 
p.m., June 20, L988, Plaintiffs hand delivered all the motions 
which are presently before the Court. Their actions show that they 
did not believe their demand meant anything, and that response to 
6 
the demand was not seriously intended. 
21. I have read the foregoing Affidavit and know the contents 
to be true and correct of my own personal knowledge. 
DATED this Jjj 1/ day of June, 1988. 
^^O^jyesq^J^R and SWORN TO before me this ~xiK day of June, 1988. 
/ /BARBARA L . \ \ 
r f / HAn ON > ^ , 
J-wi,263 Stewart I iiHDr "1' ^ ( . t . ^ i \ i r i , rA <H<X'vJVift-«P* Notary Pub l i c ,-, 
R e s i d i n q i n : K,0<^ H e ^ M \ 1>T~ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, first class 
postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing^AFFIDAVIT OF RAYMOND N. 
MALOUF, , this J ^ U a y of at±f*e-> 1988, to:JJQ_ 
N. George Daines 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Daines & Kane 
108 North Main, Suite 200 
Logan, Utah 84321 
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Raymond N. Malouf - 2067 '* /Jlu ---•'• -;-cr'l'x 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Third Party Plaintiffs 
MALOUF LAW OFFICE 
150 East 200 North, Suite D 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 752-9380 
THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN 
BARBER, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
VS. VON K. STOCKING 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, 
et al., 
Defendants and 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
N. GEORGE DAINES and Civil No. 25616 
DAINES & KANE, 
Third Party and 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF CACHE ) 
COMES NOW, Von K. Stocking, and being first duly sworn, 
deposes and states the following facts, in opposition to the 
Plaintiffs1 Motions for Partial Summary Judgment: 
1. I am a Defendant and Counterclaimant in this action. 
Together with my wife, Donna Stocking, I am a Plaintiff in an 
1
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action against the Plaintiffs herein, the Third Party Defendants 
and against First Federal Savings u Loan, which action is also 
filed in this Court as Civil No. 22183. I was also a Defendant in 
Civil No. 17630, which this present action is partly seeking to 
renew and partly seeking to expand. 
2. I know that one of the questions of fact in this present 
action is how much money should be credited on the prior judgment, 
No. 17630, so that the Court will know how much, if any, the 
Plaintiffs can legally renew. 
3. I know that in Civil No. 22183, in October of 1987, this 
Court said that there was a dispute of facts about whether the 
Plaintiffs and the Third Party Defendants herein interfered with 
my rights in the home First Federal was foreclosing on, and to 
which the Plaintiffs purchased the beneficial interest in. I know 
Plaintiffs bought that interest because of the judgment in Civil 
No. 17630. 
4. Because of the interference in my rights to that home, 
I know that the Plaintiffs and the Third Party Defendants, together 
with First Federal Savings & Loan, took my equity in the home 
without giving credit on the judgment, contrary to discussions had 
with me. I know that they refused and failed to apply any of that 
equity to partially satisfy the judgment in No. 17630, even though 
I relied on their promises to allow between 312,000 and $15,000 as 
a credit against the very judgment which the Plaintiffs now seek 
to renew. I know the Plaintiffs here only bid $33,191.94 at the 
Trust Deed sale of my former residence November 4, 1983, even 
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though they wrote us a letter August 29, 1963 where they themselves 
said the property was worth between 345,000 and $60,000. 
5. Even though I was represented by an attorney at the time, 
Mr. George Daines called me directly to discuss how much equity to 
apply against th€s judgment in No. 17630, and he called me several 
times about this between October 31 and November 3, 1983, while I 
was trying to decide on curing my default or agreeing to the offers 
made for the Barbers by Mr. Daines. 
6. That in the course of those conversations, Mr. Daines did 
not tell me that the Barbers were buying the beneficial interest 
in that property, which allowed them to take advantage of me, and 
now appears to be their justification for not crediting anything 
on the prior judgment. 
7. That besides the promises to apply money on the judgment, 
Mr. Daines told me that if everything fell apart and a sale 
occurred, his clients would still have no problem in releasing me 
from the judgment. 1 relied on his promises. Mr. Daines also told 
me that his clients only wanted to collect against Defendants to 
the judgment the same percentage of the judgment as each of the 
three alleged general partners owned in The Emporium Partnership. 
In discussing the amount of the judgment to be offset, I relied on 
his representations for this also. 
8. Also in our discussions Mr. Daines said he was worried 
I would file for bankruptcy to stop the Trust Deed Sale by First 
Federal, and that he and his clients did not want me to do that and 
would discharge me from any debt owed to the Barbers if the sale 
3 
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was allowed to proceed. 
9. Mr. Dames also told me that he had 100* authority to 
represent or settle on behalf of the Plaintiffs. 
10. These conversations were initiated by Mr. Daines. In 
them he expressed a great deal of animosity toward my attorney, and 
encouraged me to exclude him from the negotiations we were having. 
11. I know the residence I had that was lost to the 
Plaintiffs here was worth at least the $60,000 they admitted it 
might be worth. 
12. That I know that The Emporium Partnership is still in 
bankruptcy and that so far as I know the trustee in bankruptcy, 
James Z. Davis, is the only official agent of the Partnership, but 
has not been named as a party or served on behalf of the 
Partnership. 
13. I know at the time I was served and even at present I am 
not the agent for the Partnership, but the Partnership was in 
dissolution. 
14. That I knew the original ]udgment only allowed for the 
Interest that the Complaint asked for, which was less than the 
contract allowed. 
15. I know the original ]udgment was on a promissory note 
which Don White and I signed to the Plaintiffs, and I know the 
original note or contract expired before the prior judgment 
expired. 
16. I know the prior judgment did not allow for attorney fees 




17. I know the original judgment did not recite that interest 
would be 12% from the date of the judgment until the judgment was 
paid, but it said other language which is different than :he 
contract provided and is different than what the complaint or che 
amended complaint here is seeking. 
18. I know the original judgment was only against The 
Emporium Partnership and myself, Don White, and Ray Malouf, and was 
not against any other Defendants which the Plaintiffs are trying 
to add to this action. 
19. I know that just as there are questions of fact in Civil 
No. 22183 about interference with my rights by the Plaintiffs and 
the Third Party Defendants, that there are similar questions of 
fact in this action. 
20. The Plaintiffs have had the benefit of all of the equity 
in my former residence, and the equity of my wife for which no 
consideration was given, plus the incomes and rents from the 
property since they took on November 4, 1983. I should be entitled 
to have this Court rule on the amount of that equity and cause the 
same to be entered as a credit against the former judgment to see 
whether there is anything left for the Plaintiffs to sue for to 
renew a judgment. I should also be excluded as a Defendant from 
the renewal judgment because of the monies received from me by the 
Plaintiffs. 
21. I have read the foregoing Affidavit and know the same to 
be true and correct. 
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DATED this 9*°l day of June, 1988. 
Von K. Stocking 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN TO before me this * day of June, 1988 
s~ 
My Commission emigres: 
/ \j**Oi (• ) ' ' f ' 
Notary Public/ -/' / 
Residingin: r >/V,^ 
^ L 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, first class 
postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF VON K. 
STOCKING, this ^ ± U day of Jt*ne, 1988, to: Stir 
N. George Daines 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Daines & Kane 
108 North Main, Suite 200 
Logan, Utah 84321 




r- n r- ( M r [", 
f t - • ' 
Raymond N. Malouf/md (#2067) (134 :EMPBARRE.$Mp) "_ . 
MALOUF LAW OFFICES 
Attorneys for Defendants; Third Party Plaintiffs 
150 East 200 North, Suite D 
Logan, Utah 34321 
Telephone (801) 752-9380 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, et al . 
Defendants / 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DEFENDANTS1 RESPONSE TO 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM, 
OPPOSING PENDING MOTIONS 
Civil No. 25616 
N. GEORGE DAINES and DANES & KANE, 
Third Party Counter-Claim Defendants. 
Two major material issues of fact remain as a bar to the 
renewal of any judgment against the Defendants. First, the parties 
disagree about whether the original judgment allows post judgment 
interest to accrue. This factual question is raised by Defendants1 
fourth defense in the original answer and counterclaim. Second, 
the parties dispute the amount of credit against a renewal judgment 
- whatever its amount - that must be given for payment, equitable 
offsets and a bid by the Plaintiffs. This factual issue is raised 
by the fifth, sixth, and seventh defenses in the original Answer 
and Counterclaim. That these material issues of fact, plus others, 
rjreraain is established by the affidavits executed June 29 and June 
c^O, 1988, and previous pleadings and affidavits from Defendants. 
Even though Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on the first so-
(tailed cause of action, they have still not listed the undisputed 
a 
Rtf facts that Rule 2.8(d) requires be listed. Accordingly, Defendants herewith set forth the disputed material facts apparent from the 
J\ 
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cause of action: 
1. The Complaint seeks not to "renew" but to 
change and improve the judgment made April 18, 
1979 in CiviJ No. 17630. The First Cause of 
Action is not just an effort to "ruboer stamp" 
or extend the prior judgment. It is an 
attempt to amend it. 
2. The Defendants are entitled to have most 
of the prior judgment satisfied from the 
payments, uncredited bid made by the 
Plaintiff, and equitable offsets acquired by 
the Plaintiffs in Mr. and Mrs. Von Stocking's 
real property. 
3. The Defendants are entitled to more 
credit than 3866.47. That December 31, 1984 
payment should be credited against the 
principal amount of the judgment and not to 
the interest that the Plaintiffs accrued after 
the judgment. Defendants are also entitled to 
an equitable offset from the judgment for the 
Stocking property of between 311,000 and 
$27,000 (approximately) and to credit for the 
amount Plaintiffs bid at a sheriff's sale, 
Decemoer 3, 1986, in the amount of 320,000, 
plus costs. 
4. The most Plaintiffs are entitled to under 
their prior judgment was $21,211.30. There is 
no authority or right in that judgment for 
costs accrued in attempting to enforce that 
judgment to be added to the renewal claim. 
Yet, Plaintiffs have sued for $41,751.43. 
5. The amcunts claimed by the renewal 
complaint in excess of $21,211.30 are not 
allowed, because action on the contract is 
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barred by the statute of limitations, §78-12-
23 U.C.A. (third defense), and the holding in 
Yergensen v« Ford, 16 Utah 2d 397, 402 Pac 2d 
696 (1965): The note or contract is replaced 
by the judgment terms, and the judgment did 
not include all the terms in the contract. 
6. A new judgment in a form asked for by the 
Plaintiffs would not be a renewal judgment, 
limiting the judgment to the language of the 
original judgment, and the firs*: cause of 
action should not replace the actual judgment 
from Civil Mo. 17630. 
7. Attorney's fees on renewing the judgment 
are not allowed by contract or by the prior 
judgment in this case. 
8. The filing for bankruptcy protection by 
the Emporium Partnership, November, 1979, 
after the judgment in Civil No. 17630 was 
granted April 18, 1979, in fact bars renewing 
that judgment without permission of the 
Bankruptcy Court. That permission has not 
been granted. 
9. The Plaintiffs1 failure to reduce the 
amount of their claim by the $20,000 (plus 
costs) bid December 3, 1986, is alleged to be 
a fraudulent act against the court and the 
Defendants, for which the Plaintiffs assert 
they are entitled to actual and punitive 
damages. 
10. Plaintiffs' failure to provide any 
equitable offset for the equity in the 
Stocking's property is alleged to be a 
fraudulent act for which the Defendants are 
entitled to actual and punitive damages. 
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11. Given the original judgment, the original 
complaint and the original findings of fact, 
to accrue interest after April 18, 1979, on 
the judgment sought to be renewed is in fact 
a modification of the judgment which is 
material and illegal. Plaintiffs1 action 
does not just renew a judgment, but really is 
an effort to modify it by asking for amounts 
in excess of what can be due from the face of 
the judgment. Defendants claim the failure to 
give equitable offsets and credit for bids 
made was not; only fraudulent but also illegal 
and malicious and that it disrupted the lives 
and property of the Defendants, for which the 
Defendants are entitled to actual and punitive 
damages. 
12. Defendants have alleged, and supported by 
their affidavits, a basis for their claim that 
Plaintiffs and/or their counsel both 
fraudulently and intentionally breached 
promises made to Defendants as to the 
equitable credit to be allowed for property 
once belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Von K. 
Stocking . 
13. Plaintiffs and/or their counsel made 
promises about the percentage of the total 
claim (whatever it is) to be paid from each 
Defendant, which promises were relied on by 
the Defendants and were breached by the 
Plaintiffs, for which the Defendants are 
entitled to actual and punitive damages. 
14. Defendants have alleged that the 
Plaintiffs or their counsel encumbered real 
property of the Defendants or caused documents 
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asserting claims against real property to be 
filed or recorded, when in fact these claims 
were groundless and for which the Defendants 
are entitled to treble actual damages or 
31,000, whichever is greater, as well as 
attorney's fees and costs as allowed by 
U.C.A. §38-9-1. 
The foregoing material issues of fact all arise from the First 
Cause of Action, Answer and Counterclaim,* items 12, 13, and 14 are 
also applicable to the Third Party Complaint (along with others). 
They are disputed factual issues between the parties. Their 
existence forecloses granting summary judgment. 
Most of the foregoing disputed fact issues are plainly 
apparent from the pleaaings and affidavits, and need no argument. 
However, Defendants argue the more important ones and respond as 
follows to the Plaintiffs1 Memorandum. 
EFFECT OF COURT OF APPEALS RULING 
The Court of Appeals ruled that Defendants' appeal of issues 
raised in Civil No. 17630 was not timely. The ruling did not 
address the merits of any other issue. It particularly did not 
discuss methods of modification of judgments, and did not discuss 
crediting amounts Plaintiffs bid or equitable offsets. Because 
the court ruled only on the timeliness question, it did not examine 
the relationship between the language of the judgment, the 
complaint it was based upon, or the application of §15-1-4 U.C.A. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals was February 12, 1988. 
The Amended Answer and Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint were 
signed September 23, 1987. The Court of Appeals1 decision does 
not address the issues raised by the current case. 
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WHAT EXACTLY DOES THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT PROVIDE? 
The May 18, 1987 Memorandum Decision by this court that "There 
is included in the renewal, continuing interest on the judgment. 
This is not a modification." can be explained. The Court assumed 
that the original judgment allowed interest to accrue. It is 
important to examine the original judgment to realise it did not 
provide for the accrual of interest after the judgment. The fact 
that it did not was not a mere oversight. That the judgment did 
not provide for accrual of interest after the judgment date is not 
cured by U.C.A. §15-1-4. 
November 12, 1986, the Plaintiffs admitted in pleadings filed 
in this court in Civil No. 17630, that the judgment was "not as 
clear" as it should be, but they wanted to rely on state statute 
to have interest on this judgment anyway. Mr. Daines said: 
Although the judgment language is not as clear 
as one would like, Plaintiffs believe it is 
sufficiently clear that State law provides 
that all judgments require interest and that 
it does not need to be restated in each 
judgment which is filed by the court, 
(Response to Motion, November 12, 1986, Civil 
No. 17630). 
That is an adnussion the judgment does not support post 
judgment interest. Plaintiffs made the same admission to the Court 
of Appeals on. page '7 of their Respondent's Brief wherein they 
stated: 
The judgment recites that the interest is at 
12* but does not specifically state that it 
continues to accrue after rendition of the 
•judgment . (Id . page 7, emphasis added.) 
Of caufee the Appeals Court did not address the issue on the 
merits, but the admission proves Defendants1 point. Plaintiffs 
justify the omission and their accrual of the interest by relying 
on Dairy Distributors, Inc. v. Local 976, 12 Utah 2d 85, 396 Pac 
2d 47 (1964) and S15-1-4 U.C.A. to argue the merits of their claim. 
They also try to explain what must have been intended by the 
inclusion of the figure $2,180 for interest, and the language "from 
6 ?Afi 
the date hereof". They explain that it must have meant from a 
period before the judgment entered until the date of the judgment. 
They specifically say "the date hereof' must mean the date of the 
Complaint. That's probably true, but the fact remains the judgment 
is deficient. It does not allow accrual of post judgment interest. 
The judgment has nev€?r been amended. 
THE VERY WORDS 
What the judgment says is consistent with the prayer in the 
complaint which only asks for "interest additional at the rate of 
12% per annum unt i1 judgment" ; and is consistent with the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law which only provided for "accrued 
interest at the rate of 12% per annum from date hereof until paid 
in the amount of $2,130" (Record pages 2, 37, & 38). The judgment 
itself has the same identical language. It simply grants interest 
of a limited amount, but all the Complaint asked for, and does not 
provide for interest to accrue after judgment. 
Since the judgment does not provide for interest to accrue, 
Plaintiffs had to.rely on the Dairy Distributors case and U.C.A. 
§15-1-4 to try and argue that interest can accrue after judgment. 
Even though the Appeals Court never got to the merits of these 
arguments, discussion is appropriate. The distinction in Dairy 
Distributors is that there a clerk erred and did not fill in the 
blanks provided in the judgment form for interest after judgment. 
The reasons that case cannot control this case are: (1) there were 
no blanks to fill in; (2) there was no inadvertance by the clerk; 
and, (3) the court n€>ver made a finding that interest can accrue 
after judgment. Nor was it logical the court should have allowed 
interest to accrue, because the Complaint, for whatever reason, 
failed to ask for it. 
Similarly, solely because Dairy Distributors was a clerk 
error, §15-1-4 U.C.A. could be applied to allow interest to accrue 
on the Dairy Distributors judgment. However, it can't be applied 
that way here. Section 15-1-4 U.C.A. says that: 
Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract 
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shall conform thereto and shal L bear the 
interest agreed upon by the parties, which 
shal 1 be specified in the judgment; other 
judgments shall bear interest at the rate of 
12% per annum, (Emphasis added). 
As can be seen, the judgment did not provide what it had to 
provide in order to give the Plaintiffs what they now ask for. 
This oversight by Plaintiffs' counsel and failure to amend by the 
Plaintiffs must be applied to their detriment. The Defendants are 
entitled to the benefit of the pleadings and the statute. The 
Plaintiffs have not shown any authority to the contrary. 
Particularly, the Plamtiffs have failed to show any authority or 
justification for an attempt to amend a judgment by filing a writ 
of execution in an amount other the amount provided for in the 
original judgment. 
Any renewal judgment must be limited to the specific language 
of the original judgment, defective as it may have been, because 
it was not amended. 
WHAT ABOUT AMENDING THE JUDGMENT? 
A long list of Utah decisions dating from 1895 squarely 
support the position that the only basis for changing the amount 
of money allowed by a judgment is for the judgment itself to be 
amended. Richards v„ Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314, 471 Pac.2d 143 
(1970), is often referred to for the distinction between judicial 
and clerical errors. The court must remember that the problem with 
the judgment in Civil No. 17630 was not a clerical one from having 
wrongly recorded a judgment as entered. It was intentional or it 
was at most a judicial error. That does not mean the judge erred, 
but that there was an error by someone in renderring the judgment 
actually entered It wasn't a last minute error in this case, 
because the judgment conformed to the wording in the original 
pleadings. Richards held that a judicial error can only be cured 
by a timely motion for a new trial, amended findings, appeal, or 
a new action. Here, tne error wholly belongs to the Plaintiffs and 
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their counsel , and the judgment entered does not provide for post-
judgment interest. Any writs of execution are in conflict with the 
judgment, and since the judgment is still contested, must be read 
as subordinate to the judgment. They certainly cannot amend the 
judgment. 
Moreover, the court does not have jurisdiction to unilaterally 
change the judgment even if it wants to prefer the Plaintiffs. In 
Benson v. Anderson, 14 Utah 334, 47 Pac. 142 (1896) the Supreme 
Court said that judicial tribunals may not exercise revisionary 
power over a judgment after it has passed away from the judge. 
There, an effort to change a judgment six months after it was 
entered was considered too late. In Frost , et al . \ . District 
Court , et al . , 96 Utah 106, 83 Pac.2d 737 (1938) the Supreme Court 
said " . . . after the time for appeal has expired, the court has 
no power to modify a judgment in a substantial or material respect. 
This is well settled law." Since there was neither an appeal of 
the judgment, nor a timely modification attempted, it certainly 
cannot be changed now that the Plaintiffs wish to renew it. 
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO AMOUNT OF PLAINTIFFS1 BID 
PLUS EQUITABLE OFFSETS AS CREDITS AGAINST THE 
JUDGMENT, WHATEVER IT IS. 
The parties dispute whether additional credits should oe 
allowed toward.s the judgment, whatever it is. Depending on tne 
total amount, the judgment may have been paid. Plaintiffs admitted 
that they have bid amounts which have not been credited on tne 
judgment. December 3, 1986 Defendants bid the sum of $20,000, plus 
costs, against the judgment. Plaintiffs refused to credit this 
because they do not think they are obligated to credit their bid. 
Plaintiffs1 bid was an irrevocable oi-fer. Rule 69(e)(4), 
U.R.C.P. says that the failure of a purchaser to pay the bid is 
contempt of court. Plaintiffs admitted to making the bid, and now 
claim that Rule 69(g)(2) U.R.C.P. excuses them from payment. 
Actually, Rule 69(g)(2) U.R.C.P. only allows the purcl^aser to oe 
exempt from his bid if there are irregularities in the proceedings 
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of the sale or the property sold was not suDject to execution and 
sale. Moreover, Rule 69(g) (2) U.R.C.P. is only to give third party 
purchasers at a sale either a judgment against a creditor or a 
judgment against a debtor if the third party purchaser does not end 
up with the property bid for. It does not address the question of 
what happens if the Plaintiffs themselves bid for the property, 
but regret the bid later. 
In oral argument, Plaintiffs said that the Defendants alleged 
irregularity. They offered to provide evidence of this. They did 
not provide the evidence in their Memorandum. The Defendants have 
not argued irregularities in the sale or an/thing else sufficient 
to allow the Plaintiffs to be excused from the requirement that 
they credit the bid. What Defendants did was to argue before the 
sale that there should be no execution sale because Defendants had 
no equity in the property, notwithstanding, Plaintiffs went ahead. 
They cannot now say they should not have to pay. Rule 69(e)(4) 
U.R.C.P. provides: 
Every bid shall be deemed an irrevocable 
offer; and if the purchaser refuses to pay the 
amount bid by him for the property struck off 
to him at a sale under execution, the officer 
may again sell the property at any time to the 
highest bidder, and if any loss is occasioned 
thereby, the party refusing to pay, in 
addition to being liable on such bid, is 
guil.ty of a contempt of court and may be 
punished accordingly. When a purchaser 
refuses to pay, the officer may also, in his 
discretion, thereafter reject any other bid of 
such person. (Emphasis added.) 
The Plaintiffs have neither admitted nor alleged specific 
irregularities in the sale. They have not alleged that the 
property should not have been sold. Such an allegation by 
Plaintiffs is not likely now. After all, one of the issues in the 
Amended Counterclaim is whether they wrongfully proceeded to sell 
the property. Perhaps Plaintiffs regret the bid because they 
acknowledge that Defendants had no equity in the property. 
Nevertheless, they sold all of Defendants' right, title and 
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interest, and bid a certain amount for it, and they must be 
compelled to enter a satisfaction of judgment for the amount b*d. 
This must be done before there can be determination made of what 
is owed on any possible renewal judgment. While it is true that 
Defendants opposed the sale, after the saie they did not allege 
irregularities or anf basis for Plaintiffs to now claim their bid 
is not binding on them. Plaintiffs were represented by counsel and 
insisted on the sale; and even if they gee nothing for the bid, 
they are obligated to credit the judgment with the amount bid. In 
Randall v. Valley Title, 681 Pac. 2d 219 (Utah, 1984) the Utah 
Supreme Court required a creditor bidding at a sale to credit his 
judgment and discharge the claim to the extent of the bid. 
April 24, 1987, this court required the Plaintiffs to enter 
a partial satisfaction for the $20,000, pius costs of sale bid. 
This has never been done, and is apparently a disputed material 
question of fact. Such a requirement went beyond the court's 
Memorandum Decision of December^12, 1986 in Civil No. 17630 where 
the court told the Plaintiffs that as to any amounts Plaintiffs 
acknowledge receipt of that are not shown as partial satisfactions, 
that these should be acknowledged in the dockett book. Where the 
Plaintiffs have acknowledged they made the bid and have not entered 
the partial satisfaction, it is also apparent that the bid should 
be credited to the judgment. If it is not, there is certainly a 
material issue of fact to be resolved before any summary judgment 
can be seriously considered by any court that has reviewed the 
pleadings. 
The Order entered April 24, 1987 provides in the Findings of 
Fact: 
9. Plaintiffs have not filed partial 
satisfaction of judgment required after the 
December 3. 1986, sheriff's sale, where 
$20,000 wa3 paid by the Plaintiffs toward the 
judgment. 
The Conclusions of Law in the same Order provided: 
11 
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7. Plaintiffs are required to first enter-
part lal satisfaction of judgment from the sale 
of one Defendant's interest in property from 
December 3, 1986. 
From the foregoing, the court granted the Defendants1 motion 
to quash and struck v*ith prejudice the subpoenas duces tecum the 
Plaintiffs tried to get the court to enforce. 
EQUITABLE OFFSET FOR STOCKING PROPERTY 
The court has received affidavits from Von Stocking setting 
fortWthe basis for an equitable claim against the Plaintiffs and 
their counsel against the value of this judgment for the equity 
taken from Mr. Stocking and his wife by the Plaintiffs. August 29, 
1983, the attorney for the Plaintiffs wrote a letter, previously 
entered with the pleading dated April 20, 1987. The letter written 
by Mr. George Daines admitted that Von Stocking's property was 
worth between $45,000 and $60,000. The letter attested to the fact 
that some of the equity in that property should go to offset the 
judgment that the Plaintiffs now seek to renew. Even by 
Plaintiffs' own admission in the letter, the equity in that 
property was between $11,808.06 and $26,808.06. A material issue 
of fact exists as to the amount, if any, of this equity that should 
be credited against the judgment. Mr. Stocking's affidavits 
support the conclusion that the issues in the Counterclaim are 
valid claims against the Plaintiffs and their attorneys. 
Referencing the subject matter of Von Stocking's property being 
credited to this judgment, the letter from Mr. Daines, dated August 
29, 1983, says in part: 
Norm Barber and I have examined the Von 
Stocking home and believe that its worth would 
probably be somewhere in the range of $45,000 
to $60,000 (first paragraph). 
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Anticipating that this (sic) is going to take 
several weeks to determine what the appraisal 
of that home is and the likelihood that the 
home is insufficient to pay the full amount of 
the judgment, I think it is advisable that we 
continue with the Supplemental Order that was 
started this week. (Third paragraph.) 
Read together with the affidavits of Mr. Stocking, it is clear 
that an equitable offset is owed to the Plaintiffs for this 
property, which the Plaintiffs acquired for $33,191.94 on November 
4, 1983. The difference between $33,191.94 and $45,000 is 
$11,808.06, and between $33,191.94 and $60,000 is $26,808.06. 
Either amount makes <= material difference to what could be owed on 
a renewal judgment, if any. 
LEGAL ISSUES OPPOSING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Besides the material fact questions discussed in detail 
heretofore, there are numerous legal questions which have been 
raised by the affirmative defenses, but not briefed by Plaintiffs 
in their motion. Defendants refer the court to prior pleadings 
filed in this action, including Defendants1 Motion to Strike, filed 
in August, 1987 and the Memorandum and Reply Memorandum in support 
thereof. See also the memorandums supporting Defendants' in their 
Motion to Dismiss and Strike, filed on or about April 20, 1987 and 
May 8, 1987. . While some of the matters are beyond the partial 
summary judgment motions here, the legal questions addressed in the 
affirmative defenses by the Defendants still stand. 
Plaintiffs acuse Defendants of wrongfully filing an Amended 
Counterclaim and a Third Party Complaint seeking damages not only 
against Plaintiffs, but also their counsel. These pleadings, 
however, were not filed until after the Plaintiffs first filed an 
Amended Complaint which added the so-called Second and Third 
Causes of Action. That brought the pleadings well beyond a mere 
rubber stamp renewal of the judgment. Even though this was all 
done previous to the Appeals Court decision in February of 1988, 
the Appeals Court decision did not address the legal issues or 
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merits of this case, and all of these legal questions still exist. 
The Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint are 
justified because the Plaintiffs failed to credit bids and enter 
equitable offsets to this judgment that their own letters or 
orders of this court require. Where they have knowingly failed 
and refused to deal fairly, Defendants are entitled to bring a 
Counterclaim and seek the damages prayed for. If in the past the 
court has failed to recognize the validity of the Defendants' 
claim, particularly that the initial judgment cannot be expanded 
merely by liberal drafting of writs and loose reading of pleadings, 
the court can still correct the Plaintiffs. It must restrict them 
to a renewal of only the actual judgment, once all the material 
facts have been resolved. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs have repeatedly admitted they are applying post 
judgment interest. The legal availability of that right has been 
shown by this pleading and prior arguments to not exist. It is 
time the court addressed this issue thoroughly, because it has not 
been addressed on the merits heretofore. The pleadings made on 
behalf of Defendants have not been frivolous, are made in good 
faith, and are consistent with what the Supreme Court and the 
statutes of this State have provided. It also recognizes the 
limitations of the Plaintiffs' initial pleadings. Defendants 
request this court restrict the Plaintiffs to those pleadings. 
The Plaintiffs have not provided any authority as to why they 
should not credit the $20,000, plus cost of sale bid. They have 
not provided any authority or justification why they should not 
make an equitable offset from Mr. Stocking's equity. They have 
provided no authority for how a writ of execution on a judgment can 
somehow amend the judgment to the advantage of the Plaintiffs when 
they later seek to renew it. They have not provided a list of 
undisputed facts which they claim are undisputed. Numerous 
material facts exist. There are also substantial legal questions 
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which foreclose the granting of any of the motions for summary 
judgment or the other motions before this court. 
At some point in time, Defendants are entitled to have argued 
and presented the questions of post judgment interest. This has 
never come before this court or the Appeals Court and needs to be 
thoroughly addressed by this court at this time. 
The court should reject the motions for partial summary 
judgment and the motion for sanctions. The court should also 
consider dismissal of the renewal judgment effort because it 
clearly goes beyond the scope allowed by the initial judgment. 
Defendants argued in open court that if the renewal effort was 
merely an effort to rubber stamp the prior judgment that there 
would be less defense, once the credits and offsets were resolved. 
Defendants have demonstrated a sufficient basis to show that the 
original judgment may already have been satisfied. The court could 
only go ahead on what damages the Defendants are entitled to for 
excess recovery by the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have tried to expand 
this effort beyond all legal reason or justification. Then-
efforts are not equitable and not justifiable. The court should 
take whatever steps are necessary to restrict any possible renewal 
judgment to the limits allowed by the underlying judgment. The 
court cannot correct prior mistakes in that underlying judgment, 
and is itself bound by the errors of counsel made on behalf of 
Plaintiffs. 
Each of the affirmative defenses discussed herein or referred 
to was not resolved by the Appeals Court decision of February 12, 
1988. That decision limited itself solely to the question of the 
timeliness of an appeal from the underlying judgment. It did not 
address the merits of the questions raised herein, but limited 
itself solely to the timeliness issue. The factual issues before 
this court include: What is the amount of the prior judgment? Has 
that judgment been paid? Should there be equitable offsets against 
the judgment? Are the Plaintiffs required to honor the bids they 
have made? What amount, if any, should be renewed? The 
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Plaintiffs' fraud or misrepresentation in seeking to enforce this 
3uagment i,s an issue raised by the original Counterclaim and Third 
Party Complaint. Legal issues that exist in this court include the 
jurisdiction of this court to enter a judgment against the 
partnership or general partners where the partnership is in 
bankruptcy. Also, whether a judgment can be renewed against joint 
obligors where Von Stocking may have been released by negotations 
between himself and George Daines. Whether the Plaintiffs can seek 
additional attorney's fees is an issue. The statute of limitations 
has been raised as a defense to 'all efforts to expand from the 
literal terms of the judgment. Factually, except for the questions 
of amount of judgment and payment, a rubber stamp renewal of the 
previous judgment's exact language, with all its failings could be 
proper. However, these material issues of fact and the legal 
issues that oppose Plaintiffs restrict entry of any partial 
judgment at this time. The motions should all be rejected. 
Dated this day of August, 1988. 
kr^^iM<y / I / hu ®yft 
Raymond N. Malouf 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR CACHE COUNTY, UTAH 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER, 
NOTICE OF OBJECTIONS 
Plaintiffs, TO PROPOSED FINDINGS 
AND JUDGMENTS AND 
vs. REQUEST FOR FINAL 
RULING 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, et al . , 
Defendants and Third Party 
Plaintiffs 
vs. 
N. GEORGE DAINES and 
DAINES & KANE, 
Civil No. 25616 
Third Party Counterclaim 
Defendants 
COME NOW the Defendants and give notice of their objections 
to the proposed Findings and Judgments being held by the Court for 
consideration after September 12. These objections are given 
pursuant to Rule of Practice 2.9. They pertain to the proposed 
Findings and Judgments entered as a result of the August 22, 1938. 
Memorandum Decision issued by this Court. That Memorandum Decision 
pertained to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
(1) the first Cause of Action and initial Counterclaim and (2) the 
Amended counterclaim and Third Party Complaint. The Court granted 
'dumber _ _ _ _ _ _ _ «> \ 
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partial summary judgment on the first Cause of Action, the initial 
Counterclaim and the Amended Counterclaim. Defendants want the 
benefit of Rule 54(b) . U.R.C.P., and request that any order entered 
be certified as a f .nal order. 
The objections are as follows: 
1. THE PROPOSED FINDINGS AND JUDGMENTS ATTEMPT TO EXFAND 
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS FROM A JOINT JUDGMENT TO A JOINT 
AND SEVERAL JUDGMENT. The original Judgment on April 18, 1979, 
said: 
It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed 
that the Plaintiffs have recovered judgment 
against the Defendants in the amount due on a 
promissory note in the amount of $15,000 plus 
accrued interest at the rate of 12% per annum 
from date hereof until paid in the amount of 
$2,180, attorney fees in the amount of $4,000 
and Court costs in the amount of $31.30. 
Any renewal judgment should be limited to the specific language, 
considering particularly that it (1) says nothing about joint and 
several liability and (2) only allows $2,180 of interest which was 
consistent with the Complaint that specifically asked for interest 
at 12% until judgment. The renewal judgment is only changed by 
getting a new date. A renewal judgment is not an amended judgment. 
The only variations that should be permitted by the Court are 
adjustments for payments or credits. 
Neither the original Judgment nor the Complaint used the words 
"jointly and severally". It is impermissible for a renewal 
judgment to insert the language "jointly and severally" where it 
did not exist in the original Judgment. The original Complaint 
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did not allege joint and several liability, and statutes provided 
liability could only be joint* 
The Complaint to renew the Judgment never alleged joint and 
several liability, either. The relevant section of the Utah Code, 
Section 48-1-12, makes a distinction between joint liability and 
joint and several 1 iabil ity. Any renewal judgment may not make the 
Defendants jointly and severally liable where the prior judgment 
did not. This would be an impermissible modification of the prior 
Judgment, an amendement unsupported by fact, law or pleadings. 
Conclusion of Law No., 6 and the Partial Summary Judgment must be 
changed to remove all statements about joint and several liability. 
As will be shown in Point No. 4, the form should be further 
modified because of this issue. 
2. PLAINTIFFS HAVE MISCALCULATED THE AMOUNT DUE. The total 
of the sums represented by the initial Judgment is $21,211.30. Of 
that, $2,180 is interest. Interest is allowed in that total sum 
only. The Court has made an interlocutory ruling here that 
calculating more interest is not a modification of the first 
Judgment. Even if that is so, the form of the Judgment has 
interest calculated on interest and is thus in the wrong amount for 
March 25, 1987. The form then proceeds to calculate interest on 
the total amount after that date. This amounts to again charging 
interest on interest, which has not been allowed by this Court. 
Also, in considering the $866.47 offset, since that amount was 
considered paid December 31, 1982, interest should be calculated 
on that figure from 1982 to determine the amount to be subtracted 
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from the total. 
In addition, proposed Finding of Fact No. 6 and Conclusion of 
Law No. 7 refer to a later determination of the effect of 
Plaintiffs' $20,000, plus costs, bid made December 3, 1986. The 
alleged costs of the renewal complaint probably include the cosi;s 
of that bid. No cost affidavit has been submitted. It is 
inappropriate for any partial judgment to enter for a total amount * 
where about half the total, the offset for the bid, is reserved. 
The total sum of any partial Judgment should be reduced by the 
amount of $20,000 plus the costs o£ the Sheriff's sale as of 
December 3, 1986. Requiring the Plaintiffs to do this now would 
be completely consistent with this Court's April 24, 1987 ruling 
in Civil No. 17630 requiring the Plaintiffs to enter a partial 
satisfaction for the 320,000 plus the costs of the sale. That has 
never been done, and it is contemptuous for these proposed 
pleadings to not do it: now. Requiring that this reduction be made 
now, before partial judgment is entered is consistent with the 
Court's prior ruling and proper under the circumstances. This was 
an issue which was previously decided, and the Court should require 
the Plaintiffs to follow its prior ruling. 
3. THE DEFENDANTS NEED TO BE IDENTIFIED PROPERLY. The 
Complaint to renew the Judgment named the partnership and the three 
alleged general partners of The Emporium Partnership. Of the three 
partners named, Don A. White, Jr., has never appeared. The Court 
clearly lacks personal jurisdiction over him. He is not a party 
to this action. Therefore, he cannot be a party to the Partial 
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Summary Judgment. Therefore, the Judgment cannot be entered 
against "the Defendants", using that term. It must be entered only 
against the Defendants who are actually parties to the lawsuit, and 
except Don White, if any Judgment is to be entered at all. 
4. THE COURT CAN NO LONGER GET JURISDICTION ON MR. WHITE, 
SO "JOINT LIABILITY" CAN NO LONGER EXIST, OR THE JUDGMENT MUST BE 
FURTHER REDUCED. Don White was not even served. The Complaint to 
renew the Judgment was filed March 27. 1987, some 17 months prior 
to the entry of the Court's August 22, 1988, Memorandum Decision 
allowing partial summary judgment. Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b) 
requires that the Summons must be served within one year of the 
filing of the Complaint or the action is deemed to be dismissed. 
However, where some of the Defendants were served, the others may 
be served or appear at anytime before trial. If the Court is going 
to grant partial summary judgment on the first Cause of Action, 
then there never will be anything for Don White to be in trial 
about. Therefore, the summary judgment proceeding has to be 
considered all. the trial he could have had if he had been a party. 
He was not, and it is too late for him to be served. A separate 
action cannot now be brought against him because it would be 
commenced beyond eight years after the original Judgment. Thus, 
Don White is out of the case because of the actions of the 
Plaintiff and the decision of the Court to grant judgment now. 
This action ot the Plaintiff should be considered equivalent to a 
release of a co-obligor, and the results should be governed by Utah 
Code Section 15-4-5. That Section provides that if an obligee 
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(Barbers) releases an obligor (White) without reserving rights 
against co-obligors (Stocking, Malouf, The Emporium) but knows the 
obligor released (White) did not pay his share of the debt, then 
the obligee's (Barbers') claim against a co-obligor shall be 
satisfied to the amount which the obligee knew or had reason to 
know that the discharged obligor was bound to pay. If the obligee 
didn't know the obligor hasn't paid what he's supposed to pay, the 
claim against the co-obligor still has to be reduced by the amount 
of the fractional share released. 
The foregoing means that Don White's share of the dett, 
whatever it was, should be subtracted from the Judgment awarded in 
the First Cause of Action. Heretofore, Plaintiffs alleged each of 
the Defendants owed one third. This was disputed in the prior 
action, where it was argued that ex-Defendant Don White owed more 
than one third. Even giving the Plaintiffs the benefit of their 
argument, the total debt and proposed Judgment should te offset by 
at least 1/3 because one joint obligor has been released. Or, 
before entry of the partial Judgment a hearing must be had to 
determine the amount of reduction for what his share was. 
This argument relates to the issue of "joint and several" 
liability. Because this Judgment is a joint liability judgment, 
rather than a joint and several liability judgment, several 
liability on the whole sum cannot be had against the other 
obligors. In fact, because this judgment never was joint and 
several, a new Judgment should not enter at all. There is a 
difference between joint liability and joint and several liability. 
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Th« previous* reference to U.C.A. Section 46~i-i2 ia a beginning 
distinction. In the prior action, this issue was collaterally 
approached by both parties in an effort to allow collection only 
of proper shares from each defendant. Here the distinction is used 
to see whether there can even be a judgment. In the prior 
argument, there was disagreement. However, applying only the 
Plaintiffs1 own argument, it is at least correct that a difference 
between "joint liability" and "joint and several liability" is that 
in a joint and several liability situation one can proceed against 
one party in the legal action without joining the other parties. 
On the other hand, where there is only joint liability, the 
Plaintiff is required to proceed against all of the parties (see 
Mr. Daines1 pleading in Civil No. 17630 dated September 4, 1986, 
page 3). Since Plaintiffs did not proceed against all parties, 
they should not get judgment against any. 
Certainly it is too late to change the original Judgment from 
joint liability to joint and several liability. (The Court itself 
has said the original judgment is fixed.) In this case, joint and 
several liability was neither pleaded nor granted. Therefore, the 
Judgment may only be joint, and Don White had to be joined as a 
party in order for there to be renewal judgment. Since he was not, 
there can be no Judgment entered. Prior rulings of this Court do 
not address the question of whether a judgment can be entered 
against some, but not all of the Defendants, but only address the 
question of whether the Plaintiffs could proceed to collect 
individually against joint Defendants. The Court allowed them to, 
227 
but that judgment has expired. Now Plaintiffs chose net to proceed 
against all joint obligors. Accordingly, Judgment cannot be 
f^ltftfc-sd fi#w b««AU«to there waa never joint and several liability. 
It is too late for there to be joint liability, because Don White 
was released by Plaintiffs. 
Sufficient reasons have been shown to show why there should 
be no partial judgment entered. The nature of the original 
Judgment forecloses a renewal judgment unless the Judgment is 
renewed against all of the Defendants. It can't be because one of 
the joint obligors is not a party to the action. Alternatively, 
and only if this argument is rejected. Defendants submit that the 
judgment must be reduced by Don White's share and the Findings and 
Conclusions must be restricted to only provide judgment against the 
two Defendants who are actually parties to the action. 
6. THE COURT OF APPEALS RULING DID NOT DEAL WITH SUBSTANTIVE 
ISSUES. It addressed only timeliness. Therefore references in 
Finding of Fact No. 7 and Conclusion of Law No. 8 should not refer 
to that decision. The Memorandum Decision did not refer to it. 
7. THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES IS NOT SUPPORTED BY PROPER 
FINDINGS. The proposed form of Findings and the Judgment refer 
to the $3,000 for attorney fees awarded as a penalty for seeking 
remedies after issues have been settled, and repeating arguments 
"although tne wordLng may be different". Yet, there were no 
pleadings asking for attorneys' fees on the partial summary 
judgment. The Motions for Partial Summary Judgment did not include 
a request for attorneys' fees. Plaintiffs suggested this issue be 
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deferred. No fee affidavits were submitted. There was no evidence 
to justify a finding for attorneys' fees in any amount, Urder 
U.C.A. Section 78-27-56, the Court can only award reasonable 
attorneys1 fees to a prevailing party if the Court determines that 
an action or defense of the action was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith. The Court made no such 
findings. The Court ought to be able to justify the amount of its 
award, and have made findings supporting it. Instead, the Court 
found the Plaintiffs were burdened by more legal fees to answer 
matters previously adjudicated. However, there was no basis to 
find Plaintiffs were burdened with attorneys1 fees. It is only 
assumption. The case may be with Plaintiffs1 attorney on a 
contingency fee arrangement. 
Where is the Court's analysis? If requests of Defendants uere 
previously decided, a fact disputed by Defendants, why couldn't the 
Memorandum Decision refer to what they were and where they had teen 
decided? Defendants had just submitted a detailed list of disputed 
facts and leg^l arguments about the amount of judgment and offsets. 
To expect a reasoned decision is reasonable and not asserted in 
bad faith. For example, the Appeals Court said the timeliness of 
the issues raised was the reason it was rejecting Defendants' 
claims in the appeal. Somehow Plaintiff thinks that resolves the 
post judgment interest issue. Yet, nowhere has the Appeals Court 
said that the language of the original Judgment was amended by 
issuance of a Writ not in conformity with the judgment's language. 
Since the prior judgment was allegedly not paid, writ language is 
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moot. Moreover, this Court has never addressed the question of how 
the judgment language, referred to verbatim in the first paragraph 
of these objections, has ever been stretched to provide for post-
judgment interest. Defendants1 brief pointed out where Plaintiffs 
admitted the judgment language had problems. Assuming arguendo 
the Court has ruled on that issue, it could only have done so in 
the context of execution writs which have never been satisfied. 
Since the writs were not satisfied any effort to renew the judgment 
should refer to the prior Judgment itself, not the writs. Hay 18, 
1987, in a Memorandum Decision the Court said interest on the 
judgment wasn't a modification. Where was the analysis? There 
hasn't ever been one. The only basis to say that the post-judgment 
interest question has been resolved is to say a writ amends a 
judgment. Writs do not amend judgments. This Court, the 
Plaintiffs and the Defendants have all said it is too late to amend 
the original Judgment. The Court should make an analysis of the 
language and Complaint from the prior judgment and explain itself 
clearly at some point. If it has, to find contempt it should be 
able to point to a violation of a clear previous order. Where has 
the Court ruled on the post judgment interest issue? 
Another major argument raised by Defendants was that of 
offsets for Von Stocking's home and for the bid of 320,000. 
Defendants argued the ruling requiring that the $20,000 be credited 
before Plaintiffs proceeded. There are no findings to justLfy 
penalizing Defendants for arguing the bid must be credited before 
a Judgment is entered. Where is the explanation the bid was not 
an irrevocable offer? The Court required crediting the bid in its 
order. Plaintiffs should be in contempt for not doing it. Where 
is the analysis that this argument is not well taken? The 
equitable argument for Mr. Stocking's offer is only redundant if 
the Court considers that it is an issue also raised in anotner 
suit, Stocking vs. Barber. In granting partial summary judgment 
in this action, the Court must be reserving Mr. Stocking's claim 
against Barbers in the other action. Where is the analysis to 
explain why a factual issue there is not also a factual issue here? 
Defendants tried to relate the two actions. 
No penalty of the nature imposed by the Court is supportable 
by the pleadings. No basis for the amount of the award was shown. 
Where there is insufficient evidence of the reasonableness of 
attorneys' fees, their award must be vacated. See Associated 
Industrial Development, Inc. vs. Jewkes, 701 P.2d 486 (Utah 1984). 
The Memorandum Decision cannot support specific findings. 
Defendants are entitled to a hearing to refute assumptions the 
Court makes. . The Court should not enter contempt findings or 
judgment in any form. 
The form improperly adds the name Malouf Law Offices in 
Findings No. 1 and 5, and Conclusions 1 and 5. The Court used the 
word "he" in referring to Defendants1 counsel's alleged contempt, 
and any findings or judgment should be limited solely to the 
individual referred to. Plaintiffs are not entitled to 
gratuitously insert the name of the law firm. 
8. DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL HAS BEEN DENIED DUE PROCESS. If the 
11 231 
Court is to make a finding of contempt, the Court is obligated to 
follow the procedures in U.C.A. Sections 78-32-3 and support it by 
an affidavit; Section 78-32-10 and allow a hearing on the issue; 
and Section 78-32-11 and make sure the hearing determines actual 
loss or injury. 
The undersigned believes the Utah Statutes on this civil 
contempt issue have been ignored, and the Court had insufficient 
information to make its decision. No prior rulings have been 
violated by Defendants. No findings or conclusions justify entry 
of a Judgment for contempt. 
9. THIS MATTER SHOULD BE CERTIFIED AS FINAL ORDER. Pursuant 
to U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b) if the Court enters any partial summary 
judgment against the Defendants in this case or on the contempt 
issue, the undersigned respectfully requests that the Court certify 
any order actually entered as a final judgment for this part of the 
case, under Rule 54(b). Defendants request this so they may file 
an immediate appeal,, Multiple parties are involved, but the other 
parties still* involved are not subject to the First Cause of Action 
or the contempt proceeding. 
DATED this Av- day of September, 1988. 
A" ^ ;///{< iklrM^xcf 
Raymond N. Malouf / 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN * 




THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP 
et al., * 
Defendants and * 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs • * 
N. GEORGE DAINES and * 
DAINES & KANE, 
• 
Third Party and 
Counterclaim Defendants. * 
RESPONSE TO OBJECTIVES 
Civil No. 25616 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs' and respond to Defendants' 
objections as follows: 
1. Joint Liability: The form of the judgment tendered now 
requests joint liability only. 
2. Amount Due: The amount due is correct and has 
repeatedly been held correct by the court. 
3. Defendants': Attorney Malouf entered an appearance for 
all the Defendants' with his Amended Answer and Counterclaim. 
All Defendants' are therefore before the court. 
4. Award of Attorneys Fees: The attorneys fees awarded are 
based upon Rule Sanctions they are not based upon the request set 
Number , „T. -,;,.:...;, ^ ; u T , ;,. -:7> 
SEP I 31388 
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forth in the Complaint. Given that the court is proceeding on 
the basis of sanctions it is free to decide sanctions on its own 
basis. The court i^ not is not basing its sanctions on any proof 
of attorney hours or time involved. The order presented has been 
corrected to cl^xify that situation. 
WHEREFORE Plaintiffs' pray that the court deny Defendants' 
remaining objective and enter the order as amended. 
DATED this ^ day of September, 1988. 
DAINES & KANE 
/ 
A / 
A / -.. : 
J .,.
 X ,,.-*., t • II - H I M . I . 1 . 1 ,-l 
/
 N. George Daines 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the , {; day of September, 1988, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO 
OBJECTIONS to tne following: 
Raymond N. Malouf, Jr. 
MALOUF LAW OFFICES 
150 East 200 North, Suite D 
Logan, UT 84321 
^ » h . A t , .\ tfn, f W I km - i . ii. / 
Secretary 
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Raymond N. Malouf/md (#2067) 
MALOUF LAW OFFICES 
Third Party Plaintiffs 
150 East 200 North, Suite D 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone (801) 752-9380 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, 
et al. 
Defendants and Third 
Party Plaintiffs 
vs. 
N. GEORGE DAINES and 
DAINES &. KANE, 
Third Party Counterclaim 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF OBJECTIONS 
TO SECOND PROPOSED 
FINDINGS AND JUDGMENTS, 
AND 
REQUEST FOR FINAL RULING 
Civil No. 25616 
1 
COME NOW the Defendants to this action and give notice of 
their objections to the Second Proposed Findings and Judgments 
mailed September 16, 1988. Plaintiffs made some small changes to 
the proposed forms from nearly identical pleadings previously 
offered. Tjie court already received Defendants' Notice of 
Objections to those proposed findings and judgments. The 
objections, dated September 12, 1988, are still applicable to the 
Second Proposed Findings and Judgments. Rather than repeat the 
arguments, Defendants incorporate those objections by reference 
here, and further respond to the short response of the Plaintiffs 
as follows: 
1. The second proposed form of the findings and judgment 
CD 
replaced the words "joint and several" with "joint", evidencing 
Plaintiffs1 acceptance of Defendants' argument that, since the 
original judgment did not plead or allow judgment to be "joint and 
1 
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several", neither should this one. However, even joint liability 
does not exist because Don A. White, Jr. was not made a party and 
joined in the suit. This is explained fully on pages 3 through 8 
of the September 12, 1988 Notice of Objections. Plaintiffs say the 
Amended Answer was on Don's behalf too, but that is net correct. 
Why it is not correct is explained in point 3 herein. 
2. The amount due is no more correct than it was before. 
The same figures were again used. Plaintiff has not justified 
them. The court has not "repeatedly" held this amount to be 
correct. What the court has repeatedly done, over Defendants1 
objections, is refuse to quash writs of execution on the old and 
prior judgment in amounts in excess of what that judgment allowed. 
That judgment has expired. The renewal judgment form must be 
limited to the actual language of the first judgment, no* writs. 
If the court enters the proposed form of the judgment, it will be 
allowing interest on interest. It will also not be properiy 
crediting the one offset Defendants admit, the $866.47, paid 
December 1, 1982. The proposed judgment still includes no offset 
for the Plaintiffs1 bid of $20,000, plus costs. That issue the 
Plaintiffs propose to resolve by having the court decide it at a 
later date. Obviously, if it needs to be decided at a later date, 
there are disputed questions of fact and law which have not been 
resolved. Summary judgment should not enter if there are disputed 
issues to warrant a trial. Bennion v. Amass 28 Utah 2d 216, 500 
P.2d 512 (1972). The form presented by the Plaintiffs should not 
be used for a renewal judgment. 
3. It is absolutely untrue that an appearance for the 
Defendant Don A. White, Jr. was made or intended by the Amended 
Answer and Counterclaim. Mr. White was never before the court, as 
is shown by the history of the appearances and the pleadings on 
this subject: 
a. The Complaint was filed March 27, 1987; 
b. Raymond N. Malouf filed a Motion to Dismiss and to 
Strike on his own behalf about April 20, 1987; 
2 
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c. May 4, 1987, Von K. Stocking's appearance by counsel 
was accepted by the court ; 
d. May 8. 1987, an entry or appearance for Von K. 
Stocking was made in which he joined in Mr. Malouf's motion; 
e. On the same date, May 8, 1987, "The Defendants 
appearing herein" filed a Reply in Support of Defendants1 Motion 
to Dismiss and to Strike. The reterence to Defendants obviously 
could only be to the two Defendants who had appeared; 
f . An Answer and Counterclaim on behalf of Von Stocking 
and Ray Malouf was filed about July 23, 1987. The Answer began in 
this fashion: 
COME NOW Defendants Von K. Stocking and 
Raymond N. Malouf, Jr., the only Defendants 
who are parties to this action, and reserving 
the right to answer for Don A. White, Jr., if 
and when he becomes a party, answer the 
allegations of the Complaint as follows: 
Among the defenses enumerated in the Answer was the Ninth Defense, 
which alleged Plaintiffs had waived or compromised their claim 
against each of the answering Defendants, either by specific 
agreement to release, operation of law, or latches. There is and 
was no evidence that a Summons had issued to be served on Don A. 
White, Jr, or that Don became a party. 
g. Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint about July 
23, 1987, more than 3 months after the Complaint was filed. The 
lead paragraph said Plaintiffs re-stated their original Complaint 
as the First Cause of Action. They also added additional parties 
as Defendants to a Second and Third Cause of Action. Those parties 
were separately served with Summons, unlike Don White. One of 
those additional parties was Logan Savings and Loan Association. 
h. The Amended Answer and Counterclaim was filed about 
September 23, 1987, after some motions. The lead paragraph and 
answer to the First Cause of Action read as follows: 
3 
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COME NOW Defendants herein, with the 
exception of Logan Savings and Loan, which is 
not represented by the undersigned, and Answer 
the Amended Complaint, Counterclaim and claim 
as follows: 
ANSWER TO FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Defendants incorporate by reference, as 
if fully set forth herein, the Answer and 
Counterclaim 













, Fourth , 
and Ninth 
Defenses set forth therein • 
The original Answer and Counterclaim, which specifically excluded 
Don A. White, Jr. (item "f" above) was preserved. Obviously, 
answering on behalf of all Defendants herein except Lcgan Savings 
and Loan was not the same as an entry of appearance for Don A. 
White, who had not been served. The "Defendants herein'1 did not 
include Don A. White. He was only a potential Defendant to the 
First Cause of Action. The original Answer and Counterclaim was 
not filed on behalf of Don A. White. It specifically made mention 
to the fact that he was not a party, and counsel reserved the right 
answer for him when he became a party, if ever. The Amended 
Complaint did nothing to make him any more a party than he already 
was. Neither did the Amended Answer. Plaintiffs were on notice 
from July 23, 1987, at least, that Don White had not been made a 
party. If they wanted him included, they would have to serve him. 
Plaintiffs have not shown how Don White is a party in this action. 
The Amended Answer to the First Cause of Action incorporates 
language which excludes him by name. He is not a party in this 
action because he has not been served, no entry of appearance was 
made on his behalf, and no answer was made on his behalf. 
Therefore, all of the objections discussed on pages 3 through 
8 in the September 12, 1988 Notice of Objections are still valid. 
The judgment is not against Don White. Because the judgment is 
only joint and not joint and several, and no effort was made to 
join Don White as a party, Plaintiffs waived their claim, elected 
4 
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not to proceed against all obligors, and are not entitled to have 
the judgment entered now. 
4. The attorney's fees proposed have not been justified. 
Plaintiffs have made some changes in the proposed form of the 
judgment. They leave the reference to contempt in, but add 
references to sanctions, sayx*iig the award is being male pursuant 
to Rule 11. The problem with this is two-fold: First, nowhere in 
the August 22, 1988, Memorandum Decision is reference made to Rule 
11 sanctions, The only reference is to contempt. The objections 
already submitted show how the form of the findings and conclusions 
and judgment cannot be justified by Utah statutes on contempt. 
Apparently the Plaintiffs agreed with this, because they have 
gratuitously tried to solve the problem by references to Rule 11. 
Secondly, Rule 11 itself only allows sanctions if "a pleading, 
motion or other paper is signed in violation of the Rule". 
However, the court made no findings that any pleadings were in 
violation of the Rules. Moreover, the sanctions which are allowed 
by Rule 11 include only reasonable expenses incurred because of the 
filing of whatever pleading was involved, and only allow a 
reasonable attorney fee. The decision made by the court was not 
supported by any facts or findings about the reasonableness of 
expenses or attorney's fees. The objections prev.ously made 
September 12, 1988, on pages 8 through 12 are all still very 
correctly taken. No argument against them has been made. The fact 
remains the court made its decision on insufficient information and 
the proposed form of findings and conclusions and judgments should 
not be entered. 
If the court has made repeated findings in the past on the 
issues the Plaintiffs think are so very clear, the Plaintiff ought 
to be able to specifically refer to the analysis the court made. 
Plaintiffs have not provided a reference to any analysis to show 
how a prior judgment, which has expired, can be amended now by 
writs on the prior julgment , which have also expired. There is also 
no reference to any analysis to show why the court's April 24, 1987 
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ruling, (requiring Plaintiffs to enter a partial satisfaction for 
the bid of $20,000, plus costs), should not be followed before a 
judgment is entered. Where is that analysis? If the matter has 
been repeatedly adjudicated, and if the Plaintiffs have complied 
with that, why is the Plaintiff unable to cite the date and name 
of decisions to show all or even some of the "adjudications" and 
to show the reasoning used by the court? The answer is that the 
court was asked by Plaintiffs to accept statements by the 
Plaintiffs about conclusions which were not true. Plaintiffs lack 
evidence that the reasoning has been done in the past. In fact, 
it had not. The proposed findings and conclusions, even as 
changed, still are subject to the objections previously filed and 
should not be entered. 
REQUEST FOR "FINAL RULING" 
5. If the court enters any partial summary judgment against 
the Defendants in this case or on the so called contempt (which the 
Plaintiffs refer to as sanctions), the Defendants who are parties 
respectfully request that the court certify all orders actually 
entered as final judgments for this part of the case under Rule 
54(b). This request is made so Defendants may file an immediate 
appeal. Even though multiple parties are involved, the other 
parties still involved are not subject to the First Cause of Action 
or the contempt proceeding. 
Dated this ty(yday of September, 1988. 
Raymond N. Malouf 
CERTIFICATE OF^gJVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^  day of September/, 1988, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Objections to 
Second Proposed Findings and Judgments, And Request for Final 
Ruling, Civil No. 25616, was mailed, postage prepaid to the 
following: 
N. George Daines, Esq. 
Daines & Kane 
108 North Main <L # * _A 
Logan, Utah 84321 /A L^+~ A ^ o ^ t ^ i ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Secretary 
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